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Foreword
In the new millennium, multiculturalism has significantly declined as a 
policy and social aspiration. While multiculturalism has long been criti-
cized for connoting the mosaic like cohabitation of mutually exclusive 
cultures and communities, it has come under much stronger attack and 
critical scrutiny, particularly since September 11, 2001. Multiculturalism 
is alleged to be nation dividing, a detriment to national unity, and 
harmful to national security. Thus, the denunciation of multicultural-
ism has been accompanied by the intensification of national border 
controls and the reclaiming of national integration; this has resonated 
in a reactionary fashion, further amplifying people’s growing sense of 
anxiety and longing for a secure and peaceful community in which 
to live. However, the demise of multiculturalism has diminished nei-
ther the dynamics of national border crossings nor cultural diversity 
within national borders. The speed and scale of transnational mobility 
and interconnection have become even more intensified. Stuart Hall 
(2000) famously distinguished the “multicultural question” from mul-
ticulturalism, which refers to policy discussion on the management of 
immigration and cultural diversity. An imperative multicultural issue 
we need to engage with is “how people from different cultures, differ-
ent backgrounds, with different languages, different religious beliefs, 
produced by different and highly uneven histories, live together and 
attempt to build a common life while retaining something of their 
‘original identity’” (p. 210). The decline of multiculturalism necessitates 
that we develop better analytical tools and approaches that seriously 
tackle the multicultural question by involving a wider strata of people 
and institutions.
While multiculturalism has come under serious criticism in many 
Western societies, the management of emerging multicultural situa-
tions has come to be officially discussed in East Asian countries such 
as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, though the term multiculturalism is not 
necessarily adopted. In these countries, in addition to long-existing 
racial and ethnic minorities, the rise in the last few decades of labor 
migration and transnational marriage, especially involving people from 
other parts of Asia, has considerably increased the number of foreign-
national residents, migrants, and “mixed race” youth. The multicultural 
question has become a key issue in the Asia-Pacific, though in contrast 
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to Europe and the United States, the experiences of East Asian countries 
pose the intriguing question of how to engage the multicultural ques-
tion in a societies that have not addressed multiculturalism and related 
immigration policy through institutional development at the national 
level. However, while multiculturalism as policy and liberal political 
discourse in the Asian region has recently attracted academic attention, 
the multicultural question remains critically underexplored. 
Multiculturalism and Conflict Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific is a sig-
nificant attempt to fill this lacuna. The innovativeness of this book 
lies in its argumentative structure. The first part presents theoretical 
and conceptual considerations of multiculturalism in a critical man-
ner. Three chapters in this part critically revisit liberal multicultur-
alism and the essentialist conception of culture in the Asia-Pacific 
context. The following part deals with issues pertaining to language 
and education in a multicultural society—some of the most highly 
contested issues in policy. The final part explores in an empirical 
manner various sociocultural issues that migrants encounter and 
negotiate in their moves to host countries. While these three parts 
appear to deal with diverse issues by using different disciplinary 
approaches, they are coherently structured according to the key prin-
ciple of the book: to examine theories, policies, and negotiations in 
pursuit of “interactive and communicative multiculturality,” which 
is constitutive of the formation of the public sphere. Centered on 
this analytical axis, interdisciplinary approaches to various issues 
discussed in these ten chapters are highly complementary with each 
other and effectively constitute the book as a coherent intellectual 
project. The book does not directly deal with issues surrounding 
identity, belonging, and conviviality. However, its key aim has a 
clear resonance with Hall’s argument regarding the multicultural 
question, and the book offers fresh theoretical and empirical insights 
into Hall’s question, derived from the sociohistorical context of the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
People will become more mobile across borders, and cultural diversity 
in the Asia-Pacific region will intensify in the years to come. This will 
exacerbate reactionary movements involving racism and xenophobia, 
which have already been on the rise in the region. How to advance 
dialogue between citizens across sociocultural divides will be a key issue 
for all stakeholders in multicultural societies. Toward this end, further 
interdisciplinary research is required that critically examines how peo-
ple live, negotiate, and interact with each other under the neoliberal 
configurations that administer people’s mobility and cultural diversity 
x Foreword
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Kosuke Shimizu and William S. Bradley
This book is the culmination of research carried out at the Afrasian 
Research Centre at Ryukoku University in Kyoto, the ancient capital 
of Japan. Ryukoku University was established in 1639 as a Buddhist 
educational institution by the Nishihongwanji Temple, the head temple 
of Shin Buddhism, later becoming a university, and is known as one of 
the oldest tertiary educational institutions in Japan. The Centre was 
established in 2005 in conjunction with the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan (MEXT) to facilitate a 
cooperative research body to explore theoretical and pragmatic inquir-
ies into a wide variety of conflicts and confrontations in the Asia-Pacific 
region. The Centre aims to provide analysis and suggestions for pos-
sibilities of conflict resolutions. Research meetings and international 
symposia were held each year for the past three years to discuss and 
exchange information about ongoing conflicts caused by the radical 
changes and expeditious transformations in an increasingly globalizing 
world. What became ever more clear through our meetings and sympo-
sia was the speed of the changes and transitions in the world and the 
power of liberal discourses of globalization, which eventually resulted in 
the alteration to the focus of inquiry. The Centre subsequently shifted 
its focus more to conflict reconciliation and critical engagement with 
specific attention to the current policies, discourses, issues, and lived 
experiences of multiculturalism.
Any conflicts in the contemporary era of globalization, whether 
micro-level conflicts or macro-level confrontations, are intertwined 
with the concepts of difference viewed through the prisms of the over-
arching concepts of culture and civilization. These terms have been 
utilized in many fields in the past several decades. While we can only 
offer a brief overview of two of the fields with which the editors are most 
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knowledgeable (cultural anthropology and international relations), we 
can claim without too much controversy that culture and civilization, 
joined as they are historically, have been threading their way into dis-
cussions of difference, appearing at crucial junctures to create seemingly 
unbridgeable chasms between peoples. This is increasingly evident both 
in media and in everyday use, as well as in social science analyses, like 
some unfinished business of the past returning to remind one, almost in 
a melancholy manner, of the excesses of past misdeeds (Gilroy, 2005). 
Anthropological discussions that blossomed out of the problem of 
“Writing Culture” (Clifford & Marcus, 1986), and the predicament that 
culture presents for ethnographers and others (Clifford, 1988) exposed 
the dilemma of trying to pigeonhole entire peoples under a single unify-
ing term, especially when those doing so were the prominent outsider 
insiders (i.e. anthropologists themselves). However, the complexity of 
what to do about the grand scheme of difference remains. Arguments 
for writing “against culture” (Abu-Lughod, 1991) and suggestions to 
“forget culture” (Brightman, 1995) meant that anthropologists have 
in the last two decades been extremely wary of an overarching culture 
concept unified by the “heroic” narratives derived from hard-earned 
research in the field. While some have suggested that culture can still 
be retained as a reasonable mode of analysis, especially if care is taken 
to avoid overgeneralizing (Brumann, 1999), the penchant for thinking 
against culture as a certifiable category for more than convenience is 
assumed by much contemporary anthropological research.
Civilization discourses, bound together with the pathology of 20th 
century modernity out of control (genocide and racism), have also been 
similarly viewed with scepticism by many social scientists, including in 
detailed treatments in anthropology (Patterson, 1997) and global history 
(Mazlish, 2004). Patterson focused on the (not coincidental) historical 
overlap of Social Darwinism and the discourses of civilization, industry, 
and progress, illustrating how these were instrumental in the “inven-
tion” of barbarian peoples and the ensuing genocidal actions of colonial 
powers in the Americas through the slave trade and wars with native 
peoples. Mazlish traced the first usages of the term “civilization” to Victor 
Mirabeau in 1756 and its link to European colonial ideology—“a racial 
interpretretation of civilization in favour of Europe” (Mazlish, 2004, 
p. 70)—as the 18th century gave way to the 19th century. Nonetheless, 
despite such critiques, both culture and civilization have steadily found 
their way back into common parlance, even for some as synonyms of 
superior models of human development, particularly (but not entirely) 
through reactions to political events after September 2001. Any attempt 
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to analyze, evaluate, and summarize discussions of multiculturalism in 
theory and practice must first set out to deflate some of the aspects of 
the supposedly unifying discourse of cultural commonsense. Then it 
becomes plausible, taking great care to specify the intervening variables 
and conditions, to recognize concept(s) of cultural “difference” against 
the backdrop of a concept of a common human universality of recogni-
tion and tolerance based on rules and norms of international conduct, 
whether or not they are termed public, civil, civilized, or otherwise. It is 
that conundrum that we attempt to address by using conflict reconcilia-
tion in the title of this collection. When we discuss this problem in as 
large a region as the Asia-Pacific, there are bound to be numerous and 
unavoidable problems of particularism which threaten to negate any 
kind of generalizability. Even as earlier work on multiculturalism in 
Asia (Kymlicka & He, 2005) took care to avoid this kind of overgener-
alization by focusing on a thick description of cases in many parts of 
Asia, it cannot be too surprising to find that Asia is occasionally seen to 
represent some kind of counter to European and North American 
models of culture and civilization, here and elsewhere. This may be 
inevitable, but we hope in this volume that we can move beyond such 
reductionist thinking, which has typified much of the discussion that 
revolves around the categories of East and West, to name perhaps the 
most overused and salient simplifying dichotomy. We are additionally 
aware that, by including the term Asia-Pacific in the title, we may be 
eliding a discussion of topics that are mostly focused on Japan with 
areas far and wide. On the other hand, we wish to draw attention to 
the multiple chapters that analyze phenomena related to migration, 
language, and politics in Japan in the Asia-Pacific as well as others that 
are not primarily focused on Japanese people or categories, even if they 
may be related to territorial aspects of Japan.
Turning our attention to political science, and international relations 
in particular, one can say that the overwhelming, one might say exces-
sive, attention paid to Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis 
has been an archetypal representation of increasing academic concern 
for the current state of world affairs and its connection to questions of 
cultural division (Huntington, 1993).
Moreover, as successive publications relating culture and international 
relations show (Barber, 1996; Fukuyama, 1992; Lebow, 2008; Nye, 2004; 
Pettman, 2004), the so-called “cultural turn” in the social sciences more 
generally, and in international relations in particular, has been instru-
mental in helping to understand conflict, reconciliation, and building 
understandings between and across diverse populations in localized 
4 Kosuke Shimizu and William S. Bradley
settings. As a result, a particular way to read multiculturalism as theory 
and a set of policies and programs to transcend the normative state of 
affairs of a world in conflict has come to the fore in the academic world.
In the existing literature of migration studies and international rela-
tions, culture has been often mistakenly treated as the one of the root 
causes of conflict. Jihad versus McWorld (Barber, 1996) and the West 
and the Rest (Scruton, 2002) are cases in point, let alone Huntington’s 
clash of civilizations. Joseph Nye’s excessively state-centered concept 
of “soft power” also provides a good example in which nation-states 
are destined to endless competition with each other by utilizing the 
power of culture (Nye, 2004). What permeates these discourses are 
stereotypically essentialized liberal interpretations of culture and iden-
tity with strict demarcating boundaries of selves vis-à-vis the other. As 
is well known, this interpretation is claimed to be the indispensable 
foundation of contemporary world affairs on the basis of civilizational 
clash (Huntington, 1993). This is apparently important not only 
theoretically, but also for its political implications. In fact, many of 
the discourses of culture and international relations can be read not as 
academic inquiry per se but also as a form of political manifestation of 
US global hegemony (Jones, 2002, p. 227). In this sense, the old saying 
is true that culture is political (Brown, 2006, p. 20), and, in the case of 
international relations, theory is always for someone for some purpose 
(Cox, 1981).
In order to avoid repeating this naïve approach and concluding 
that cultures inherently clash with each other through the process 
of civilizational confrontations, we draw on theoretical perspectives, 
expanding horizons spread across diverse disciplines and research areas 
from micro to macro, from regional studies to international relations, 
from humanities to social sciences, from everyday language to political 
terminology and theoretical conceptions, and from civil society to 
power politics. In order to illustrate this more clearly, we may refer here 
to the Arendtean (following the work of Hannah Arendt) understanding 
of the public. To Arendt, the differences among individuals and the 
existence of the public sphere are intimately intertwined and mutually 
indispensable. Without the public sphere, a society easily falls into the 
hands of totalitarianism (Arendt, 1973). What we are concerned with 
in this research project is similar to what Arendt tried to address. This 
is the way in which we become able to eschew the coercion of politi-
cally and culturally specific interpretations of truth and justice of one 
party onto the others, while at the same time establishing an interac-
tive and communicative public space for reconciliation of conflicts and 
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confrontations in the Asia-Pacific region. This space is characterized 
by interactive and communicative “multiculturality” (an active and 
formed-in-process type of multiculturalism) in the case of the present 
studies. In this manner, it is one that does not stop at cautiously advo-
cating the mere coexistence with those from different cultures, but 
encourages dialog and negotiation among them.
It is precisely at this moment in the second decade of the 21st century 
that we have a firm conviction that the public sphere is indispensable 
in constructing an environment for reconciliation. Yet culture narrowly 
defined in the essentialized way, mainly formulated in the liberal dis-
course of multiculturalism, does not automatically (or, in any final 
sense, authentically) provide a ground for dialog or reconciliation 
among the parties involved in conflict. Here, the concept of interac-
tive and communicative multiculturality comes to the fore as a form 
of the public sphere and appears in a way that holds some relevance 
for transcending the presupposed continuous collision of different 
cultures. However, even in the framing of multiculturalism, it is argued 
by some, the essentialized concept of culture still resides robustly in its 
mainstream discourses (Baumann, 1999; Phillips, 2007).
Accordingly, critical investigation of the widely accepted version 
of liberal multiculturalism with the essentialized concept of culture 
becomes particularly imperative. Continuous acceptance of liberal 
political discourse together with the concomitant interpenetrations of 
capitalism and globalization has appeared to us as a salient assumption 
for promoting the doctrine of mutual exchange among individuals with 
distinctive cultures. Simply put, it claims that we have to be tolerant of 
those who hold different cultural values and norms. However, culture 
in this context becomes problematic, as it is implicitly defined in dis-
tinctively rigid and inflexible terms. No unitary notion of culture in this 
context retains the possibility of changes and transformations through 
encounters and interactions with those who do not possess the same 
values and norms. Wendy Brown succinctly puts it:
When … middle and high schoolers are urged to tolerate one another’s 
race, ethnicity, culture, religion, or sexual orientation, there is no sug-
gestion that the differences at issue, or the identities through which 
these differences are negotiated, have been socially and historically 
constituted and are themselves the effect of power and hegemonic 
norms, or even of certain discourses about race, ethnicity, sexuality, 
and culture. Rather difference itself is what students learn they must 
tolerate. (Brown, 2006, p. 16)
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As a consequence, the multicultural environment in the present context 
on the basis of liberal discourses of tolerance, in Japan as in other parts 
of the world, only constitutes a place in which different cultures merely 
coexist next to each other. This environment occasionally leads to harsh 
and hostile confrontations in the name of identity politics, and turns 
out to be a space which is filled up with the stories of who gets what 
and how. In its barest and most balkanized version of coexistence, it 
becomes merely an aggregation of different and isolated identities and 
cultures. The alleged container of “multi-culture” promotes a display 
of a fixed collection of different cultures, which totally lacks political 
orientation to address the conflicts and confrontations between cultures 
by means of continuous dialog and negotiation.
In the discourse of liberal multiculturalism of tolerance, the wide-
spread inclination of academic discourses to associate each culture 
with the concept of nation-states has been noted. This is particularly 
so in the case of studies in international relations. The main agents of 
interactions and diplomatic relations in contemporary world affairs 
are, needless to say, nation-states. It is often said that the perception 
of international relations as a discipline has been formulated on the 
basis of the assumption of the exclusivity of state sovereignty. As a 
result, world affairs have been described and articulated with the clear 
distinction between inside and outside (Walker, 1993). Under the given 
condition of potential anarchy in the world, where no transcendental 
political bodies or authorities over nation-states exist, individual states 
are destined to compete with each other militarily, politically, and eco-
nomically. This is because all nation-states are assumed to be desperate 
to maintain their sovereignty. This traditional view of international 
relations has been severely criticized recently by researchers and schol-
ars of such heterodox approaches to world affairs as post-structuralism, 
critical theories, gender studies, post-colonialism, and non-Western 
international relations theories (Acharya & Buzan, 2010; Baylis, Smith, & 
Owens, 2011, chapters 8, 10, 11, 12, 16; Shilliam, 2010).
Among those critical approaches, non-Western international relations 
theory is the most recent development. However, despite its initial 
intention to develop and provide new approaches to world affairs, 
many works of this emerging literature have shown little change in 
terms of the concepts and methodologies they employ with regard to 
nation-states (Chen, 2012). The majority of the non-Western inter-
national relations discourse confirms the traditional methodology of 
social science, in which researchers and scholars pursue the notion of 
universal truth in contemporary world affairs. Consequently, they focus 
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on the cores and centers of nation-states, and essentialize them with 
their allegedly distinctive cultures (Shimizu, 2011).
It is here that the concept of culture becomes problematic. While 
culture itself is very much transformative and unstable by definition, 
much of the non-Western international relations literature defines 
culture with pre-given distinctive patterns of thinking and behavior 
accepted and maintained by the nationals of a given place and which 
is assumed to be not observable anywhere else. The reason why much 
of the literature defines culture in such an essentialized manner is its 
methodological and epistemological modernist orientation of scientific 
investigation. Modernism has developed with such concepts as ever-
continuing progress and civilization, and the development becomes 
possible only when it is supported by the accurate comprehension of 
the present (Hamashita, 1994, pp. 2–3). Thus, human progress and 
civilization have inevitably evolved hand in hand with the positivist 
scientific epistemology striving for the transcendent and universal truth. 
Obviously this epistemology assumes the subject/object division, which 
is inflexible in its ontological quality. The result is the static view 
towards the object of inquiry as a “thing,” and the acceptance of a rigid 
concept of culture within liberal multiculturalism can be understood 
according to this line of reasoning.
As this pursuit of the transcendent and universal truth is a distinctive 
characteristic of modern knowledge construction in general, the analysis 
of world affairs with a specific focus on the cores and centers of the world 
mapping, i.e. nation-states, is not confined to international relations. The 
critique of methodological nationalism with regard to social sciences has 
been carried forward by a number of scholars in recent years (Chernilo, 
2006; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002). Area Studies, focusing on the 
East Asian cultural relations, is not an exception either. In the discourse 
of Asian Area Studies, much attention has been paid to explaining inter-
actions among different parties in the region with such essentialized and 
immobile concepts as “Chinese,” “Japanese,” and “Korean” cultures. 
However, this pre-given analytical framework, based on the concept of 
nation-state is, we argue, insufficient for fully comprehending, and thus 
providing a feasible solution for, conflicts and disputes in the Asia Pacific 
region.
Hamashita (1994) contends in this context that the reason why the 
contemporary knowledge structures of social sciences and humani-
ties are unable to sufficiently grasp the issues of East Asian politics is 
due to their ignorance of the margins. Because previous studies have 
analyzed the region only in terms of nation-states and concomitant 
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cultures, they miss the underlying layers of socio-economic and cultural 
interactions and negotiations that profoundly influence the perceptions 
and identities of locals. These margins are not the margins frequently 
deployed by such contemporary academic discourses as critical inter-
national relations, world systems theories, or subaltern studies. While the 
latter generally assume the center–periphery relations, with the specific 
concentric circle regularly denoting the West and the rest, Hamashita 
contends that there are uncountable and ubiquitous concentric circles 
in the world, and thus a margin has multiple centers against which it is 
defined. Utilizing such conceptions is an example of a way to enhance 
approaches to interactive and communicative multiculturality.
Taking into consideration the difference between interactive multi-
culturalism as a political movement striving to establish a public space 
in the region (Alagappa, 2004) and traditional liberal multiculturalism 
as a mere collection of individualized and isolated cultures mainly asso-
ciated with nation-states, we are obliged to ask the question of which 
multiculturalism we are referring to, and with what methodology we 
can formulate an interactive multiculturalism. Accordingly, subsequent 
questions might include: Who are “we” speaking of in reference to 
multiculturalism? In what capacity are “we” entitled to speak of “others’” 
cultures? How does the discourse of multilingualism affect the formation 
of interactive multicultural environments? How do language educa-
tion policies make impacts on the processes of establishing the public 
sphere? Is culture the cause of these myriad types of conflict? What is an 
alternative interpretation of culture that promotes dialog, negotiations, 
and reconciliation among different cultures? Are these supposedly dif-
ferent cultures significantly different anyway?
The current volume is a collection of research and investigations on 
multiculturalism to answer these questions in the search for new and 
alternative ways of comprehending and analyzing multicultural society 
in Japan embedded in the Asia-Pacific. Individual parts of the book deal 
with specific foci on multiculturalism: theories, language, and migra-
tion and citizenship. These sections are somewhat separate at a glance, 
but are deeply intertwined with each other, not only at the theoretical 
level, but at the everyday level of ordinary individuals.
The concrete themes of individual researchers in this volume are 
diverse, with the many approaches representative of the multiplicity 
of disciplines. The methodologies are diverse as well, ranging from 
traditional methodologies, such as empiricist and positivist, to more 
contemporary constructivist, critical, and post-structuralist approaches. 
This diversity reflects our commitment to the idea of the public to 
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represent voices from the margin. In other words, the research program 
for the Centre itself was established in the public sphere of “interactive 
multiculturalism,” where intense, continuing negotiations take place 
between communities and individuals. The authors in this volume have a 
firm conviction, following extended, cooperative research across differ-
ent disciplines on conflict and reconciliation, that dialog, negotiation, 
and reconciliation are the keys to achieving an alternative multicul-
turality. This vision extends to both researchers and ordinary citizens. 
We thus see the present volume as an important contribution to the 
existing literature on multiculturalism.
1.1 Focus of the three sections
1.1.1 Theories and identities
The chapters in Part I focus on theories and identities of critical multi-
culturalism, paying specific attention to the contexts of Asia and Japan. 
While theories of multiculturalism have been increasingly scrutinized 
and challenged from a wide range of perspectives, they continue to 
be used as background and support for understanding policies and 
programs of diversity in societies, not least, for example, in relation to 
language and language policies (Part II) and migration and citizenship 
(Part III). The chapters in Part I focus more generally on society in the 
larger frame, occasionally starting from a national container perspective 
(while calling attention to the porous boundaries), but where possible 
drawing on transnational dimensions. This entails that the various 
chapters come to some critical understanding of processes that tran-
scend the nation-state, as argued above.
As the chapters in Part I show, the definitions of what counts as mul-
ticultural are quite diverse—so much so that another challenge arises in 
deciding if multiculturalism is the primary object of analysis, a cause, 
an outcome, or just one of the many intervening elements. In looking 
at some of the dominant versions of liberal globalization, it had been 
noted that multiculturalism has often become nothing more than a 
marketing technique for multinational corporations to show sensitivity 
in the face of their consumer diversification, or viewed even more criti-
cally as a Disneyfication of difference (Gilroy, 2005). The intermingling 
relationship between nation-states and the global economy makes the 
issue even more complicated. Even if we try to transcend the prevailing 
territorial concepts, we often end up with wider geographical areas such 
as Europe, Asia-Pacific, or the “West.” In this case, a version of multi-
culturalism that is widely accepted is likely to be a multiculturalism of 
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the nation-state based on existing political and economic hegemonies. 
As a consequence, we subconsciously speak of a multiculturalism of a 
particular kind initially formulated for someone for a specific purpose, 
without noticing the embedded bias. Consequently, these chapters 
attempt to critically investigate the current discourse of multicultural-
ism and theorize difference in ways that retain sensitivity to important 
and self-defined differences (by individuals, communities, and wider 
polities inter se). This hopefully ensures the aim of a multiculturalism 
which addresses the idea of the public, in the Arendtean sense, while 
avoiding essentialist and retrogressive understandings of ethnic, racial, 
national, sexual, and class divisions. Thus, what we call for here is multi-
culturalism without pre-given essentialized culture (Phillips, 2007).
While these contributions in Part I cannot serve as some finalized 
theory for the types of empirical analyses of “actually existing” mul-
ticultural policies, programs, and dynamics in both the international 
arena and national societies, they attempt to push past the boundaries 
pre-set by the established discourses of multiculturalism. They explore 
how critical analysis of the multiple levels of changes of heretofore 
(at least nominally) nationally self-contained societies in the 21st century 
can be better formulated. In so doing, they specifically pay attention to 
phenomena in the interstices of what is termed multicultural and that 
mediate between the conceptualization and performance of global and 
local identities.
1.1.2 Language and language policies
Following the theoretical analysis of multiculturalism, the chapters in 
Part II deal with the role of language, language policies, and language 
education in constructing a space for negotiation and dialog among 
those with different cultural backgrounds. The chapters highlight the 
variety in multiculturalism, which deserves thorough attention in and 
through analyzing contemporary society and language. Needless to 
say, languages are regarded as one of the core factors which constitute 
cultures. But the reason why we pay specific attention to languages is 
not confined to this aspect. It also includes the fact that one is forced 
to use language for the expression of whatever arguments one retains 
and develops. No one can avoid using language as far as he or she tries 
to express the judgments and thoughts they come up with. Thus, lan-
guages are continually formulated and reformulated in power relations. 
Or, put more bluntly, languages are always products of certain power 
or power relations (Baumann, 1999). Controlling language not only 
rules and manipulates the means of expression, but also profoundly 
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influences the way in which the contents of thoughts are formulated 
and constituted. This is why we place a special focus on the issue of 
language in comprehending contemporary multiculturalism.
Conflicts focused upon in this section include those from personal-
level friction between individuals in daily life through to national-
level societal problems of the question of English in world politics. 
Many conflicts at the personal and national level can be attributed to 
issues of non-native status in and through language: that is, the fact 
that immigrants are non-native speakers and learners of the language 
publicly spoken in the host country. Such problems arise despite the 
official promotion of immigration policies in the globalized world 
specifically targeted to provide second language education for immi-
grants, with the expectation that they will be enabled to become 
competent and contributing members of the host society. This problem 
is of particular interest in the context of contemporary discourses of 
multiculturalism because it becomes impossible for recent immigrants 
to negotiate with the local community when they are deprived of 
the means of communication and mutual understanding, let alone 
the problem that the language (and thus the concepts and categories 
of negotiation) is by no means set by themselves. The same prob-
lem is detectable in the context of world politics, where, as is well 
known, English has been the main language used in understanding 
contemporary world affairs. An important dimension of this issue is 
the establishment of appropriate language policies as a primary pre-
requisite for the creation of a public space, not only for those who 
have recently immigrated, but also for those who have the responsi-
bility to include them.
By drawing on their critical analysis questioning the current state of 
language, the chapters in Part II reveal, in terms of perceptions towards 
the contemporary world and its relation to language, how language 
influences our intellectual lives and how language has the potential to 
reformulate our views of the world. It also reveals, in terms of language 
education policies, how the results of language education policies in the 
region, particularly in Japan, are by no means matched to the expected 
goals. The contributors in Part II ask the following questions, among 
others. Who are the ideal speakers of the hegemonic language? For 
what purpose are the language norms formulated? How different are the 
recently introduced bilingual education policies in Japan from those of 
multilingualism? What are the consequences of the bilingual education 
policies? What is the ideal language norm which promotes dialog and 
negotiations in multicultural environments?
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1.1.3 Migration and citizenship
After the theory-oriented analysis of multiculturalism in Part I and the 
policy-oriented analysis of language in Part II, the chapters in Part III 
concentrate more on empirical analyses of migration and citizen-
ship. These chapters bring together empirical research studies with a 
particular focus on the dynamics of formal and informal negotiations 
in multicultural settings in Asia and Japan. Such negotiations become 
imperative in light of the intensified movement of people resulting 
from demographic transformations in host countries as well as increas-
ing economic inequalities between sending and receiving countries. 
Furthermore, for the migrants themselves, these negotiations are a vital 
element of their “survival strategies” in the host country.
While Part III focuses on formal negotiations, on which there have 
been some prior studies, it also depicts the implicit and invisible negotia-
tions that take place as people go through their daily activities. This is 
particularly important in the case of migrants who have to make social, 
economic, psychological, mental, and other adjustments and transactions 
as they struggle to survive in the host country’s culture and society. Each 
analysis in Part III contributes to the discussions on the links between 
international migration, citizenship, and multiculturalism by directing 
our attention to existing negotiations.
Culture undeniably plays a key role again in the negotiations between 
the migrants and the stakeholders in the host society (and sometimes even 
parties in the sending society like those left behind by the migrants), either 
as an influencing factor in negotiation or as its consequence. Culture often 
contributes to the outcome of the negotiation through its influence on 
the motivations and strategies of the parties involved on the basis of 
culturally determined notions of language, religion, gender, power, and 
minority identity. Culture also plays a contextual role as the place where 
the interactions and negotiation take place. This means that culture can 
be one of the outcomes. As negotiation progresses and concludes, a new 
“culture” may take shape, or, in some cases, may be “re”-shaped to accom-
modate the other’s culture, as in a “hybrid” form of culture in which the 
identities of both sides are subject to reformulation through dialog. In this 
process, the state of the public, or a type of multiculturality as the space 
of the negotiation, is achieved in which both sides politically agree on a 
more convivial relationship through reconciliation. Seen in this way, some 
contributors to Part III consider the public space as a natural by-product of 
negotiations arising from the international movement of people.
As the number of people moving beyond geographical boundaries 
increases and globalization of economy via trade, investment, and 
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information networks, intensifies, the number of negotiations, which 
are either explicit or implicit, explained or unexplained, and visible or 
invisible, such as those addressed in this section, is expected to increase. 
We consider the discussions in this section to be a base for reference in 
the study of multiculturalism within the context of international migra-
tion and citizenship, and our case studies illustrate negotiations that 
provide the vital links between the phenomena of multiculturalism, 
migration, and citizenship in the era of globalization.
1.1.4 Issues
Following the introduction, Part I starts with William Bradley’s focus on 
multicultural coexistence in Japan. In Chapter 2, Bradley begins with a 
discussion of the discourse of multiculturalism and argues that, given 
that multiculturalism and multicultural policies have been sharply chal-
lenged in many parts of the world in the past decade, discussions about 
what comes after multiculturalism have become more salient. In Japan, 
debates about multiculturalism (tabunka kyōsei) and policies for its 
implementation have been less vociferous and it could be argued that 
there is more support than in many other countries (especially Europe), 
where multiculturalism was at one time more strongly and publicly 
discussed and supported, at least on some levels. His argument starts by 
reviewing some examples of multicultural policy in several urban and 
rural localities in Japan and then moves to a more general discussion of 
the challenges and necessity for immigration policy and recognition of 
diversity in Japanese society.
In Chapter 3 Takumi Honda outlines the discourses of multicultur-
alism in the US regarding immigrants from Japan during the Second 
World War. Honda focuses on the history of Japanese Americans during 
that period and shows that this history constitutes part of the wider 
context of multiculturalism in the US. However, this is not the end of 
the story. There are Japanese Americans who were disregarded in the 
story of multiculturalism in the US because they did not fit into the 
story of what were thought to be good Americans. Honda strives to 
clarify why they have not been brought into the spotlight, and critically 
assesses the current discourse of multiculturalism in the US.
In Chapter 4, Lee Gunderson analyzes multiculturalism related to 
teaching and learning in classrooms that are filled with students who 
have various linguistic and cultural backgrounds. The purpose here is 
to develop a multicultural model that can be argued, contested, dis-
cussed, and possibly observed and tested in classrooms and schools in 
Asia. Most countries in Asia are experiencing an increase in school-age 
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immigrants enrolled in their schools. However, the immigrant enrollment 
varies widely from country to country, area to area, and school to 
school. The potential for inclusion can be estimated by comparing the 
cultural features that immigrants bring to a school with the cultural 
features of the enrolling school (and teachers). Gunderson argues that, 
overall, the absolute percentages of immigrant students in a classroom 
can be hypothesized to roughly predict inclusion/exclusion, along with 
other factors, so that neither a small number nor a very high number of 
immigrants will likely be easily included in a classroom.
Part II begins with Chapter 5, by Kosuke Shimizu, which specifically 
targets the relationship between the English language and international 
relations as an academic discipline. Shimizu starts his argument by 
claiming that the issue of language has received insufficient atten-
tion in contemporary academic circles, partly because of the uncritical 
assumption that language is a transparent device conveying the mean-
ings in the mind of the subject. Shimizu criticizes the widely accepted 
claim that using English is a contradiction in the narratives of the 
Post-Western political theories, because they mistakenly regard English 
as a Western language. Against these prevailing notions of language 
and politics, he conducts a thorough investigation that reveals some 
hidden and unquestioned assumptions underlying the claims, particu-
larly relating to subjectivity. Shimizu strives to criticize this immature 
acceptance of a naive equation of English with the West, and argues 
that English can no longer be seen as a Western-owned language, and 
politics and international relations must be prepared for negotiations 
with hitherto undreamt of grammatical transformations of English in 
order to become more multicultural and more literally an international 
discipline.
In Chapter 6, Toshinobu Nagamine takes up the MEXT’s announce-
ment of a new policy in 2009 to mandate that senior high school English 
teachers conduct all classes in English. He contends that there is no 
doubt that the new policy is adding to the pressure on both preservice 
and inservice teachers. The level of associated anxiety, in addition to the 
level of pressure, might vary among teachers, possibly due to differing 
language abilities, school settings, employment status, teaching beliefs, 
and/or the way teachers perceive realities. Nevertheless, dialog by which 
critical stakeholders (i.e. teachers) can engage with their questions and 
challenges is lacking in the current discourse regarding the development 
and enactment of the new policy. Therefore, a qualitative case study was 
designed and conducted to explore and investigate English teachers’ 
perceptions of the new policy. The study revealed contextualization of 
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realities and issues uniquely recognized and perceived by the participants 
(preservice and inservice EFL teachers). Some implications were proposed 
for policy-makers, administrators, and teacher educators to develop and 
implement language education policy successfully in Asian EFL contexts 
in general and Japanese EFL contexts in particular.
In Chapter 7, Mitsunori Takakuwa contends that in compulsory 
education in Japanese public schools, English education is the de facto 
foreign language education. However, the majority of Japanese peo-
ple can live their daily lives without using English. Rather, there are 
slightly greater chances for them to use other foreign languages, given 
that Japanese society is becoming more diversified with “internal inter-
nationalization.” This is especially the case with teachers at schools in 
which foreign children who do not have knowledge of the Japanese 
language are enrolled. In line with the diversification of Japanese society, 
more effective foreign language education should be implemented, in 
contrast to MEXT’s current policy of bilingualism, through the teach-
ing not only of English but also other foreign languages that Japanese 
people may have a chance to use in Japan, and this may lead Japan to 
become more multicultural.
Part III begins with Chapter 8, in which Rieko Karatani focuses on 
female overseas workers in Britain. She argues that regional regimes 
such as the EU and global regimes such as the UN superficially appear 
to offer hope for female overseas domestic workers (FODWs), yet are 
favorable only to a limited group of women who are willing to accept 
the current dominant “power geometry.” As a result, the lives of FODWs, 
who often end up finding themselves at the bottom of the society of 
their host countries, are fixed and controlled by the two transnational 
regimes in addition to the nation-state. Thus, Karatani argues that the 
benefits of “global householding” in the developed countries are reaped 
at the expense of damage by “global de-householding” in the developing 
countries. In this sense, multicultural environments in the developed 
countries in fact become possible at the cost of stable lives in the deve-
loping world.
In Chapter 9, Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos takes up the issue of con-
temporary migration. She argues that the movement of Filipino nurses 
is profoundly affected by various factors in the host and intermediary 
countries, of which one of the most important factors is multiculturalism 
in the host countries as they consider and migrate to various locations 
in what she terms “stepwise migration.” Carlos examines the state of 
multiculturalism in such host countries as Singapore, the UK, Ireland, 
Australia, and the US, and investigates the extent to which policies based 
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on multiculturalism in these places influence the selection of the final 
destination by immigrants. She clarifies the difficulties of host countries 
in providing stable environments for immigrants, which is particularly 
important for countries facing a shortage of nurses and an aging society. 
She further analyzes attempts to deliver possible alternative policies for 
these new circumstances by paying specific attention to multiculturalism.
In Chapter 10, Shincha Park examines the issue of dual nationality 
in the Asia-Pacific region, with particular attention to South Korea. In 
an age of increasing interaction and migration, the issue of nationality 
is attracting more attention than ever. The issue of dual nationality has 
traditionally been regarded as a problem of and threat to national sove-
reignty, but his analysis reveals that recent policies in the region are 
based on rather different perceptions of dual nationality. In some cases, 
central governments, explicitly or implicitly, promote dual nationality. 
What purpose lies behind the policies? What are the consequences of 
the promotion of dual nationality policies? Who is benefiting from 
the promotion of dual nationality? By answering these questions, Park 
analyzes the different attitudes among countries in the region towards 
the issue of dual nationality, and strives to provide a way to achieve the 
communicative space in the international arena for migrants.
In Chapter 11, Julian Chapple introduces Japan’s “global jinzai” (global 
human resources) policy enthusiastically put forward by MEXT. This is 
an attempt to promote changes in Japanese society to make it become 
more outward-looking. This is because stated goals, such as economic 
development and domestic growth, require Japan to interact on a greater 
scale internationally. However, the global jinzai policy is not free from 
the nationalistic orientation MEXT has been pursuing in the past 150 
years. Sometimes more explicitly, other times less so, such an orientation 
currently resides in the core of this policy, and never fully commits to 
an opening towards cosmopolitan multiculturalism, instead favoring a 
clearly instrumental form. If Japanese society is to embrace multicultural-
ism, Chapple argues, global jinzai offers the potential for and possibilities 
of creating a required social and mental framework for cosmopolitan 
vision. However, in order to achieve this goal, it should be emphasized 
that the policy would need to foster global citizens who are empowered by 
a strong sense of social responsibility from an unbiased global perspective.
1.2 Concluding remarks
As noted at the beginning of this introduction, this volume covers a 
collection of diverse disciplines and research areas on multiculturalism 
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in the Asia-Pacific. The research fields range from migration to language 
and politics. The research methodology also varies according to the 
discipline with which the contributors are familiar and their focus on 
more empirical or theoretical discussion. However, what permeates 
these diverse chapters is the firm conviction that dialog and negotiation 
are the key to providing a reconciliation process for the conflicts and 
confrontations resulting from co-mingling of those with various cul-
tural and historical backgrounds. In order to provide a space in which 
the dialog and negotiation take place, mere tolerance towards other 
peoples with diverse cultures is not enough. Critical insight directed 
toward the concept of culture itself, which is often mistakenly assumed 
to be rigid and inflexible, is additionally required. It is questioning the 
assumption of stable cultural bases that enables us to propose what 
multiculturalism in the 21st century might mean not only to those who 
formulate migration and language policies, but also to those who reside 
in the Asia-Pacific region negotiating between conflict and coexistence 
in the circumstances of an increasingly globalizing world.
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Despite the reasoned claims and detailed research of many social sci-
entists that much of humanity lives in an increasingly multicultural 
world, the ever-present threat of a set of partitions between “us” and 
“them” transnationally (but also within countries), seems certain to 
linger for some years forward. While there is no final answer to the 
question, “Can’t we all just get along?,” so seemingly simplified by 
Rodney King in the aftermath of his beating by Los Angeles police 
in 1991 and subsequent riots (which led to the deaths of more than 
50 people three months later in 1992, when those officers who had bru-
talized him were acquitted of crimes of excessive force (National Public 
Radio, 2008)), the incommensurability on multiple levels of such a plea 
still haunts the supposed naïve proposal of tolerance and respect for 
difference, let alone celebration of diversity, embedded in a normative 
liberal multiculturalism.
In this chapter, I discuss the development of multiculturalism in 
Japan against the background of global retrenchments over and to mul-
ticulturalism, visible as a fragile project. Such a project is set against a 
background of global events that can make theorizing about the future 
of tolerance and respect for difference appear to be embedded in a hope-
lessly optimistic utopian dream at any moment, when periodic renewed 
calls for retribution against the perpetrators of terror attacks, to name 
just one instantiation of a globalized political event that recurs in the 
contemporary post 9/11 world, unfolding at a rapid pace, highlighted 
by targeted drone strikes and invisible communications monitoring, 
and channeled by media spectacularization of cultural difference as the 
prominent causal agent of conflict.
2
Multicultural Coexistence in Japan: 
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The focus of this chapter is multiculturalism in Japan and Asia more 
generally. This is not because Japan is the best or most dynamic exam-
ple of a multicultural society in Asia or even that there are relatively 
straightforward connections between other Asian countries and Japan 
directly linked to multiculturalism. At the conclusion of the chapter, 
I will briefly review a case that has been made that Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan share similar trajectories in multicultural policies and trends, 
despite rather distinct histories and resident groups of minorities. More 
specifically, however, in connection with the global future of multicul-
turalism as a vision of 21st century society, the case of Japan offers some 
corrective to the prominent mainstream discussions of multiculturalism 
which are taking place currently in Europe, North America, Australia, 
and New Zealand. Is Japan belatedly following immigration trends seen 
earlier in other places, or is there something new about Japan’s contri-
bution to multicultural policies and multicultural nation-building? Or 
is Japan simply a late adopter of policies, under duress of demographic 
pressures, which are increasingly under attack elsewhere?
In the first part of the chapter, I place the discussion of multicultural-
ism’s end firmly as a hegemonic Eurocentric discourse. In the second 
part, I turn to a discussion of multiculturalism in Japan. Certainly this 
is an expansive topic, so I will simply point to some exemplary trends in 
Japanese society that suggest that multiculturalism is not moribund, if 
not exactly thriving, requiring a discussion of the need for many kinds 
of qualifications and criticisms: political, economic, and otherwise. 
In terms of sheer numbers, Japan cannot be considered particularly 
diverse by the standards of large immigrant countries such as Canada 
and Australia. Moreover, the diversity that does exist is masked in many 
ways by the presence of large minorities of phenotypically similar 
ethni cities, in particular Chinese and Koreans and indigenous peoples. 
I argue that the Japanese case provides a well-balanced, if tenuous, 
example by which to track the development of multicultural coexist-
ence (in the Japanese phrase tabunka kyōsei) in a large economically 
advanced democratic society of the 21st century. This phrase for the 
understanding of Japanese multicultural society, more widely circu-
lated in the aftermath of the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake of 1995 and 
the cooperation that developed between ethnic communities in Kobe 
(Okano & Tsuneyoshi, 2011; Takezawa, 2008), who came quickly to 
the understanding borne of necessity that mutual aid and coopera-
tion would hasten their survival and recovery efforts, is not without 
its detractors and drawbacks, as I will note below. However, it offers an 
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alternative view to where we, as a human community, find ourselves in 
the 21st century, learning to get along with each other in the world.1 
Japan’s version of multiculturalism, I will argue, has something to sug-
gest not about the end of multiculturalism, but a possible new direction 
for multicultural understanding or post-multicultural coexistence.
2.2 The end of multiculturalism
The idea of the end of multiculturalism has been much discussed in recent 
years, particularly in Europe, where dissatisfaction with the integ ration of 
Muslim minorities has led to a significant backlash against open-ended 
immigration and tolerance (Alexander, 2013).2 Despite this generalized 
reaction to the negative aspects of 30–40 years of multicultural policies, 
there is little agreement as to what should come after it. As Kymlicka 
(2010, p. 97) puts it, “there is a surprising consensus that we are indeed 
in a post-multicultural era,” with near uniform disdain for the reduction-
ism of multiculturalism parodied as the “panoply of customs, traditions, 
music, and cuisine” (also known as the three Cs: customs, celebrations 
and cuisine, or the four Fs: folklore, food, fashion, and festivals). I give a 
further definition of multicultura lism below, but it is important to point 
out from the outset that there are numerous “multiculturalisms,” from 
conservative to liberal to critical, with the versions parodied above by 
the pithy reduction to identifiable characteristic material aspects of foods 
and clothes serving as a shorthand for symbolic multiculti.3
Mishra (2012), writing about why what he calls the “crisis” of liberal 
multiculturalism signals that multiculturalism is a problem itself that 
needs to be continuously redefined, suggests that a key question is the 
incommensurability of the universality of rights clashing with the prob-
lems of what he and others refer to as the politics of redistribution. In 
other words, there is an inherent insolubility to the problem of recogni-
tion versus the political and economic policies that can be promoted to 
facilitate and enhance justice for minorities, especially newcomers who 
more often than not come to a society with little capital—economic 
or social. Either recognition is seen by the politicians, majorities, and 
ordinary citizens of a given community as sufficient in itself, in place 
of solving other pressing problems, or even worse, it leads to a back-
lash among the majority and other communities (including minorities 
themselves) who do not feel they gain (or in some cases fear that they 
will lose their own jobs and positions) from such a form of politics, tied 
as it often is to demands for equal opportunities.
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Within four months of each other at the end of 2010 and the beginning 
of 2011, the prime ministers and president of Europe’s three most 
powerful countries declared multiculturalism a failure. Angela Merkel 
stated that multiculturalism in Germany had “failed utterly,” David 
Cameron argued that in Britain “the doctrine of state multiculturalism” 
had failed to give “a vision of society,” and Nikolas Sarkozy said that 
France had been “too concerned with the identity of the person arriv-
ing and not enough with the identity of the country receiving” them. 
Multiculturalism as a state policy (or set of policies) has been judged by 
many, including these conservative leaders, as a finished affair, and the 
time was ripe for new ways to deal with minorities, who are, it is argued, 
not cooperative enough in adjusting to the society in which they seek to 
live, either temporarily or for the long term. Such blaming of the “other” 
for not fitting in has a long trajectory in conservative European politics, 
intersecting with and growing out of seminal mediated “events” such as 
the Danish cartoon crisis of 2005 and l’affaire du foulard: bans on school-
girls wearing head scarves in France and other countries.4
Multiculturalism has been increasingly attacked by liberal and radical 
critics as well (Kundnani, 2012; Murphy, 2012). It goes without saying 
that a comprehensive term such as multiculturalism has been easily 
critiqued from all corners as it can serve as a proxy for whatever is ailing 
21st century societies and causing lack of solidarity among citizens who 
find themselves less and less able to appeal to so-called common identi-
fiable values. Kivisto (2012, p. 853) writes of the claims of conservative 
multiculturalism critics, “that diversity inevitably undermines a more 
universalistic form of solidarity—that the solidarities of particular groups 
impede or undermine national solidarity.” This implies a zero sum game 
in which people must choose one or the other identity (the particular or 
the national/cosmopolitan/universal), not both, and that there cannot 
be a collective identity that embraces both. But in order to examine this 
question we first need a working definition of multiculturalism.
2.3 Defining multiculturalism
While there are many versions of multiculturalism, from liberal to criti-
cal,5 a prime distinction needs to be made between multiculturalism as 
philosophy and policy (Murphy, 2012, p. 4). Reducing philosophies to 
more concrete foci, Murphy (2012, p. 62) lists the following seven types of 
multicultural arguments: (1) liberal multiculturalism; (2) tolerationist mul-
ticulturalism; (3) the value of cultural diversity; (4) the politics of inclusion; 
(5) deliberative multiculturalism; (6) democratic multiculturalism; and 
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(7) the politics of recognition. Many of these nuanced differences revolve 
around the “classic” liberal question of freedom versus the prevention 
of harm and address central political questions such as equality, accom-
modation of minorities, and social cohesion (Murphy, 2012, pp. 7–9). 
A critique of this type of distinction could be made that that the particu-
lar policy framework and the philosophy on which it is based are not 
always identifiable in a singular fashion. In other words, policies can be 
derived from many sources, problems, ideals, and everything between.
Perhaps a single definition is impossible, but Vertovec (2010) lists the 
many areas of “institutional objectives” that have come to define multi-
cultural policies. These included providing opportunities for group rep-
resentation to local and national government authorities; restructuring 
institutions towards pluralistic public service provision; putting in place 
measures to promote equality, respect, or tolerance, particularly among 
the dominant population towards minorities; and providing resources 
to support continuity of traditions and identities among immigrant 
groups (as opposed to assimilation) (Vertovec, 2010, p. 84).
Another distinction is made by Kymlicka (2010), who argues that 
three patterns related to multiculturalism have emerged in Western 
democracies: (1) new forms of empowerment for indigenous peoples; 
(2) new forms of autonomy for sub-state national groups; and (3) new 
forms of citizenship for immigrants. One repeated question is whether 
these groups with different histories, different aspirations for belonging 
to the mainstream society, and different motivations for seeking recog-
nition should be considered together by policy makers or separately. 
For example, some authors argue that the inclusion of “voluntary” 
immigrants with other groups involves diluting the focus of multicul-
turalism ( Joppke, 2004), leading to hostility and disorder. The rights 
and benefits in many societies obtained by indigenous and sub-state 
national groups have been much greater than those of immigrants, 
partly due to recognition of their “blood sacrifice” in the face of the 
historical hegemony of the dominant national group, as well as inter-
national recognition received from the United Nations (UN) and other 
organizations (Mishra, 2012, pp. 53–54). With regard to Japan, indi-
genous groups have applicability as a category (Zainichi Koreans,6 Ainu, 
and Okinawans) as do immigrants.
Critiques of multiculturalism have often asserted contradictions through 
conflations in theorizing about who and what is multicultural. Modood 
(2007, p. 119) points out five levels of what he refers to as “multi family 
resemblances.” Differences that affect specific policies in specific spatial 
domains (place and time) are: (1) differences between groups (as alluded 
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to above); (2) labeling based on different types of attributes (such as race 
or religion); (3) groups not acting the same; (4) groups having different 
priorities; and (5) individuals within groups differing.
Another key argument used against multiculturalism is to look for the 
most extreme case of minorities’ failure to integrate or even criminal 
misbehavior and suggest that it is sanctioned by multiculturalism itself 
in its emphasis on freedom based on cultural rights, in effect conflat-
ing ideas advocated by some multicultural theories of epistemological 
anti-foundationalism with radical relativism, which is advocated by 
relatively few (Murphy, 2012, p. 24).
Despite the negative reception for multiculturalism recently in aca-
demic and popular discourses, there is an irony in the widespread success 
of multicultural policies (Kymlicka, 2010; Modood, 2012; Vertovec, 2010). 
Thus, even as the leaders and mainstream media of many countries deem 
multicultural policies a failure, the policies, plans, implementation, and 
acceptance of multiculturalism in everyday life continues more or less as 
it did at its high point in the 1990s.
In a different way, multiculturalism has been boosted by the simple 
fact of increased levels of diversity in many countries that have accepted 
immigrants. Not only is immigration increasing,7 but the types of 
immigration and routes are changing, and there is more frequent and 
short-term movement, instead of permanent migration. In addition, 
families with multiple ethnicities, and individuals with multiple and 
hyphenated identities, are also increasing. Vertovec (2010) has proposed 
the term “super-diversity” to describe these developments.
The best that one can conclude at the current juncture about multi-
culturalism is to suggest that it is in a crisis moment. This is inherent in 
recent analysis, using terminology such as “panicked multiculturalism” 
(Noble, 2013) and “ambivalent multiculturalism” (Bygnes, 2012). While 
the immigrant countries of Western Europe and North America (as well 
as Australia and New Zealand) seek to contain their overdone stresses to 
the social fabric and resultant distress over policies that were beneficial 
to their economies at one time, but now require more attention (both 
economic and political), it is not surprising that interest in diversity, 
migration, and multiculturalism would have spread to new places. In 
the next section, I turn to a discussion of Japanese multiculturalism.
2.4 Japan as an exemplar
Japan’s history of accepting immigrants is a long and varied one.8 As 
Oguma (2002) has shown in his well-cited study of the flexibility of 
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inclusivity of “Japanese-ness”, which extended to Taiwanese and Korean 
peoples in the Japanese colonial period, a much more porous image of 
what was a “Japanese” was prevalent than the one that has dominated 
in contemporary Japan as “one nation, one civilization, one language, 
one culture and one race” ( Japan Times, 2005) until recently.9 Similar 
research by Morris-Suzuki (1997, 2006) and others shows the deep 
interconnections with and movements of peoples between the Korean 
peninsula and Japan both over historically long periods of time and in 
the modern era in the periods before and after the Second World War. 
In particular, much of the assumption of a period of little or no immi-
gration during the 35 years after the Second World War (until roughly 
1980) can be challenged as masking what she calls the “invisibility” of 
illegal immigration, along with the growing institutional architecture 
of detention facilities and courts for deportation (Morris-Suzuki, 2006).
The rise of tabunka shugi (multiculturalism) or tabunka kyōsei shakai 
(multicultural existence society)10 can be said to have commenced in the 
1990s as the total number of foreign residents topped one million.11 This 
is not to suggest that activism over the human rights of foreign residents 
(Koreans in particular) in Japan had not existed before this period,12 but 
that a level of consciousness in the wider society was attained following the 
pattern of increased numbers and increased diversity among minorities 
(including foreigners) in Japan in the 1990s. Several years after this, in 
approximately 1995, the number of Japanese residents of Korean nation-
ality dropped for the first time since the end of the war to less than half 
of the total foreign resident population (Tsuneyoshi, 2011, p. 128), and 
has continued to descend to its current total of 530,048, or 26.1% of the 
total number of foreign residents as of 2012, falling behind the number 
of Chinese, who have occupied the top position of total numbers of 
residents in Japan (by nationality) since 2007. This is explained by a 
continuous rate of naturalization of long-term Korean residents since the 
mid-1980s, when Japanese law was changed (roughly 10,000 per year), as 
well as the increasing numbers of new immigrants from China (and else-
where). For the past four years the overall number of foreign residents 
has been decreasing to a total in 2012 of 2,033,658, approximately 1.7% 
of the total population in Japan.13 Much of this decline can be attrib-
uted to that of a single nationality, Brazilians (the third highest national 
group until 2012, when Filipinos surpassed Brazilians for the first time), 
many of whom lost employment opportunities in the economic down-
turn since 2008, while other groups (with the small continuous decline 
in Korean numbers as noted above) have either declined or risen only 
slightly. The number of Chinese residents continued to rise even after 
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2008, reaching a high or 678,391 in 2010, but then declined slightly in 
the subsequent two years. The number of Filipino residents, as of 2012 
registering 202,974, third after Koreans, has risen every year (except 
2004) until 2012, when there was a small decrease. The number of 
Vietnamese has also risen almost every year and even further in 2012 to 
attain the position of the fifth highest at a total of 52,364. Of the top 
11 foreign resident nationalities, eight of them are Asian (the exceptions 
being Brazil, Peru at number six, and the USA at number seven). 
From this brief and necessarily cursory statistical overview, one 
can state two things. First the range and degree of diversity has been 
increasing steadily, illustrating, albeit on a somewhat limited scale, the 
proposition of superdiversity noted above. Notwithstanding the drops 
in overall numbers, the countries involved each have different patterns 
of increases and drops that correspond to historical, economic, and 
social issues that affect ethnic groups differently. This is even more 
apparent when the rates of different prefectures are examined, a discus-
sion which I will bracket due to space limitations. However, the pattern 
of immigration throughout Japan shows a great deal of variation, with 
the percentage of Chinese immigrants largest in Tokyo, Koreans largest 
in Osaka, and Brazilians largest in Aichi. Second, the use of numbers 
of immigrants statistics is deceptive in that if one considers only these 
numbers, much of the growing diversity in Japan in the past two dec-
ades will be overlooked. There are, for example, sizeable populations 
of indigenous minorities, Okinawans and Ainu, as well as increasing 
numbers of individuals who have two ethnicities—for example mixed 
Japanese heritage or hyphenated Japanese.14
While it is also true that some have argued that, phenotypically, 
the majority of non-Japanese in Japan (also including the indigenous 
minority populations) closely resemble Japanese and are often indis-
tinguishable, there is surely an increase in the awareness of Japan as 
a multicultural society. Important edited volumes in English on mul-
ticulturalism in Japan have been published in succession in recent 
years (Graburn, Ertl, & Tierney, 2008; Tsuneyoshi, 2011; Willis & 
Murphy-Shigematsu, 2008; the latter calling its field transnationalism 
as opposed to multiculturalism), each utilizing a wide range of case 
studies to make the case for an increase in multiculturalism as an indis-
putable reality, while reaching varying conclusions about its greater 
acceptance. Certainly there will be a great divergence in this acceptance 
across Japan, as variation will exist with almost no sign of diversity 
in many rural prefectures (but see below for a counter example), and 
much higher diversity in some urbanized areas (up to 20% minority 
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populations in some parts of Shinjuku Ward in Tokyo). This has led at 
least one critic to maintain that the positive recognition and conceptu-
alization of multiculturalism as a “new” reality, albeit based on a policy 
discourse regime that has roots in government initiatives, is a reaction 
by (mostly) foreign scholars to the persistent discourses of Nihonjinron 
in the 1980s and later into the 1990s (Burgess, 2007).15 Many other 
critics have agreed that at the national policy level there is little in the 
way of aggressive support or legislation for multicultural society,16 while 
at the local level there exists, in some places, a growing movement for 
expansion of rights and inclusion of minorities and a concomitant flow 
of policy influence from the local to the national (Flowers, 2012; Green, 
2013; Lovell, 2010; Nakamatsu, 2013). I discuss these trends at greater 
length below.
Other edited publications in Japanese have also been published 
recently foregrounding the concept of tabunka kyōsei (Fujimaki, 2012; 
Kagami, 2013; Satake, 2011), documenting the diversity that exists 
primarily in prefectures in urban areas with the largest concentrations 
of non-Japanese (in absolute numbers and percentage of the total of 
foreign residents, the order is Tokyo, Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Saitama, 
Chiba, Hyogo, and Shizuoka, each with large cities except for Shizuoka, 
which does not have a city larger than one million people).17 Earlier 
publications had used the term tabunka shakai (Ishii & Yamauchi, 1999; 
Komai, 2003). Whether there is now a consistent agreement in the past 
decade on the preferential use of tabunka kyōsei is beyond the scope of 
analysis here. However, Graburn and Ertl (2008, p. 8), point out, as have 
others, that the concept of kyōsei, or coexistence, tends to allow differ-
ences to remain as unsettled and not melded.18 In researching this topic, 
clearly there are valuable studies on many individual minority groups, 
relating their struggles for recognition and equal rights to the theme of 
a multicultural Japan, which due to space limitations I will not review. 
In analyzing the problem of multiculturalism from a holistic and 
comparative perspective, there is a danger that the important details 
that separate different groups are left unstated and underanalyzed. 
Multiculturalism, through its terminology, draws analysis away from 
the specific to the general and categorical. To cite just two compelling 
recent studies, Cotterill (2011) writing about the Ainu19 notes a govern-
ment survey of 23,782 self-acknowledged Ainu in Hokkaido. However, 
the actual numbers are far greater, with many having intermarried with 
other Japanese, many living in metropolitan areas such as Tokyo, and 
a large number becoming more interested in reclaiming some part of 
their long submerged identity, but not necessarily “coming out” to 
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their neighbors, and even in some cases family members. In a similar 
manner, Hankins (2012) in doing research on Buraku20 minorities, sug-
gests a new interest in “authenticity” of identity. One of the strategies 
used is the display of suffering, which exists in a dialectic fashion, i.e. 
by displaying marginalization, one has more authentically “suffered” 
discrimination, which serves to increase pride in self-identification for 
those who are part of the group, but also among affirming groups in 
Japanese society such as progressives, social activists, and others who 
take interest in multiculturalism.
However, persistent doubts remain about the extent to which Japan can 
be considered multicultural in any recognizable sense at all, and similar 
to other countries, mediatized events can produce understandings that 
conflict harshly with the idea of Japan as multicultural. Perhaps it is not 
surprising given the aforementioned politicians’ comments on Japan as 
one nation that the perception exists among some internationally of 
Japan as a “monoethnic” enclave. After Norwegian far-right extremist 
Anders Breivik was arrested for killing 77 people in Norway in July 2011, 
his manifesto of more than 1,500 pages, which he had uploaded to the 
Internet shortly before he carried out his massacre, was examined, and 
numerous references praising both Japan and South Korea as “monocul-
tural” and for having rejected or avoided multiculturalism were discov-
ered ( Japan Probe, 2011; Reuters, 2011).21
On a more serious level are critiques such as Kashiwazaki’s analysis 
that immigrants are incorporated into Japan first and foremost as “for-
eigners,” and not as “ethnic minorities,” or “hyphenated Japanese” 
(2013, p. 32). Given the movement towards greater recognition of 
Japanese national minorities noted above, albeit incremental and still 
in the face of hardships and discrimination, a question that is inevita-
ble is whether, as in Kymlicka’s inclusive definition above, progressive 
thinking about multiculturalism benefits from more generalized inclu-
sion of all minorities (including, but not limited to, sexual minorities, 
victims of environmental disasters, atomic bomb victims, and people 
with disabilities) as opposed to strategic focus that may allow for some 
coalitions, but not one that includes everyone on all issues. It is clear, 
whichever way this question is answered (and it is unlikely that a single 
answer will be appropriate for every context; in other words, multiple 
types of coalitions between minorities are likely to emerge in different 
regions and over different issues), the observation of Htun (2012, p. 19) 
that focus on “diversity and agency within minority groups” means less 
demand and interest for displays of suffering. The younger members 
of minority groups, especially, in contrast to previous generations, feel 
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more entitled to be open about their identity both as minorities and as 
members of a Japanese society moving towards the future, not dwelling 
on past injustices.
At the same time, however, discussion of the lived reality of multicul-
tural consciousness in Japan reveals problematic lacunae that require 
critical attention. First, what is the understanding that the mass of aver-
age Japanese citizens have about Japanese society being multicultural? 
Numerous scholars have suggested that even if a plurality of Japanese 
citizens accept Japan as multicultural, there is still little understand-
ing or acceptance of diversity beyond a division between Japanese and 
foreigners, leading to models of “coexistence” (read as assimilation) in 
the simplest form, between the “Japanese” and the “others” (Graburn & 
Ertl, 2008, p. 4; Ishiwata, 2011; Kashiwazaki, 2013; Nagayoshi, 2011; 
Nagy, 2012; Okano & Tsuneyoshi, 2011, p. 2; Yamamoto, 2012), some-
times as a homogenous group of non-Japanese and sometimes as their 
own ethnic group. In other words, the acceptance of a multicultural 
Japan (i.e. a Japan with a small percentage of resident foreigners), entails 
a reinforcement of the uniform identity of Japanese-ness, which in turn 
serves to exclude foreigners and other minorities as (not more than) 
residents, and not as part of a project for a dynamic and changing mul-
ticultural Japanese identity and society of the 21st century.
In an example of empirical work to investigate such a claim, 
Nagayoshi conducted research utilizing public opinion polls and veri-
fied that acceptance of a Japanese homogeneity coincides with support 
for “endorsement of multiculturalism.” This positive affirmation of 
diversity, however, is coupled with the conclusion that “Japanese people 
regard minorities as just ‘exceptions’ within a culturally homogenous 
society” (2011, p. 574). The question remains, however, what people 
think they are endorsing when they conceptualize multiculturalism, 
operationalized here as government assistance to minorities to “pre-
serve their customs and traditions.” Some critics argue pessimistically 
that this leads to a vision of Japanese society that Morris-Suzuki (2002, 
cited in Nakamatsu, 2013, p. 3) has termed “cosmetic multicultural-
ism,” a discourse that “allows expression of cultural diversity only under 
strict conditions … mak[ing] no demands for changes in the existing 
structure.” Or to follow this binary logic to its concluding point, “the 
positioning of the ‘other’ is always in relation to and as a means of 
further discovering what is Japanese” (Yamamoto, 2012, p. 437). Such 
arguments recall the problem raised by Mishra, at the outset in this 
chapter, that multiculturalism was (and is) always a problem in need of 
redefinition. “‘Multiculturalism’ as theory comes as a challenge to an 
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earlier definition of it as an empirical fact,” in short “cultures were part 
of the nation, without the nation itself sensing the need to theorize itself 
in terms of multiplicity of cultures” (Mishra, 2012, p. 23). The degree 
that this challenge to a prior status quo is now taking place in Japan then 
is open for debate.
Nonetheless, such a critique may underestimate the potential for 
change in consciousness that is occurring among the majority of 
Japanese, particularly young people, not only in their recognition of 
documentation and representations of otherness in Japan, but in rela-
tion to issues of education, political representation, and discriminatory 
practices (elaborated on below). Each of these offers only a starting 
point for discussion and can be framed as much as problems as they are 
hopes for the future. A point that is made clear, however, is that they 
are problems that are mostly dealt with on the local level.
There has been quite a lot of forward movement regarding local 
policy initiatives connected to multiculturalism in Japan, though not 
all of it is readily visible to the ordinary citizen. One reason is that the 
diversity in Japan is localized in some areas and relatively invisible (or 
much less) in other places, mostly (but not only) rural regions. However, 
from the central government’s side, the 2006 Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications (MIC) report, “Research Group concerning the 
Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence,” also triggered discussion about 
implementation at the local society level (chı̄ki shakai). A number of 
researchers have looked at the effect of this national governmental policy 
on local policies. Shortly after the national policy report was produced, 
a letter was sent to local authorities asking them to investigate “guidelines 
and plans for the promotion of multicultural coexistence in keeping 
with the circumstances of their respective regions” (MIC letter cited in 
Aiden, 2011, p. 215). Thereafter (and shortly beforehand in some cases) 
a number of prefectures, cities, and wards made such plans (for example, 
Shinjuku Ward in 2005, Kawasaki City in 2005, Hiroshima City in 2006, 
and many more; see also Nagy, 2012). The original policy document from 
the central government divided the type of help that could be provided 
into four areas: (1) communication (language); (2) lifestyle (housing and 
employment); (3) coexistence systems in local communities (exchange 
and organizations); and (4) a more general coexistence promotion system 
(linkages with business, government and other agencies).
Nagy (2012, p. 5) has described this system critically as a “social inte-
gration system,” an attempt to fill in “gaps” rather than fostering respect 
for diversity, promotion of cultural pride, or encouraging steps towards 
citizenship. Aiden’s (2011) analysis of 22 local “multicultural coexistence 
plans” (MCPs) on the other hand is slightly more optimistic, citing the 
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effect of the MIC document on local governments, urging them to utilize 
cooperation with NGOs, NPOs, and International Exchange Associations 
to further the goals of multicultural policies. Lovell’s (2010) research on 
Nagata Ward (with an estimated 10% minority population) in Kobe argues 
that, indeed, the use of policy drivers (kokusaika or internationalization, 
and tabunka kyōsei) has been important in moving the discussion forward 
and creating policy documentation to address the varying needs of old-
comer and newcomer minority populations. But other research suggests 
that both local staff and NGO workers have relatively low impressions 
of tabunka kyōsei policies and their implementation from the top down 
(Nakamatsu, 2013). They questioned both the lack of ideological support 
and detailed concrete measures. “The government’s sudden adoption of 
a multicultural framework and of the categorization of their work as part 
of this official discourse” was deemed opportunistic and not an attempt 
to “bring about cultural, social and political equality,” exemplified by the 
unfamiliar naming involved in the term kyōsei coupled with the more 
understandable tabunka (Nakamatsu, 2013, p. 11).
Case studies of local area implementation fill in some of the gaps in 
understanding what may (or may not) be taking place with regard to 
action at the local level in various locations in Japan. Flowers’ (2012) 
study of Shinjuku Ward, in particular the town of Ōkubo, which con-
tains up to 20% of non-Japanese residents (many of them Korean) and 
has been renamed an “ethnic town” by the local government, illustrates 
both the active aspects of multicultural policy making on the ground 
and the risks that are concomitant. She describes Ethnic Town Ōkubo 
as “an entertainment destination” for the consumption of culture, e.g. 
food and other ethnic goods.
While urban areas are rightly the predominant focus of multicul-
tural activities, in Japan, as elsewhere, the rising number of foreign 
female spouses in rural areas due to the inability of farming household 
males to be able to find marriageable Japanese women as partners has 
led to tabunka kyōsei centers and support services in prefectures such 
as Yamagata. In addition to language education, the centers provide 
various information about health services, employment, and visas, 
and serve as spaces for socialization for the women, many from the 
Philippines, China, and other Asian countries (Kwak, 2009).
2.5 Three areas of contestation
While there are many other areas worth mentioning in regard to multi-
culturalism and multicultural policy in Japan, including the connec-
tion between integration and employment (Kibe, 2011), immigration 
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reform (Yamamoto, 2012), the relatively “extensive usage” of the term 
“foreigner” as opposed to other terms such as “citizen,” “immigrant,” 
“ethnic,” or “minority,” with the implication of there being impover-
ished models of citizenship opportunity structures (Kashiwazaki, 2013), 
I turn in this section to three critical areas of implementation and con-
testation that will have strong effects on the long-term success (or lack 
thereof) of multiculturalism in Japan. These are (1) education; (2) local 
political participation; and (3) anti-discrimination legal frameworks.
Education and multiculturalism is a well-researched topic and many 
frameworks for understanding different and varied developments have 
been advanced. If one includes the pioneering efforts in both Korean 
and Burakumin communities to promote education for human rights, 
multicultural education can be considered to have a long history in 
Japan. Tai (2007) documents the many nuances of Korean ethnic edu-
cation connected to civil rights, particularly in Osaka City, home to 
the largest number of Koreans in Japan. Koreans’ campaign for ethnic 
classes (which include language, music, history, and other topics) in 
mainstream schools was partly inspired by the notions of “liberation 
education” that had been developed previously by Buraku activists (Tai, 
2007, p. 8). While placing great emphasis on human rights and the 
struggles that have achieved them to date, such education is also some-
what limited by its separation into the majority/minority communities 
(Tsuneyoshi, 2011; see also Okano, 2006).
In contrast, a framework of internationalization for education is used 
for newcomer education (as well as Japanese returnees from abroad). 
Much of this education focuses on Japanese language learning. In 
public schools there is no special budget for teachers who can teach in 
students’ native languages. Research on Brazilian and Peruvian school-
children (many Nikkei22 and some with mixed ethnicity) shows some of 
the problems of education in a multicultural Japan. Moorehead’s (2013) 
examination of the “Amigos Room” at an elementary school in central 
Japan shows that teachers are sometimes unenthusiastic (they are not 
specialized, but chosen to staff the room in rotation) and the room is 
not well supplied and serves not as a place for supplementary Japanese 
language instruction so much as a space for students to overcome their 
feelings of isolation by being with immigrants like themselves.
Next, I turn to local political participation. Kawasaki City in Kanagawa 
Prefecture became the first city in Japan to establish an assembly for 
foreign residents in 1996. This was followed by other cities: Tokyo (1997), 
Kyoto (1998), Mitaka (1999), Atsugi (2002) and others (Green, 2013). 
Kawasaki also became the first city in Japan to abolish the requirement 
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of Japanese citizenship to work for the municipal government. In 2009, 
Kawasaki passed a resolution to allow foreign residents to vote in local 
elections and referenda. Both Kwak (2009) and Green (2013) make a 
strong case for the effect that local policy initiatives have made on the 
larger national policy perspective. “The significance of the foreigners’ 
assembly may be trivialized because of a lack of political power. In real-
ity, however, the activities of the assembly have a meaningful influence 
on decision making through propositions” (Kwak, 2009, p. 173). Even 
in the absence of central government leadership, cities like Kawasaki 
“found it in their interest to try and incorporate their immigrant popu-
lations into the decision making process. What began as a means of 
dialogue with foreign residents in Kawasaki gradually spread through-
out the country, eventually turning into codified local voting rights for 
a variety of cities” (Green, 2013).
Finally, regarding anti-discrimination and legal frameworks, numer-
ous authors have pointed out the lack of such protections in Japan. 
In 2006, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Special 
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance filed a report on his Mission to 
Japan in which he criticized discrimination of both a social-economic 
and political nature. He also “note[d] with concern that there is no 
national legislation that outlaws racial discrimination and provides a 
judicial remedy for the victims” (Diène, 2006). This report was followed 
up in 2010 by another, the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights Special Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights 
of Migrants (Bustamante, 2010), reiterating the lack of legislation to 
“address the persistence of racial discrimination,” especially as related 
to migrants and their difficulties in securing education. Most notable as 
well was the declaration that there was an “overall lack of a comprehen-
sive immigration policy that respects the human rights of migrants and 
ensures their integration into the Japanese society.” This illustrates the 
distance that is still necessary to be traversed toward ensuring durable 
structures that will protect foreign residents not only in good situations 
but bad situations as well. Space precludes lengthy discussion of exam-
ples of recent discriminatory acts directed at minorities, but hate speech 
directed at Korean schools has been slowly increasing ( Japan Times, 
2013). A recent court ruling declared that such rallies were not protected 
by constitutional free speech statutes. Whether the ruling will lead to 
parliamentary action is not clear, but such changes in the law outlawing 
discrimination could certainly do much to address some of the concerns 
of the UN reports cited above.
36 William S. Bradley
On reviewing these three areas of contestation, the conclusion is that 
there are both positive and negative evaluations of the sustained com-
mitment to multiculturalism by the national government and down to 
local levels. As with the previous discussion, which showed that move-
ment in local areas is at the moment more expeditious than in national 
policy areas, these three foci—education, political participation, and 
anti-discrimination legislation—show the most dynamism at the local 
level (particularly with the case of political participation). However, 
here too the story is mixed, since educational opportunities are also 
quite variable depending on the locality.
2.6 East Asian multicultural societies
Comparative work done to assess the level of multicultural policy making 
across national contexts in Asia has shown that Japan has some affinities 
with other East Asian countries, South Korea and Taiwan in particular. 
Both Nagy (2013) and Kim and Oh (2011) found commonalities across 
these three countries, with low fertility rates, increasing but selective 
immigration, and “passive multiculturalism” policies. In contrast to 
the low evaluation for educational policies and anti-discrimination 
legislation, Kim and Oh argue that the mass media representations of 
foreignness vary between assimilationist and some activism in all three 
countries (2011, p. 1575). Watson (2012, p. 99) states about South Korean 
multiculturalism, similar to the critiques regarding homogeneity in 
Japan above, that the core identity of Korean society is maintained along 
ethnic lines, with foreigners simultaneously excluded, but representing 
the diversity of global progress: a “global Korea,” as such.
A more nuanced discussion of the convergences as well as divergences 
of ethnic immigrants (Korea accepting Chinese and Korean-Chinese, 
while Taiwan accepted larger numbers of Indonesians, Vietnamese 
and Thais) would suggest that regional effects of multicultural policy 
making are not insignificant. However, it is clear that multicultural 
policies in East Asia should be examined further in the near future 
with respect to regional policy comparative analysis to break down the 
obsession with borders that hinders the development of more dynamic 
multicultural models.
Miller (2011, p. 808) has written that the “gradations of inclusion 
and exclusion are far more subtle and varied in Asia” and “the bound-
aries between formal and informal rights are often blurred” based on 
less legalistic conceptions. He and Kymlicka (2005, p. 2) wrote about 
Asian multiculturalism that “appeals to international human rights 
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instruments and Western policies of multiculturalism are interspersed 
with appeals to local traditions, national mythologies, regional prac-
tices, and religious practices.” Each of these dimensions would benefit 
from more research, but it is certainly true that just as provincialized 
as Asia is in this statement, so too is the backlash of multiculturalism 
now visible in the so-called West: fierce in certain European contexts, 
while not so apparent in others, like North America. Whether it is 
really Western multiculturalism or Japanese tabunka kyōsei that is 
being appealed to, the point remains that the universality of human 
rights and the local, regional, and national issues that affect their 
acceptance and valorization are contentious, no matter the context. 
Learning from those who have made some contributions to creating 
communities that broaden participation to those beyond only the 
majority in any context is useful for application in other contexts. 
In any case, it can be argued, in the case of these three East Asian 
countries, that there is significant overlap in societal diversification, 
and while there is no universality of multicultural policy, there is at 
least a set of commonalities. At the same time we can note, as above, 
that much of the leeway that has been afforded with regard to local 
policy making has taken place in the absence of robust policy making 
at the national level.
2.7 Conclusion
Do the cases presented by East Asian countries, Japan in particular, as 
have been examined here, lead us to be more optimistic about the pos-
sibility of multiculturalism first of all here in Japan and Asia, but also 
in relation to the rest of the world? Probably that depends on what 
work one expects to be done in the name of multicultural policy and 
to what degree multiculturalism can be removed from limitations of its 
idealistic liberal usage and reduction to tolerance of diversity. Tolerance 
is no doubt a quality with much to offer, but it does little to solve the 
problems of mutual understanding and cooperation that are neces-
sary in communities in many places in Japan. More attention to the 
dimensions of education, political participation and representation, 
and anti-discrimination frameworks and laws are necessary to improve 
the basic conditions of a society for and of tabunka kyōsei. This chapter 
offers no final answer to the question of whether Japan is leading the 
way forward or struggling on its own terms. If anything, I would argue 
that is doing both, and that Japan, never having been definitively mul-
ticultural, can possibly offer a vision of the post-multicultural, but only 
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by squarely facing the problems that it is confronting from increased 
diversity in localized pockets across Japan.
Notes
 1. I acknowledge that recourse to a “common” humanity is always problem-
atic, especially from the perspective of epistemology and that here it is nec-
essary to acknowledge one’s own privilege and position. Mine, in this case, is 
as a Caucasian North American who holds a tenured position in a Japanese 
university. My view of humanity and its struggles is no doubt different from 
those who have suffered multiple and repeated instances of discrimination, 
to problematize the standpoint in just one way.
 2. The contents of the following two sections are derived in part and rewritten 
from a longer version of the argument I have made elsewhere (Bradley, 2013). 
See Alexander (2013) for extended examples of the attacks made on multicul-
turalism by both politicians and academics in Europe in the past decade.
 3. Also spelled multikulti, the term was popularized especially in Germany 
and was referenced in Angela Merkel’s 2010 speech regarding the failure of 
multicultural integrationist policies in Germany. It has been used in English 
to imply a sarcastic stance towards multicultural policies and events.
 4. In France, wearing headscarves resulted in the school expulsions of three 
girls in 1989 and 23 girls in 1996.
 5. According to May and Sleeter (2010, p. 3), critical multiculturalism differs 
from the liberal varieties by systematically accounting for “structural inequal-
ities, such as racism, institutionalized poverty and discrimination” in contrast 
to emphasizing liberal multiculturalism’s “politically muted discourses” of 
“culture and cultural recognition.”
 6. Zainichi refers to “residents,” and has been used often for “oldcomer” 
Koreans (but also some Chinese and others) whose families have been in 
Japan for three to five (or even six) generations.
 7. Modood (2012, p. 19) estimates that in most of the largest cities in northwest 
Europe the population is 20–35 percent non-European; many cities in North 
America have large percentages of immigrant populations, with Toronto and 
Miami, for example, both around or exceeding 50%.
 8. The terminology of “oldcomers,” consisting mostly of Koreans, and “new-
comers,” consisting of many other nationalities, is not uniform. I use 
“foreign resident” and “immigrant” interchangeably in this chapter, using 
the former to emphasize long-term status (particularly of Koreans, many of 
whom are long-term residents and non-citizens in Japan) and the latter to 
emphasize the evolving and changing nature of many foreigners’ stays in 
Japan from temporary to settled and finally permanent.
 9. This quote is attributed to former Prime Minister Aso Taro, at a time when he 
served as Minister of Internal Affairs in Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s 
cabinet and gave a speech at the opening of the Kyushu National Museum in 
Daizufu, Fukuoka. This is but one of a series of similar comments in the last 
several decades by cabinet ministers regarding the homogeneity of Japanese 
ethnicity.
10. I discuss these terms at length below.
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11. Statistics in this section are derived from the Japanese Ministry of Justice 
homepage statistics; Ministry of Justice 2013 and previous years).
12. A notable example was the decade long resistance against fingerprinting 
begun in 1980 and ended in 1991. For some of the history of Korean human 
rights movements, especially in relation to Korean ethnic education, see 
Okano (2006) and Tai (2007).
13. An exact percentage is hard to derive, given the discrepancies in counting 
who is foreign or not. See also footnote 8.
14. Japanese law does not allow dual citizenship, so there are many Japanese 
(exact numbers unknown) who might be considered as having multicultural 
backgrounds due to a parent of non-Japanese nationality. The term haafu is 
sometimes used for such individuals, but is controversial for several reasons. 
First, it is used mostly for those of half European and half Japanese ethnicity, 
and second because some suggest that it implies a less than whole identity.
15. Nihonjinron are theories of Japan and Japaneseness and have been critiqued 
by many for their cultural exclusivity.
16. This claim is sometimes made, policy documents notwithstanding, such as 
the 2006 Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) report, 
“Research Group concerning the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence,” 
detailed below.
17. Shizuoka has large concentrations of Brazilians who emigrated to jobs in the 
auto industries and factories in smaller cities such as Hamamatsu; the only 
city of more than a million residents in a prefecture not in this list is Sapporo 
in Hokkaido (Ministry of Justice, 2013). See also Hirasawa (2009).
18. The term tabunka kyōsei is widely attributed to origins in discussions of 
biological phenomena in phrases like shizen to kyōsei: coexistence with the 
environment. According to Lovell (2010, p. 5) some have translated it as “mul-
ticultural symbiosis” or “symbiotic multiculturalism,” maintaining the bio-
logical roots. He also writes of the phrase tomo ni ikiru (living together) which 
was used from 1965 onwards by the Japanese government in commitments to 
improving civil rights for resident Koreans. Chapman (2006, pp. 98–99) also 
describes the use of tabunka kyōsei for disparate groups such as children with 
disabilities and to address gender inequities. According to Hirasawa (2009, 
p. 165) the term tabunka kyōsei was used by a policy document in Kawasaki 
City in 1993 for the first time. Nakamatsu (2013, p. 5) also cites 1993 as the 
first newspaper mention but in relation to development education. Some have 
argued that tabunka shakai is a more sociological and inclusive term.
19. Ainu people, whose origin was in northern Japan and Hokkaido, were 
acknowledged as an indigenous people by the Japanese government in 2008 
(unlike Okinawans who have not been formally recognized). They have also 
used the name Utari to refer to themselves.
20. Buraku, or more formally Hisabetsu Burakumin (people of the hamlet subject 
to discrimination; a discrimination based on ancestry, dating from the Edo 
Period, 1603–1868, in which a caste system was prevalent in Japan, which is 
now illegal) are non-identifiable by names or physical characteristics. They 
number from 2 to 3 million, and similar to the previous discussion of Ainu, 
it is difficult to arrive at an exact figure due to stigma of self-identification 
and intermarriage. However in recent years, a number of well-known politi-
cians and public figures have made their Buraku background open.
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21. In preparing this chapter, I was able to find Breivik’s manifesto online. 
I deliberately chose not to cite it, so as not to give further publicity to a racist 
polemic. However, it is instructive in that he clearly believes that the East 
Asian countries ( Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) have achieved their suc-
cesses through maintaining traditional societal patterns of monoethnicity 
and patriarchal relations.
22. Nikkei refer to people with Japanese ethnic heritage who have settled 
predominantly in North and South America, a number of whom returned 
to Japan in the last 20 years. A number of them were forced to leave after 
the economic downturn of 2008, in some cases receiving money from the 
Japanese government for repatriation, stipulating that they would not return 
to Japan for a minimum of three years.
References
Aiden, H. S. (2011). Creating the “multicultural coexistence” society: Central 
and local government policies towards foreign residents in Japan. Social Science 
Japan Journal, 14(2), 213–231.
Alexander, J. C. (2013). Struggling over the mode of incorporation: Backlash 
against multiculturalism in Europe. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36(4), 531–556.
Bradley, W. S. (2013). Is there a post-multiculturalism? Afrasia working paper series: 
Studies on multicultural societies, 19. Shiga: Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku 
University.
Burgess, C. (2007). Multicultural Japan? Discourse and the “myth” of homoge-
neity. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Retrieved from http://japanfocus.
org/-Chris-Burgess/2389.
Bustamante, J. (2010). Report of the special rapporteur on the human rights of 
migrants, Jorge Bustamante: Enjoyment of the rights to health and adequate housing 
by migrants (A/HRC/14/30). New York: United Nations Human Rights Council.
Bygnes, S. (2012). Ambivalent multiculturalism. Sociology, 47(1), 126–141. 
Chapman, D. (2006). Discourses of multicultural coexistence (tabunka kyōsei) 
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A Critical Analysis of 
Multiculturalism and Deviant 




What part have Japanese immigrants played in multiculturalism in 
America? How have such immigrants been described in the prevailing 
multicultural discourse? In recent years, discussions of multiculturalism 
and Japanese immigrants are increasingly attracting more attention. 
In fact, Japanese immigrants are now regularly mentioned in American 
history textbooks as representative “good Americans.” This suggests 
that Japanese immigrants have become an integral part of multi-
cultural education in the US. However, the history and identity of 
Japanese immigrants described in these discussions and textbooks do 
not completely cover the stories of Japanese immigrants in America, 
especially those who were marginalized and forced to struggle to main-
tain their distinctive identities. Those aspects of Japanese immigrants 
depicted in the established discourse of history and identity present 
only one model for Japanese immigrants. When the immigrants 
crossed national borders, they encountered complicated struggles 
over their own identities. How should such a struggle be understood? 
What does this understanding mean to the contemporary literature of 
multiculturalism?
In order to address these questions, this chapter starts by focusing 
on how Japanese immigrants have been described in conventional 
discourses of American multiculturalism. Second, I will pay specific 
attention to people who have been heretofore barely described in the 
traditional history of Japanese immigrants. Third, I will examine the sig-
nificant influence that conventional multiculturalism discourses have 
exerted on the omission of particular types of Japanese immigrants, 
OPEN
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with a focus on the concepts of “tolerance” and “integration.” This will 
be followed by brief concluding remarks.
3.2 Mainstream discourses regarding multiculturalism 
and Japanese immigrants in America today
The issue of migration is, needless to say, important for understanding 
modern society. The global flow of people is obviously a major concern of 
policy makers as well as scholars of international affairs. In America, after 
9/11, multiculturalism, which is deeply tied to the image of “tolerance” 
in the minds of Americans, is actually spurring disputes in the inter-
national community. While many of the discourses of multiculturalism 
straightforwardly promote tolerance and acceptance of other cultures, 
some argue that such discourses only result in concealing the violence 
that certainly continues to this day (Yoneyama, 2003, p. 223). This is 
also the case in the context of Japanese immigrants in the US. What 
has been described as the history of Japanese immigrants continues 
to exclude and marginalize particular identities from the legitimate 
history. Behind a series of such descriptions of Japanese immigrants 
has always been a politics habitually controlled by the majority. The 
repetition of such a description in classrooms and everyday conversa-
tions leads to the continuous exclusion of those do not fit the ideal 
immigrant figure of multicultural discourse. Multiculturalism in this 
sense has performed its function of absorbing Japanese Americans and 
other ethnic groups into the “multiculturalism” framework by estab-
lishing certain models of “good Americans,” and often ended up by 
homogenizing them into the unified idea of patriotic citizens (Grant & 
Sleeter, 2009).
In America in the latter half of the 1980s, a new concept of “diver-
sity” began to be widely referenced, and the concept of “multicul-
turalism” subsequently began to be discussed intensively. The word 
“multiculturalism,” with a concomitant concept of tolerance, was 
derived from America’s efforts to promote a change in the majority’s 
conventional public awareness of minorities (Inoue, 1999, p. 88). It 
has often been said that this type of multiculturalism was the result of 
identity politics primarily developed by African Americans and Asian 
Americans in order to protest discriminatory structures in the US (Tai, 
1999, p. 38). Initially, multicultural movements strived to create a 
multicultural society by embracing all minority ethnic groups and cul-
tures. However, multiculturalism is said to have begun performing the 
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role of concealing the political and economic gap between minority 
groups and cultural diversity within a minority group (Gordon & 
Newfield, 1996). Sub sequently, it was often said that the discourse 
of multiculturalism only functions to integrate such people into the 
framework of the pre-given “multi-cultural,” creating an impression 
of tolerance presumably residing in the minds of the majority. In this 
way, multiculturalism began to be used as a theory of national inte-
gration (Yui & Endo, 1999).1
In the 1990s, multiculturalism became even more visible. This con-
cept continues to be welcomed widely in the US even now. Discussion 
of multiculturalism is particularly active at educational institutions, 
higher educational institutions in particular, where ethnic groups with 
different roots are actively featured in classrooms as a part of the history 
of multicultural America. Multiculturalism is, therefore, still believed to 
represent an imperative and indispensable aspect of America that com-
prises a wide variety of cultures (Hollinger, 1995, p. 150).
The cases where Japanese immigrants are utilized by mainstream 
multicultural discourse in America often emphasize the collapse of 
their identity resulting from compulsory confinement during the 
Second World War, and regularly refer to the reconstruction of their 
identity as Japanese American with the victory of the compensation 
movement in the post-war period. Although textbooks feature Japanese 
immigrants as a part of the success of multiculturalist policies in the 
US, they ignore the complicated, multi-layered, and diverse experiences 
of Japanese immigrants. In fact, multicultural education often fails to 
focus on the identity of Japanese immigrants during the period from 
their first arrival in the US to their compulsory confinement (Petersen, 
1971). In order to clarify this point, it is necessary to review the aca-
demic research previously conducted on Japanese immigrants, and 
compare this with the narratives of those who were marginalized and 
the movements continuously protesting against the established social 
structure.
The period from Japanese immigrants’ first arrival in the US until 
their confinement in the camps was essentially characterized by the dis-
criminatory sentiment they encountered. In the receiving society, the 
government and the majority usually strive to integrate minorities into 
the established rules and norms of the society, as well as maintain and 
expand their social merits and privileges. If the majority in the receiving 
society finds no difference between themselves and immigrants, and if 
the majority shares a mutual interest with them, the immigrants are 
easily accepted into the society. This type of integration is often related 
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to the interest not only of the receiving society, but also of those who 
are accepted (Muller, 2001, pp. 17–40).
However, the first generation of Japanese immigrants had a different 
story and experienced many difficulties. It is impossible to explain these 
difficulties with only the simple understanding of multiculturalism that 
insists that they were eventually able to reclaim their identity as Americans 
because of the success of the compensation movement (Okamoto, 2005, 
p. 74). Their struggle largely emanated from the “shaking” of their iden-
tity, especially from the time of their arrival in the US in 1900 until 1945. 
Although they are “accepted” in multicultural American society today, it is 
impossible for them to erase their complicated experiences and memories 
from that period.
Sakaguchi (2001) contends that the period during which the iden-
tity of Japanese immigrants was transformed can be divided into three 
periods: (1) from the 1900s, when they first migrated, to the 1920s, 
when they “did not care that they were Japanese”; (2) from the 1920s 
to the 1930s, when they were “half-Japanese”; and (3) the period after 
the 1930s, when they had to identify themselves as either Japanese 
or American. In this way, Japanese immigrants continually sought an 
identity that could bridge the two conflicting nations for approximately 
45 years (Sakaguchi, 2001, pp. 17–42).
The selection of a nation, Japan or the US, that Japanese immigrants 
in America were forced to identify themselves with successfully led some 
of them to reside in harmony with fellow Americans, but left others with 
an unbearable contradiction and unforgettable experiences. This was 
partly because, regardless of the result of their selection, the structure of 
the society of Japanese immigrants was profoundly, sometime uncontrol-
lably, influenced by the national interests of the US and Japan, and thus 
influenced by their diplomatic relations. One of America’s true goals was 
securing its national interests. It might be natural that when a national 
interest is tied to the loyalty of immigrants, the immigrants are induced 
to transform their identities into something that confirms the prevailing 
order of their living environment and demonstrates their loyalty to the 
receiving country. In reality, an uncountable number of Japanese immi-
grants followed this path toward acceptance in America (Muller, 2007, 
pp. 73–82). However, the influence of the diplomatic relationship bet-
ween Japan and the US became particularly salient for Japanese immi-
grants when it deteriorated before and during the Second World War. At 
that time, neither government showed any interest in the immigrants’ 
decisions about the nation to which they demonstrated their loyalty. Even 
if the immigrants demonstrated their loyalty to Japan, with a firm belief 
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that they were Japanese, the Japanese government did not make any real 
efforts to improve the living conditions of Japanese Americans isolated in 
the US. Similarly, when they demonstrated their loyalty to America, the 
US government did not try to respectfully accommodate them or improve 
their living environment either. Consequently, Japanese immigrants had 
no choice other than being held in concentration camps from the begin-
ning of the war between Japan and the US (Hayashi, 2004, pp. 76–81).
This analysis of Japanese immigrants’ history in the US varies signifi-
cantly from what has been told in the context of contemporary American 
multiculturalism. The history of Japanese immigrants in the widely 
accepted discourse of multiculturalism usually concentrates on their suc-
cessful identity transformation during the period from their compulsory 
confinement to the compensation movement, and scarcely mentions 
the fact that American society during those 45 years was characterized 
by widespread political, economic, and social oppression of Japanese 
immigrants, of which the compulsory confinement was just an ultimate 
consequence (Togami, 1986, p. 319). The mainstream discourse of mul-
ticulturalism in the US ignores these historical complexities and only 
emphasizes the compulsory confinement and victorious compensation 
campaign by Japanese immigrants after the war, which presumably led 
them to transform their identities successfully. In a way, multiculturalism 
only touches upon the history of Japanese immigrants in order to recognize 
and share their story of loyalty and successive contribution to America.
The reason why American multiculturalism discourses deal with the 
compulsory confinement and the compensation movement, and rec-
ognize the loyalty and contribution of some Japanese immigrants, is to 
promote the integration of minority ethnic groups in America (Morimo, 
1999, pp. 175–180). In other words, the compulsory confinement and 
compensation movement of the Japanese immigrants are described only 
in the context of “loyalty” and “contribution.” What is missing in this 
context is the exclusion of those who did not fit the ideal figure of the 
successful immigrant. Those who have not been described in the history 
are those who did not demonstrate their loyalty to America, who were 
consequently excluded from the social structures of both America and 
Japan, and who continuously experienced the “shaking” of their identi-
ties even after the success story of Japanese immigrants prevailed.
3.3 Narratives of Japanese immigrants
According to Creswell (2013, p. 13), there are five major research 
designs that are typically found in a qualitative approach. The first, 
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phenomenological research, is a design of inquiry in which the researcher 
describes the lived experiences of individuals in relation to a phenomenon 
and as they are described by the participants. This description culminates 
with a description of the essence of the experiences for several individu-
als who have all experienced the phenomena (Giorgi, 2009; Moustakas, 
1994). The second, grounded theory, is a design of inquiry from sociology 
in which the researcher derives a general, abstract theory of a process, 
action, or interaction grounded in the views of participants (Charmaz, 
2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2007). Ethnography, the third type, is a design of 
inquiry coming from anthropology and sociology in which the researcher 
studies the shared patterns of behaviors, language, and actions of an intact 
cultural group in a natural setting over a prolonged period time (Creswell, 
2013). The fourth type, case studies, are a design of inquiry found in many 
fields, especially evaluation, in which the researcher develops an in-depth 
analysis of a case, often a program, event, or activity, and researchers then 
collect detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures 
over a sustained period of time (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009, 2012). Narrative 
research, the final design of inquiry, comes from the humanities and 
features researchers who study the lives of individuals and ask one or 
more individuals to provide stories about their lives (Riessman, 2008). 
This information is then often retold and re-storied by the researcher into 
a narrative chronology. Often, in the end, the narrative combines views 
from the participant’s life with those of the researcher’s life in a collabora-
tive narrative (Clandinin & Connelly, 2000).
In order to research the “shaking” of the identities of Japanese 
immigrants in this thesis, I conducted oral and written interviews 
using the methodology of qualitative narrative research with 15 
second-generation Japanese Americans in January 2009.2 For this nar-
rative approach, the interviewer sought to examine issues related to 
the oppression of individuals. To study this, stories were collected of 
individual oppression using a narrative approach (Creswell, 2013). 
Interviewees were interviewed at some length to determine how they 
have personally experienced oppression. Interviewees were selected for 
whom the interview could increase the opportunity “to identify emerg-
ing themes” (Erlandson et al., 1993, p. 82) embedded in the interview’s 
context. Along with this research, recorded data were segmented in 
consideration of every utterance’s meaning and subtle nuance. Thus, 
in the analysis of the data, the information was so dense and rich that 
the inquiry needed to “winnow” the data (Guest Macqueen & Namey, 
2012), a process of focusing in on some of the data and disregard-
ing other parts of it. Narrative interviews were conducted through 
50 Takumi Honda
an unstructured, open-ended format and the interviewer took notes 
during the interview.
The interviews focused on events related to conscription during the 
Second World War, which is often described as a constitutive part of the 
successful history of multiculturalism policy in America. This history 
regularly treats Japanese immigrants as a positive, and more or less idea-
lized, model of minority groups, with a particular focus on such events 
as “compulsory confinement” and “conscription of second-generation 
Japanese Americans,” as well as “the compensation movement,” which 
presumably led to the successful transformation of their identities. With 
these examples, the discourse of multiculturalism frequently associ-
ates stories of “the collapse of the identity,” “loyalty to America,” and 
“the reconstruction of the identity,” in order to present the image of 
Japanese immigrants as a model of “good citizens” (Japanese American 
Citizens League, 1996).
As a consequence of the compensation movement, the US govern-
ment granted prominent recognition to the excellent performance of the 
442nd Regimental Combat Team in Europe.3 The excellent performance 
of the combat team was treated as evidence of the Japanese immigrants’ 
loyalty to the US as Americans. Actually, their performance is still widely 
remembered among Japanese immigrants, and a monument ceremony 
for the 442nd team in Washington was organized by Japanese immigrant 
organizations from across the US in 2001 (Befu, 2002, p. 235).
In the context of the mainstream discourse of multiculturalism 
and the majority of Japanese immigrants, the victory achieved by the 
compensation movement meant the acceptance of Japanese immi-
grants. However, it is difficult to tell whether all Japanese immigrants 
believe that this understanding is reasonable. In fact, Interviewee A, 
a second-generation Japanese American, has a negative perception of this 
belief. In addition, Interviewee B, another second-generation Japanese 
American, indicates that the reason why he served in the military did 
not stem from loyalty to America but from something else. Why do they 
have a different interpretation of the history of Japanese immigrants? 
What lies behind their distinctive comprehension of the compensation 
movement?
Interviewee A, a second-generation Japanese American, was born in 
Sacramento, California. He was taken to a concentration camp when he 
was 14 years old. His parents, first-generation Japanese Americans, did 
not have American citizenship because of the act concerning “aliens 
ineligible for citizenship.” Based in California, he currently visits vari-
ous schools and other facilities in America to present materials and talk 
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about what the compulsory confinement really meant to him. Through 
these actions, he expresses his identity to the public. The reason why he 
attracts our attention here is that his identity was not exclusively deter-
mined by nationality. He was a model for The No-No Boys, by Teresa 
Funke (2008). Although this book is a fictional work, it deals with the 
actual issue of Japanese Americans’ struggle for their identity.
He chose to become one of the “No-No Boys,” who demonstrated no 
loyalty to America and refused to serve in the US armed forces.4 This 
choice caused him to be sent to the Tule Lake Camp, which was famous, 
or infamous, for having the severest surveillance in the US. The Tule 
Lake camp was a specific facility for those who did not demonstrate 
their loyalty to America, and for those who were subject to investigation 
by the FBI. It is said that approximately 18,000 prisoners were held in 
the Tule Lake Camp, under constant armed surveillance.
Interviewee A talks about the compulsory confinement of Japanese 
immigrants and their conscription as follows (“[ ]” signifies information 
added by the researcher):
In America, many people call where I used to be held a “relocation 
camp,” rather than a “concentration camp.” However, based on our 
understanding, we call it not a relocation camp, but a “jail” or a 
“concentration camp.” We were deprived of our homes, land, stores, 
jobs, and everything. Nevertheless, it is called a “relocation camp.” 
We feel upset about it. It was a concentration camp without any 
doubt. Not serving in the military, we had no national identity. We 
did not know who we were or where we could go. And what was 
waiting for us, those who did not serve in the military, was deten-
tion by the FBI, or repatriation to Japan, or life-long imprisonment 
at Tule Lake. Meanwhile, I was grateful that I was able to work in the 
camp as a time-keeper, a cook, a cleaner, and so on. Although the 
payment was low, it was still good to have a job. Also, I was able to 
go to school and play sports. That was something to be grateful for, 
but people around me and I thought that we would be killed if Japan 
won the war. That kind of anxiety was always with us in the life at 
the camp. Of course, there was no way of knowing about the progress 
of the war. We lived our lives at the camp without knowing what was 
going on. As for the 442nd Team, I, from the perspective of [being a 
member of] the No-No Boys, have a complicated feeling. Not all the 
team members who did a good job in the European battlefields dem-
onstrated their loyalty to America. There has always been a political 
use [of the history of Japanese immigrants].
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Interviewee A’s comments reveal that second-generation Japanese 
Americans taken to the camps in those days were given only two 
choices: (1) become a No-No Boy, which would result in either arrest, 
repatriation to Japan, or life at the Tule Lake Camp, or (2) serve in the 
military and achieve great performance on the battlefield, which means 
in this context the 442nd Team.
Based on his own experience, Interviewee A talks about the compul-
sory confinement and conscription. Interviewee B, another No-No boy, 
also touches upon the compulsory confinement and conscription. But 
he goes further to mention the discrimination and exclusion that he 
experienced after leaving the camp.
Interviewee B was born in Portland, Oregon. He is a second-generation 
Japanese American, with American citizenship. Since his mother died 
when he was young, his father made him go back to Japan, where his 
grandparents lived, but he returned to the US in 1934. Although in the 
interview he tried not to provide actual details of the compulsory con-
finement, he explained the exclusion that he had gone through and his 
agony toward it as follows:
I was born in Portland. But since my mother died while I was still 
young, my grandparents living in Japan educated me. In 1934, 
when I was a third-grade student at elementary school, I returned 
to America. That’s why I speak Japanese better than I speak English. 
Due to the economic downturn [in America] in 1929, I had difficulty 
finding a job. Since there was terrible economic aggravation and a 
horrific anti-Japanese attitude at companies run by white Americans, 
I worked for a Japanese trading company called “Furuya Shoten.” 
The pay was very low. I married my wife before we were sent to a 
concentration camp. I still feel frustrated that even though we had 
American citizenship, we were held in the concentration camp. 
When we were in the camp in Portland, we had our first baby. Since 
ours was the first baby to be delivered in the camp, this was featured 
in a newspaper. While I was at the camp, I did not join the military. 
If I demonstrated my loyalty to America and became conscripted, 
I could have legally left the camp. But I did not do so. When I left the 
camp, I was only given a small amount for transportation expenses, 
enough to go to Ontario. I was completely out of money. The only 
choices that I had were to work as a farmer or to serve in the army. 
Every day, I carried my child on my back to school. Actually, after 
the end of the war, I did serve in the army, because I had no money. 
The anti-Japanese movement was so severe that I could find no work. 
In daily life, a shop even refused to sell me an ice cream that my child 
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wanted to eat. At a Denny’s restaurant, they wouldn’t even come to 
take our order. After leaving the camp, we had no money or job. We 
just continued to be exposed to the anti-Japanese movement.
Interviewee B felt resentment that he had been held in a concentra-
tion camp, even though he had American citizenship. Also, he stated 
that he served in the army after the end of the war, but that the choice 
was not because of loyalty to America but instead the fact that he 
had no job. Moreover, he emphasized that the discrimination against 
Japanese immigrants in American society at that time deprived them of 
opportunities to work.
Interviewee C was held in the Granada Camp. She describes her expe-
rience at the concentration camp and her identity as follows:
I was held in the Granada Camp. I lived in a tiny shack. It was a hor-
rible camp. My parents worked at a vineyard. I had an elder brother. 
He was drafted as a second-generation Japanese American and went to 
war in 1944. I spent my years of eighth, ninth, and tenth grades in the 
camp. Even after leaving the camp, I experienced a lot of difficulties. 
Since my family had no money, I was taken to my uncle’s. I worked at 
a strawberry farm for low daily wages. My uncle used to tell me that he 
had actually wanted to go to Tule Lake while he was held in camp. He 
thought that, if he was taken to Tule Lake, he could leave America for 
Japan. Meanwhile, even after leaving the camp, I tried not to talk about 
my experience there. I think that this was because I had something in 
my mind that could not be classified as American or Japanese. One 
day, at school, I wrote my American name. It was soon rewritten as my 
Japanese name by my Japanese teacher. This was an identity problem. 
I did not understand what my identity was. Japanese Americans 
like me often use the phrase “facial character.” It is something like a 
surface identity. After the civil rights movement in my living town 
in 1965, I thought that my name was called for the first time in my 
life because that was the first time many minorities started to insist 
their own ethnic identities. For me, it was the identity of a Japanese 
American. But later, I noticed that I did not fit in it. The 442nd Team 
as the symbol of the loyalty of Japanese immigrants is irrelevant to me. 
To make myself fit in it, I had to throw away something. In my case, it 
can be said that I’ve thrown away my Japanese identity.
The “shaking” of her complicated identity is clearly expressed in her 
national name. She spent her childhood without a clear recognition of 
whether she was Japanese or American.
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The evidence from these interviews reveals that second-generation 
Japanese Americans who were held in concentration camps were 
deprived of their freedom in American society. In discourses regarding 
multiculturalism, it is said that Japanese Americans have been merged 
into the majority in America, and that public acceptance by American 
society relieved the Japanese Americans from having to struggle to 
establish their identity. However, the descriptions and insistences by 
each interviewee show that the compulsory confinement did not seem 
to contribute to their identity formation. Their powerful statements 
show that they did not assimilate themselves into America and that 
they have always been residing at the margin of American society. 
Actually, interviewees talked about their experiences from their own 
positions. Their descriptions reveal their insistence that they want the 
world to know about their experiences and they want to tell the world 
that they have not belonged to a pre-set identity or group.
3.4 Mainstream discourses of multiculturalism 
and Japanese immigrants in America
In order to understand multiculturalism in America, it is necessary to 
concentrate on the question of the nation state. It can be said that main-
taining the identity of Americans is one of the most important issues for 
maintaining the nation. In America, until the 1970s, 60% of white resi-
dents had British ancestors, and Anglo-conformity was regarded as an ideal 
of assimilation. In those days, the prevailing socio-cultural understanding 
was that European culture was central to America. Actually, until the 1960s, 
Japanese and other Asian immigrants, as well as Mexican immigrants, 
were not granted rights equal to those of white citizens (Tai, 1999, p. 39).
Homi K. Bhabha analyzes the country’s integration process and the 
issue of ethnic-cultural thought. Emphasizing that identity is never a 
priori, nor a finished product, Bhabha argues that identity itself is only 
ever the problematic process of access to an image of totality (Bhabha, 
1990, p. 194). In a way, he criticizes the prevailing discourse of diversity 
that focuses solely on ethnicity. While the integration of ethnic groups 
into “America” was promoted under the name of multiculturalism, 
a particular discourse has been accepted as the core narrative of the mul-
ticultural environment for American citizens. The implicit assumption 
held by the majority of the population is that the core of multicultural 
society needs to be European.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and David A. Hollinger provide typical discus-
sions in this regard. Schlesinger criticized the insistence by African 
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Americans on protest against American society. He was absolutely against 
the protest by African Americans and called their protest self-pity and 
self-ghettoization as follows: 
The ethnicity rage in general and afrocentricity in particular not only 
divert attention from the real needs but exacerbate the problems. 
The recent apotheosis of ethnicity, black, brown, red, yellow, white, 
has revived the dismal prospect that in happy melting-pot days 
Americans thought the republic was moving safely beyond—that is, 
a society fragmented into ethnic groups. The cult of ethnicity exag-
gerates differences, intensifies resentments and antagonisms, drives 
ever deeper the awful wedges between races and nationalities. The 
endgame is self-pity and self-ghettoization. (Schlesinger, 1992, p. 102)
He subsequently refers to their protests as separatism. He argues for 
a core culture in America and suggests that the culture should be based 
on the superiority of Western culture (Schlesinger, 1992). Similarly, 
Hollinger strives to promote a discussion that transcends multicultural-
ism in Postethnic America (Hollinger, 1995). Presenting a negative view 
of cultural identity generated by ethnic culture, a concept emphasized 
in the discourse of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism, he expects 
that such an ethnic element will disappear in terms of political culture. 
In this context, he criticizes Horace Kallen, who developed and pro-
moted cultural pluralism, and even insists that Kallen was too conscious 
of his own Jewish ethnicity.
Hollinger regards middle-class people of European ancestry as standard 
Americans, and defines non-white people as those who stuck to their 
ethnicity. In the end, his assumption originates in a perception that the 
center of America was comprised of people with a European tradition.
A truly postethnic America would be one in which the ethno-racial 
component in identity would loom less large than it now does 
in politics as well as culture, and in which affiliation by shared 
descent would be more voluntary than prescribed in every context. 
Although many middle-class Americans of European descent can 
now be said to be postethnic in this sense, the United States as a 
whole is a long way from achieving this ideal. This ideal for the 
American civic community is, indeed, just that – an ideal, embody-
ing the hope that the United States can be more than a site for a 
variety of diasporas and of projects in colonization and conquest. 
(Hollinger, 1995, p. 129) 
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He argues that non-white people were ethnic groups sticking to their 
ethnicity. He continues by suggesting that non-whites do not understand 
the ideal of the American civic community, of which “individuality” 
is the indispensable basis, but stuck to their race and ethnicity and ulti-
mately weaken the unitary state of culture. Ultimately, the reason why 
he tries to transcend multiculturalism is that he thinks the insistence of 
minority ethnic groups in America would disrupt the superiority of the 
whites (Hollinger, 1995).
In these discussions, multiculturalism is reduced to “the Politics of 
Recognition” (Taylor, 1994), which is often criticized for using the con-
cept of diversity to protect the narrator’s own culture. Using the phrase 
“the Politics of Recognition,” Charles Taylor contends that the contem-
porary demand for recognition by minorities has been refused. He insists 
that in the politics of recognition, the demand for equal citizenship and 
the uniqueness of each individual must be recognized (Taylor, 1994). 
However, the problem for multiculturalism is that, under the name of the 
politics of recognition, there is only one-way recognition of “minority 
cultures” by the “mainstream culture.” Not discussing the question of 
subjectivity, that is, the question of who has the right to “recognize,” over-
looks the power relations of narration involved in the case of Japanese 
immigrants in the context of multiculturalism.
Where cultural differences are observed, multiculturalism supposedly 
recognizes each different culture with the word “diversity,” Bhabha 
argues that multiculturalism was an effort to control a dynamic process 
of cultural differences (Bhabha, 1990, p. 209). He contends that both 
cultural pluralism and multiculturalism regularly function to control 
cultural differences. The ethical recognition by discourses of multicul-
turalism deadens the floating and hybrid aspects of minority cultures, 
and makes the minority cultures named and controlled by the domi-
nant multiculturalism through an essentialist understanding of culture. 
In the case of Japanese immigrants, no history has been provided in the 
multicultural education regarding those who did not demonstrate their 
loyalty to America. Those who have not been described in the discourse 
of multiculturalism are deprived of the words to explain themselves, 
and are thus often silenced. Bhabha (1994) analyzes this process as the 
containment of cultural difference.
In discussions of multiculturalism in American society, Ronald Takaki 
(2008) touches upon the “cultures recognized.” Takaki, a second-
generation Japanese American intellectual, emphasizes that American 
history has been very fragmentary and America has been formed by 
mutual interactions among a wide variety of ethnic groups. With this 
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emphasis, he strives to draw a complicated portrait of America. Stating 
that all groups contributed to the establishment of America, he aims to 
redefine American history from multiple perspectives by describing the 
experiences of each group (Takaki, 2008). The multiculturalism advo-
cated by Takaki can apparently be regarded as multiculturalism because 
of the diversity among the minority viewpoints. In fact, he insists “we 
originally came from many different shores, and our diversity has been 
at the center of the making of America” (Takaki, 2008, p. 438). By indi-
cating this diversity, he seeks to establish a shared past for America. 
By describing history from multiple perspectives, he attempts to create 
a unified America with assumed diversity, rather than an America con-
stituted by only one specific group.
However, those who continue to be marginalized in the discourse 
of multicultural America, such as the “No-No Boys,” are under con-
tinuous pressure to be incorporated into the pre-given American social 
structure, even while their identities remain marginalized. In short, 
the problem here is that the existence of those who have been unre-
mittingly pressured by the discourse of multiculturalism, and tried to 
escape from it, remains silenced and marginalized. The discussion by 
Takaki is a typical example of the recognition of Asian Americans in the 
prevailing context of multiculturalism. It functions to promote social 
integration and conceal the structure of control by the majority, and 
has enabled the containment of protest movements against the alleged 
tolerance of America.
If the main function of contemporary multiculturalism is to cease-
lessly control minorities, this suggests an imperialist character. In fact, 
Edward Said frequently referred to the US as an imperialist country 
(Said, 1993). Has multiculturalism in America been critical of the 
nation’s culture of imperialism? While strengthening national iden-
tity, it seems that a multiculturalism based on cultural control, with 
the veil of tolerance, has been exempt from self-criticism and self-
denial. Likewise, not many Japanese immigrants in the US have had a 
point of view that would generate criticism of the nation. As explained 
above, while criticizing the mainstream, Japanese immigrants have 
not sufficiently criticized the essentialist understanding of culture. In 
a word, the mainstream multiculturalist discourse in the US has con-
tinuously been producing the story of “what it is to be an American” 
and has constantly depicted the “characteristics of the good Japanese 
Americans” for Japanese immigrants. This results in the production and 
isolation of those who have neither “characteristics of Americans” nor 
“characteristics of the Japanese.”
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In reality, history textbooks have incessantly produced such “other 
people” and used them to spread the discourse of a multicultural America. 
One history textbook, for instance, told the story that some California 
residents began to be concerned about the increasing number of Japanese 
immigrants in their state, and that Japanese immigrants worked for very 
low wages, depriving native-born non-Japanese American workers of 
their jobs (Brown, Helgeson & George, 1964). While emphasizing that 
Japanese Americans were industrious workers, the textbook ultimately 
categorized Japanese immigrants as “other people” who caused a nega-
tive impact on American society. The textbook tells us about the differ-
ent perceptions of work held by whites and Japanese Americans. This 
difference in work ethic is entwined with racial differences and culturally 
essentialized. In this way, the textbook implants the essentialist idea of 
ethnicity, on the basis of a comparison between “native-born Americans” 
and “Japanese immigrants,” in the minds of the readers.
Another interesting example is a story described in a textbook about 
Japanese Americans along the Pacific coast who were forced to leave 
their homes and were gathered in camps administered by the army fol-
lowing the attack on Pearl Harbor (Bragdon & McCutchen, 1964). The 
textbook refers to this violation of compulsory confinement as “the 
sole significant event.” However, the description of the confinement is 
problematic, because the expression “sole important event” is not cor-
rect. This expression conceals the history of compulsory confinement 
of German Americans and Italian Americans during the same period. 
Moreover, the textbook implies that the cause of this compulsory con-
finement was mainly Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, and this depiction 
suggests that compulsory confinement would not have been carried out 
if there was no attack. In other words, the confinement was because 
of Japan’s wrongdoing, and the US’s decision on the confinement was 
inevitable. However, the textbook does not refer at all to the traditional 
historical aspect described by Japanese immigrants, who say that the 
compulsory confinement was a mere extension of the exclusion of and 
discrimination against Japanese immigrants (Okamoto, 2005).
As suggested above, multiculturalism, which was originally supposed 
to be related to the concept of “diversity,” has come to function as an 
apparatus for controlling minority identity, while still being intertwined 
with the concept of “integration.” The result was the reproduction of 
a strong American identity. Avery F. Gordon and Christopher Newfield 
described this as “the control of diversity,” and insists that multicultural-
ism does not question the imbalance generated by race, class, and gender 
differences in the context of the multicultural situation and instead 
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conceals this problem while providing an effective control (Gordon & 
Newfield, 1996).
3.5 Conclusion
Through discussing problems regarding Japanese immigrants in the 
context of multiculturalism, this chapter has striven to indicate the dif-
ference between those who were assimilated in multiculturalism and 
those who were not. In past studies, Japanese immigrants have been 
understood from a certain fixed perspective, which is a multiculturalism 
of essentialization and isolation. This results in promoting the isolation of 
“others” while accepting them with its supposed tolerance. However, this 
process inevitably produces another form of “others” who appear within 
the community of the pre-given “others.” As the antithesis to such an 
understanding, this chapter aimed to emphasize the differences among 
Japanese immigrants. The statements by each interviewee describe the 
“shaking” of their identity woven through their experiences. In order to 
promote discussions of multiculturalism in the circumstances surround-
ing immigrants, it is necessary to pay careful attention to ensure that the 
discussions are not oriented towards the integration of difference but 
rather toward the diversification of identities.
Notes
1. Since the process of the historical development and transformation of multi-
culturalism and multicultural education is more deeply discussed in the third 
section, I focus here on how Japanese immigrants have been described in the 
current discourse of multiculturalism.
2. The field research for this thesis was supported by the Graduate Program 
of Asian and African Studies of Ryukoku University. Further, direct contact 
and oral or written interviews with second-generation Japanese Americans 
became possible through the cooperation of Ronald Nakasone (Stanford 
University).
3. In 1942, General Emmons, in Hawaii, formed a battalion of Japanese 
Americans—the 100th Battalion. The 100th was called the “Purple Heart 
Battalion.” In June 1943, the 100th Battalion merged with the newly arrived 
442nd Regimental Combat Team, composed of Japanese Americans from 
Hawaii as well as from the concentration camps on the mainland (Takaki, 
2008, pp. 348–349).
4. In 1943, the War Relocation Authority administered a loyalty questionnaire 
to all male and female internees 17 years and older. The crucial questions 
were No. 27 and No. 28, as follows (Tule Lake Committee, 2000, p. 8):
 No. 27: Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on 
combat duty, wherever ordered?
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 No. 28: Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America 
and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by foreign or 
domestic forces and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the 
Japanese emperor, to any other foreign government, power or organization?
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Modeling the Dynamics of Inclusion 




A theoretical review of multiculturalism is incredibly complex. I am 
aware, for instance, of the complexities and arguments associated 
with multiculturalism (called multiracialism in Singapore) in many 
Asian countries. Considering the multiple discourses involved in all 
of the countries in Asia and the vastness of the topic, I will focus on 
multiculturalism as it relates to teaching and learning in classrooms 
that, I am aware, are filled with students with varying cultural back-
grounds. This chapter will include some views of individuals I have 
described in previous reports (Gunderson, 2000, 2007). My purpose 
is to develop a multicultural model that can be argued, contested, 
discussed, and possibly observed and tested in classrooms and schools 
in Asia.
Millions of people around the world are enrolled in classes where they 
learn a language different from the one they speak at home; they are also 
immersed in a culture different from their first one (Gunderson, Odo, & 
D’Silva, 2011). In British Columbia, Canada, for instance, it is not 
un usual to find classrooms that are filled with students from various cul-
tural backgrounds. Matsumura (2012, personal communication) describes 
one school in Shiga, Japan, that has a majority of students from Brazil 
who speak Portuguese but are ethnically Japanese. I have visited many 
classrooms in Asia with multicultural students. In some cases, students 
are native-born, but their culture differs from the mainstream culture. In 
other cases, there are students who are immigrants or come from families 
that are temporary or work-stay immigrants; they are sometimes called 




About 60 years ago, Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1954) recognized 160 dif-
ferent definitions of culture. Larson and Smalley (1972) proposed that 
culture represented a map or blueprint which guides the behavior of 
people in a community and is nurtured in family life. Culture organ-
izes our behavior in groups, makes us sensitive to matters of status, and 
assists us to know what others expect of us and what will happen if we 
do not live up to expectations. Culture helps us to know how far we 
can go as individuals and what our responsibility is to different groups. 
“Different cultures are the underlying structures which make Round 
community round and Square community square” (Larson & Smalley, 
1972, p. 39).
Condon (1973) proposed that culture “is a system of integrated pat-
terns, most of which remain below the threshold of consciousness, yet 
all of which govern human behavior just as surely as the manipulated 
strings of a puppet control its motions” (p. 4). Vontress (1976) concluded 
that each of us lives in five cultures that intermingle: the universal, 
ecological, national, regional, and racio-ethnic. Culture is more than 
the sum of its parts and each of us is more culturally complex than 
we realize or can describe. Culture allows human beings to survive by 
providing them the mental constructs to categorize the world. Murdock 
(1961) describes seven characteristics of cultural patterns: (1) they origi-
nate in the human mind; (2) they facilitate human and environmental 
interaction; (3) they satisfy basic human needs; (4) they are cumulative 
and adjust to changes in external and internal conditions; (5) they tend 
to form a consistent structure; (6) they are learned and shared by all the 
members of a society; and (7) they are transmitted to new generations. 
Culture can be viewed at two levels: macro—a broad generalization con-
sisting of shared features across a group—and micro—particular features 
related to an individual or a very small group of individuals.
A discussion of culture often includes descriptions, discussions, and 
arguments for and against such issues as race, ethnicity, socioeconomic 
status, economy, gender, religion, and political philosophy. Culture is 
defined within the parameters of a particular academic perspective. 
Sociolinguistic definitions differ from anthropological definitions, 
which differ from ethnolinguistic definitions, and so on. Culture 
affects the way an individual perceives the world on both macro- and 
micro-levels. Culture has a direct relationship with one’s beliefs about, 
attitudes toward, expectations for, and views of teaching and learning, 
and the importance of learning.
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When individuals move from one culture to another, there are 
both micro- and macro-level consequences. According to Schumann 
(1978a), micro-level features may include such phenomena as cul-
ture shock, motivation, and ego permeability. Schumann categorized 
acculturation relative those who wish to assimilate fully into a culture 
and those who do not. Schumann (1978a,b, 1986) proposed that two 
factors affect the degree to which a learner acculturates: social and psy-
chological distance. Variables related to social distance include social 
dominance, integration pattern, enclosure, cohesiveness, size, cultural 
congruence, attitude, and intended length of residence. Psychological 
distance is related to language shock, culture shock, motivation, and 
ego permeability.
Schumann sees culture shock as one of the most difficult experiences 
that immigrants encounter. He argues that one who is new to a culture 
begins to go through acculturation and other processes, during which 
there are “stages” that represent the degree to which one has become 
part of or adapted to the new culture.
In acculturation, an individual from one culture must adapt to 
a new culture. In assimilation, on the other hand, an individual’s 
first culture is submerged in the new one and there is often a loss 
of values, beliefs, and behavior patterns of the original culture. 
Acculturation is often associated with an individual’s success in learn-
ing a new language. Indeed, many have suggested that the failure 
to acculturate is often associated with the failure to learn a second 
language (Ellis, 1985).
“Normal” acculturation occurs in four stages: euphoria, culture shock, 
recovery, and acculturation. “Under normal circumstances, people who 
become acculturated pass through all the stages at varying rates, though 
they do not progress smoothly from one stage to the next and may 
regress to previous stages” (Richard-Amato, 1988, p. 6). There is varia-
tion in acculturation, both between and within cultural groups.
A number of factors affect the degree to which individuals become 
acculturated: nation of origin, reasons for immigrating, age on entry, 
amount of prior schooling, economic status, difficulties related to 
travel, extent of disruption and trauma related to war, and a family’s 
immigration status (Gunderson, 2007). Schumann’s (1978a) model 
“seeks to explain differences in learners’ rate of development and also in 
their ultimate level of achievement in terms of the extent to which they 
adapt to the target-language culture” (Ellis, 1994, p. 230). Acculturation, 
according to Schumann, means “the social and psychological integration 
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of the learner with the target language (TL) group” (Schumann, 1986, 
p. 379). However, a number of researchers carry a negative view of 
acculturation.
Second-language researchers have suggested that acculturation is nega-
tive (see, for instance, Duff & Uchida, 1997) because it depicts the second-
language learner as one who must give up a first culture. Socialization 
theorists have a more positive view, though. Duff (2010) notes that 
“students in classrooms are often socialized into and through discourse of 
(showing) respect (and self-control, decorum) to teachers, to one another, 
and to the subject matter itself” (p. 173). Children and other novices learn 
to function communicatively with members of a community by organiz-
ing and reorganizing sociocultural information that is conveyed through 
the form and content of the actions of others (Schieffelin & Ochs, 
1986a,b). Schieffelin & Ochs (1986b) conclude that as children learn to 
become competent members of their society, they also learn to become 
competent speakers of their language. Talmy (2012) states that second-
language socialization research “is typically longitudinal, ethnographic 
in design, and favors analytic frameworks that allow for the examina-
tion of microgenesis and ontogenesis in (L1 and L2) linguistic and other 
social practices, as well as how such practices relate to matters of extra-
situational, or macro, cultural and social logical significance” (p. 571). 
Duff and Talmy (2011) note, “Language socialization also differs from cog-
nitivist SLA in its focus on the local social, political, and cultural contexts 
in which languages are learned and used, on historical aspects of language 
and culture learning, on contestation in chains across timescales, and on 
the cultural content of linguistic structures and practices” (p. 96). It is sug-
gested here that the potential for socialization in classroom discourses is 
associated with a number of cultural features and variables.
4.3 Propaedeutic to a multicultural model
4.3.1 Teaching and learning
Teaching and learning, that is, schooling, are not culture-free. I conclude 
that “North American educators continue to view education within 
a ‘mainstream’ viewpoint, one that focuses on European values and 
beliefs, even though their school populations grow increasingly multi-
cultural” (Gunderson, 2000). It is clear that immigrant students bring 
with them complex cultural beliefs about teaching and learning that are, 
in many respects, different from the views of mainstream teachers and 
students (Gunderson, 2007).
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4.3.2 Significant cultural variables
I believe that culture constitutes the ideas, customs, language, arts, and 
skills that characterize or reflect a group of individuals in a given period, 
particularly as they relate to the scholastic learning of the group’s mem-
bers. However, culture is not a singular unitary phenomenon. Indeed, 
human beings live within the contexts of multiple cultures. In a study 
of secondary students, Gunderson (2000) notes, “Members of the dias-
poras in this study were lost in the spaces between various identities: the 
teenager, the immigrant, the first language speaker, the individual from 
the first culture, the individual socializing into a second language and 
culture, the individual in neither a dominant first or second culture but 
one not of either culture” (p. 702). People exist in multiple intercultures, 
so that a student who enrolls in a school in a new country brings with 
her a complex set of beliefs, perceptions, and behaviors related to privacy, 
cooperation/competition, personal space, eye contact, body movements, 
and physical contact. In addition, she possesses individual differences that 
are developed within a culture, which are often referred to as cognitive 
style. The features include such characteristics as analytic, methodical, 
reflective, global, relational, and intuitive (Reid, 1987; Scarcella, 1990). 
Helmer and Eddy (2012) also identify features such as assertiveness/
compliance, dominance/submission, and direct/indirect communication 
styles. Individuals also possess backgrounds that include information 
about family structure—roles of family members, child-rearing practices, 
gender roles, adult–child interactions, educational expectations, expres-
sion of emotions, conversational rules, child-rearing practices, individual 
responsibility, and spirituality. The difficulty, of course, lies in the fact 
that families exist within cultures, and their views and beliefs are formed 
through interactions with their broader culture, their family’s first culture, 
and their local community’s culture, to name a few.
Cultural influences are highly evident in classrooms. But this should 
not be a surprise, since schools everywhere are designed by persons who 
represent their cultures. There are variables that represent cultural fea-
tures—sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly—that can help predict 
cultural inclusion and exclusion (Gunderson, 2009). Groups of variables 
can constitute factors.
Cultural differences can affect the degree to which an individual from 
one culture is included or excluded in the environment of another 
culture. There would appear to be hundreds of variables that could 
be identified that are either directly or indirectly related to culture. It 
would also appear doubtful that a useful model could account for them 
all. As a consequence, I will attempt to hypothesize factors that impact 
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group dynamics in multicultural classrooms. It is important to note in 
advance that the proposed factors are neither mutually exclusive nor 
uniquely different in content.
4.3.2.1 Country of origin
The first factor to consider is a student’s country of origin. Where do 
students come from? This often informs one about the kinds of schools a 
student has or has not attended. What are the reasons families leave their 
home countries? Most immigrant families that come to British Columbia 
(BC) report that their purpose is to get a better education for their chil-
dren (Gunderson, 2007). Unfortunately, the country of origin often 
predicts an immigrant’s likelihood of success in schools in BC because, in 
many cases, the country of origin is a marker of other underlying features 
that are associated with school success or difficulty. The country of origin 
is likely a factor that impacts school success around the world.
4.3.2.2 Family
The notion of what constitutes a family varies from country to country 
and, it would seem, within a country as well (Gunderson, 2007). This is 
one of the most powerful multicultural factors, and probably the most 
complex as well. Parents and their children have views of teaching and 
learning that are related to both the views of the first culture and the 
socioeconomic status.
We waste too much time in school. Too much time not working. Teachers are 
too lazy they don’t tell you what to do. (Male, Cantonese, 15 years old)
The labs are better equipped in Canada, but the teachers don’t show us 
what to do with them. (Female, Cantonese, 16 years old)
Many individuals from higher socioeconomic families generally 
view learning the way they view business (Gunderson, 2007). From 
this perspective, the teacher is responsible for supplying the pieces of 
knowledge, somewhat like products, that are needed to pass a test. The 
student’s responsibility is to memorize (acquire) all of the knowledge 
the teachers deliver. A measure of success is the number of items the 
student gets correct in an examination. They have what Freire (1970) 
called the banking view of teaching. In some cases, the comments 
clearly differentiated those who were affluent …
There aren’t enough parking spaces at school (male, Mandarin, 18 years old).
Canada is really stupid because it builds big beautiful super highways 
but only lets you go 50 K an hour. That’s a waste of money. They waste 
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money on immigrants. They give tax money for immigrants to stay in 
Canada and all they are doing is taking advantage of Canada. It’s not good 
use of tax. Canada people have to get smart, not waste money on people 
who don’t work. (Female, Cantonese, 16 years old)
… from those who were less affluent:
ESL students work so hard. Even if you do really well you just get an ordi-
nary job. They have no future, that’s why so many drop out. Kids have to 
work to make enough money for comfortable life, no, not even comfortable 
life. In school there’s gangs, there’s drugs, oh, it’s horrible thing and school’s 
so small, it’s unhealthy. I have a few cousins, they all drop out. There’s no 
future so what’s the point? You pay extra to go to better class. Money is so 
important. Most parents can’t afford it. (Female, Vietnamese, 17 years old)
Variables related to the family factor are complex. What are the family 
dynamics? What is the family decision-making structure? Who should 
be contacted if needed at home? What is the naming system? How are 
individuals addressed? This is an important issue because the way an 
individual is addressed or named in some cultures may be considered 
impolite, insulting, or inappropriate in others. Are there communication 
patterns associated with different roles, such as those of a parent, child, 
teacher, or relative?
What are the general attitudes toward school and schooling? Are there 
strong overall cultural values that might make a difference? Are there 
views of teaching and learning that might impact students’ and parents’ 
views of the instruction occurring in a school? Are there epistemological 
differences in parental views about what should or should not be the 
focus of instruction? That is, do the teachers’ views of what is valuable 
for students to learn the same as those of the parents? In some cases, 
teachers focus on process rather than product (Gunderson, 2000). 
Differences in views clash and the result is an unfortunate conflict 
between schools and homes (Li, 2006).
Often, religious orientation has a significant influence on how a fam-
ily perceives what is being taught in school. What might this mean for 
teaching–learning relationships? What might this mean for teacher–
student, student–student, adult–student, and male-female relationships 
in school? There are numerous reports of clashes between the views or 
practices of teachers or the school and the religious views of parents. 
For instance, parents went to Federal Court in Tennessee (1986, Mozert 
v. Hawkins County Public Schools) because they felt their beliefs were being 
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assaulted by the materials being used in their children’s classrooms. 
DelFattore (1992) wrote this about the trial:
The protesters, who described themselves as born-again fundamen-
talist Christians, based their entire understanding of reality on their 
particular interpretation of the Bible. In their way of looking at life, 
all decisions should be based solely on the Word of God; using rea-
son or imagination to solve problems is an act of rebellion. Everyone 
should live in traditional nuclear families structured on stereotyped 
gender roles. Wives should obey husbands and children their parents, 
without argument or question. (p. 36)
The reading books used by the teachers were filled with imaginary 
creatures, fantasy, and fairy tales. Parents were upset about the material, 
but they were as upset about the notion of asking learners to become 
critical readers. DelFattore (1992) further notes:
Imagination, like independent thinking and tolerance for diversity, 
has no place in the Hawkins County protesters’ world view. They 
alleged that the process of imagination, regardless of the content, 
distracts people from the Word of God. Once the mind is open to 
imagination, all kinds of alien thoughts may enter, and the soul may 
be lost. Moreover, using imagination to solve problems substitutes a 
human faculty for the absolute reliance on God that is necessary for 
salvation. (p. 44)
In some cases students are not expected to ask questions of the teachers 
or of texts, while in other cases, they are. These differences in views are 
potentially extremely contentious.
4.3.2.3 First and second languages
Language differences can impact student interactions in school. What 
are some specific language features that might make a difference? 
Vietnamese speakers, for instance, find it difficult to learn English for 
various reasons (Honey, 1987). Honey notes, “Because their mother 
tongue has no inflections, differentiates words by tone, and makes 
great use of syntax and particles for grammatical purposes, Vietnamese 
find a language like English, which is so dissimilar to their own, very 
difficult to learn” (p. 238). There is a relationship between the degree to 
which one can communicate in the language of instruction and one’s 
inclusion into the culture of the classroom. There is also an overall 
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relationship between L1 and L2 that suggests individuals who speak an 
L1 that is similar to the L2 may find the latter easier to learn and, as a 
result, be included into the culture of the classroom. But again, com-
pared to other factors, this relationship is not a major one. Language 
does make a difference, however.
The white kids are big and loud like gorillas. You have to get out of the way 
because they so big. They think they own school because they are born here. 
They are so, so loud you can’t be a friends with them cuz they don’t talk, 
they scream. They are so rude. (Male, Vietnamese, 15 years old)
Perceptions are influenced by L1 backgrounds in complex ways. 
Language can be a barrier to inclusion:
I spend two years with no friends, no one. I spend two years not talking, 
anyone. I go school, I go home, I talk only my mother, my brother. Best 
friend United States. Cry, all time, cry. Being sick, all time, sick, stomach 
hurt, head hurt, heart hurt, all time, bad dream, all time, all time. (Female, 
Kurdish, 16 years old)
4.3.2.4 L1 teaching and learning practices
The methods, procedures, and practices of teaching and learning in 
an individual’s first culture or home country constitute a powerful fac-
tor in inclusion/exclusion. I conducted a number of factor analyses to 
explore English reading as a dependent variable and found that the 
standard models of L2 reading were not substantiated (Gunderson, 
2007). It appears that instructional practice is a variable that may mask 
underlying differences. Students were taught in systems that used 
bottom-up teaching styles, and the results revealed bottom-up process-
ing. Immigrants possess a deep-seated view of what constitutes teaching 
and learning. Many expect to be involved in activities that focus on rote 
memorization, attention to facts and details, teacher-centered instruc-
tion, and a focus on grades. Li (2006), for instance, found that the 
Chinese parents she studied rejected the teaching and learning going on 
in their children’s school and opted, instead, to rely on activities outside 
school to give their children the skills they believed to be valuable.
4.3.2.5 Overall numbers and inclusion/exclusion
Schools and school districts in British Columbia vary greatly in the num-
ber of immigrant or ESL (English as a second language) students enrolled 
in them. The range extends from essentially zero immigrants to 100% 
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(Gunderson, 2007). We designed a study to investigate whether ESL 
numbers make a difference in reading achievement. Two ESL consultants 
working in two large school districts were convinced that ESL numbers in 
a classroom likely affected the English reading achievement of students. 
They opined that there is probably a critical mass of ESL numbers that 
would have a negative effect on learning (Eddy, Carrigan, and Gunderson, 
2008). We hypothesized that the smaller the ESL number was, the higher 
their learning would be because more models of the target language 
would be available to them. The findings were interesting and may say 
something about inclusion/exclusion.
The study took place in two large urban school districts and included 
six schools that enrolled students from kindergarten to grade seven. 
In total, there were 1,013 students in 33 classrooms involved. There 
were no statistically significant differences in mean income in the six 
schools. We measured the ratio of native English to ESL speakers; the 
results for the six schools were A: 87–13%, B: 35–65%, C: 64–36%, 
D: 39–61%, E: 23–77%, and F: 68–32%. Ratios varied dramatically from 
classroom to classroom (from 5% to 90% ESL). Reading achievement 
varied relative to the percentage of ESL students in the classroom. 
However, the relationship was not linear. Classrooms that had low and 
high percentages of ESL students scored lower than those that varied 
from 40% to 60%. The relationship is similar to a bell curve. The results 
of the interviews suggest that inclusion was also associated with the 
number of ESL students.
Conversations with the teachers led the research team to conclude that 
ESL students in low ESL classrooms were, in essence, integrated into the 
classrooms based on the notion that they would learn English and how 
to read English simply because their classmates were English speakers 
and readers, not by making accommodations for their special needs 
and abilities. This feature is not one of inclusion, but of submersion. 
In short, these students were excluded unconsciously by being ignored. 
This finding was corroborated by three independent researchers, who 
observed and recorded notes over the nine months of the study.
Teachers in high ESL classrooms appeared overwhelmed by the 
challenges they perceived in the diversity of abilities their students rep-
resented. Students were excluded by having teachers ignore their special 
needs and abilities. Secondary-level students reported that they felt like 
they were excluded and that it was like being in a ghetto (Gunderson, 
2007). Students felt ESL classes were for second-class students—those 
who had little chance to go on to university. ESL classes made students 
feel inferior, “like those who are crippled or blind.” One 16-year-old 
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male Polish student said, “People make fun of me because I was in 
ESL.” As I argued, “Those who were in ESL classes the longest scored 
lowest on all of the examinable courses and also had the highest disap-
pearance rate;” also, “parents complained bitterly that ESL classes were 
roadblocks to students’ success and they interfered with the learning of 
examinable courses.”
It was hard to make new friends. All my good friends are in Somalia. 
I don’t know anyone in ____ school who is from my country. (Male, 
Somali, 16 years old)
Too much Chinese. ESL class are fill with Chinese. Teachers no good, not 
stop Chinese talk. No help Spanish. I not passing nothing. (Male, Spanish, 
14 years old)
I’m Kurd, Iraq. No one know (?), no one. Here, many India people, think 
we being India. Here Chinee people, think India. No one know I not India. 
(Male, Kurdish, 14 years old)
Too much Chinee talk. Too much Chinee people. No English. Bad class, 
teacher no good, not stop Chinese talk. (Male, Kurdish, 14 years old)
So, as a factor, I hypothesize that overall numbers and inclusion/exclusion 
are complex.
4.3.2.6 Individual differences
Human beings are unique in their ability to cope with elements of 
their environments. Different authorities and researchers have identi-
fied characteristics, such as analytic, methodical, reflective, global, 
relational, and intuitive, to describe individual differences in the way 
ESL learners make sense of and cope in the world, especially the class-
room (for reviews, see Reid, 1987; Scarcella, 1990). It is unclear what 
individual differences account for as regards the finding that some 
students are able to achieve way beyond their apparent capacities in 
schools where the language of instruction is different from their home 
languages. These are the resilient students, and some believe resilience 
can be taught (Roesingh, 2004). Individual differences may account 
for students’ inclusion or exclusion, but it is not clear how strong this 
factor is or whether teachers can, in fact, reliably and validly measure 
features associated with variables that make up this factor.
4.3.2.7 The multicultural model
The purpose of this model is to hypothesize variables that are associ-
ated with inclusion in multicultural classrooms where the cultural 
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background of the student differs from the culture in the classroom. 
While there are hundreds or thousands of variables that likely influ-
ence the inclusion of a person from one culture into another culture, 
five factors are proposed here: family, first and second language, overall 
numbers, individual differences, and first cultural teaching practices. To 
explore these factors I have used an approach that features focus groups. 
Several members of a culture (usually no more than 10) are recruited to 
explore these factors. Practice has shown that the following focus ques-
tions are helpful in exploring the five factors (Gunderson, 2009). These 
questions can also form the basis of an inquiry into the culture of a 
particular school in order to describe first cultural features.
4.3.3 Focus group questions
(a) Where do students come from?
(b) What is the main religious orientation? (What might this mean for 
teaching–learning relationships? What might this mean for teacher–
student, student–student, adult–student, male–female relationships 
in school?)
(c) What are the reasons that families leave their home countries?
(d) What is the naming system? (How should people be addressed?)
(e) What are the family dynamics? (What is the family decision-making 
structure? Who should be contacted if needed at home?)
(f) Are there strong overall cultural values that might make a difference 
in “our” schools?
(g) What are general attitudes toward school and schooling?
(h) What specific language features might make a difference?
(i) Are there communication patterns associated with different roles, 
such as parent, child, teachers, authorities, and others?
(J) Are there ways in which the teacher can be sensitive to cultural 
differences?
4.4 Focus group: An example
Culture is difficult to define, as shown above. It is also difficult to get 
human beings to agree on what features are common in their own cul-
tures. Gunderson (2009) notes,
The following observations were made at the University of British 
Columbia and were developed from a focus group. The reader is 
cautioned to consider the following as being an extremely limited 
view developed by five informants who themselves also made it 
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clear that these views were very limited and non-representative. They 
also concluded and argued strongly that there is no single view that 
could adequately represent the broad category “Arab.” It was noted 
by one member of the group that there was a great deal of contention 
and often bitter vituperation related to the inclusion of Egyptians as 
Arabs. It was noted that many Egyptians have deep respect for their 
rich cultural and historical roots and view Arabs as being nomadic 
wanderers without established cultural and historical roots. They 
often resent being included in the category. The reader is cautioned 
to remember that the results are dependent on the experience and 
backgrounds of a local group and they are related to where the indi-
viduals came from (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates).
The task is to compare the knowledge acquired about the first cul-
ture, as shown above, with the cultural features of the school to see 
the matches and mismatches, predict inclusion/exclusion, and identify 
areas in which the teacher might accommodate students from different 





Figure 4.1 First (C1) and second (C2) cultures and inclusion/exclusion
Source: Drawn by author.
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A student (I) possesses a complex cultural background that is a 
composite learned within the overall First Culture (C1). The background 
includes cultural features associated with family, community, and indi-
vidual differences. The graphic contains only two intersecting local 
cultures, although in reality there are many. The second culture (C2) 
is just as complex. In this case, the school (S) and community cultures 
overlap within the larger national culture, although the graphic is also 
considerably less complex than it likely really is. The degree to which 
a student is included in the C2 is initially related to the match (or 
mismatch) of C1 and C2 features. The teacher’s views are also reflected 
in the C2. In the case of Arabic speakers, the feature that may be prob-
lematic in some schools relates to gender roles. It may be difficult for a 
young Arabic-speaking immigrant boy to enter a classroom where the 
teacher is female. This would certainly have a negative effect on his 
inclusion into the culture of the classroom.
4.5 Conclusion
My purpose was to develop a model of inclusion/exclusion, where 
students’ first cultural features differ from or match those of the class-
room. Inclusion and exclusion are complex variables. One feature that 
is not mentioned has to do with national identities (Pickett & Brewer, 
2005). Individuals may not be included because of the way they are 
perceived relative to a national identity. Esses et al. (2005) conclude that 
“when national attachment takes the form of nationalism—belief in the 
superiority of one’s nation over others—increased attachment is associ-
ated with unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants” (p. 332).
It was proposed that L2 focus groups should be organized within the 
local school community. Results should be considered local snapshots 
rather than grand generalizations. A focus group of local L1 individuals 
should also undertake the same exercise to develop a picture of the same 
school-related features.
Five factors were hypothesized to be important differentially in the 
degree to which they are associated with the inclusion of an indi-
vidual of one culture into a school environment of another culture. 
As Duff and Talmy (2011) suggest, this approach is one that “addresses 
the manifold complexities of children or adults with already devel-
oped repertoires of linguistic, discursive, and cultural practices as they 
encounter new ones” (p. 97). As such, it can be described as an L2 
socializa tion view.
Every country in Asia appears to have school-age immigrants enrolled 
in their schools. It appears that immigrant enrollment varies widely 
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from country to country, area to area, and school to school. The 
potential for inclusion, theoretically, can be estimated by comparing 
the cultural features that immigrants bring to a school with the cul-
tural features of the enrolling school (and teachers). Overall, absolute 
percentages of immigrant students in a classroom are hypothesized to 
roughly predict inclusion/exclusion, along with other factors. Thus, 
a small number of immigrants in a classroom will likely not be easily 
included, nor would students in a class that has a very high number of 
immigrant students.
At some point, it would be interesting to study the features of this 
model in classrooms that have varying numbers of immigrant students. 
At this point, the model is presented here to generate discussion, disa-
greement, and argument. As a test, one could compare the Arabic cultural 
features noted above with those in schools in Asia. The question to ask 
is how do these cultural features compare to the cultural features in my 
school in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, etc.? What potential difficulties 
might students have and what accommodations might a teacher make 
to include them?
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Who Owns Our Tongue? English, 
Academic Life, and Subjectivity
Kosuke Shimizu
5.1 Introduction
The issue of language as it relates to the disciplines of politics, 
International Relations (IR) and Asian Studies has received insufficient 
attention in contemporary academic circles, in part because of the uncrit-
ical assumption that language is an unloaded and transparent system 
of signs that merely conveys the meanings in the mind of the subject. 
Some scholars argue, however, that using English is a contradiction for 
the narratives of non-Western political theories and critical Asian Studies 
because, these critics suggest, English is an exclusively Western language. 
Nevertheless, the main language in contemporary academia is English, 
which accounts for a great deal of the publications, particularly in the 
case of the disciplines noted above. Even though the argument against 
the use of English in non-Western intellectual activities seems to be 
reasonable at first glance, a thorough investigation of the language and 
the disciplines will reveal some hidden and unquestioned assumptions 
underlying contemporary academic life, particularly relating to subjec-
tivity. This article strives to criticize this immature acceptance of a naive 
equation of English with the West. Moreover, it argues that English is no 
longer a Western-owned language and that diversifying the ownership of 
English will direct us to a more democratic intersubjectivity. However, for 
this very reason, we must be prepared to accept a hitherto undreamt of 
grammatical transformation of English.
This grammatical transformation will have a substantial impact 
on academic circles because it relates to issues of translatability and 
subjectivity. Translation inevitably involves questions of grammar 
and pre-determined worldviews. For example, when one moves from 
the subject-centered ontology of Aristotle to the predicate-centered 
OPEN
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ontology of Nishida Kitaro (which one can interpret as an abstract form 
of a world order based on the China-centered tribute system), then the 
epistemological center of the world—the subject—acquires completely 
different, sometimes even opposite, forms (Shimizu, 2011). In order 
to reconcile differences of subjectivity and transcend the problem of 
incommensurability, contemporary intellectuals need to conduct a 
thorough investigation of the relationship between academic life and 
language.
The investigation in this chapter will concentrate on IR as a disci-
pline because of the limited knowledge of the author, but this by no 
means implies that the argument developed here is inapplicable to 
other disciplines. Rather, I contend that any academic discipline must 
take into account the importance of language, particularly in an age of 
hegemonic domination by English. In order to clarify the points men-
tioned above, the chapter begins by introducing some arguments about 
IR and English mainly found in the literature of non-/post-Western 
International Relations theory (IRT). Second, I will strive to explain 
the meaning of English’s hegemonic domination of IR by referring to 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Next, I will provide an introduction 
to the theory of World Englishes in order to comprehend the cur-
rent state of language education and thereby acquire a clearer view of 
English. Fourth, I will focus on the issue of subjectivity and language 
by introducing Nishida’s theory of the “place of nothingness” and the 
tribute-cum-trading system of China. I will argue that academic life 
has to prepare for different approaches towards subjectivity, and hence 
become an open-ended system of different discourses.
5.2 Practicing IR in English
People have long said that English is the world’s lingua franca. It is true 
that the number of people speaking English—either as their first or 
second language—has been increasing steadily worldwide. According to 
Kachru, there are three circles of English use. The inner circle includes 
countries where English functions as the first language, such as the UK, 
the US, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The outer circle includes 
countries such as India, Nigeria, and Singapore, where English is insti-
tutionalized. The expanding circle represents countries such as China, 
Japan, and Korea, where the diffusion of English has occurred relatively 
recently, although the social acceptability and social penetration of 
English is rapidly increasing (Kachru, 2006, p. 453). The fact is that users 
of English in the outer and expanding circles numerically overwhelm 
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the users in the inner circle. Therefore, the common argument that 
English is shrinking because the number of English speakers is declin-
ing (Huntington, 1996) is misleading. Indeed, one to two billion people 
worldwide use English, and this means that 18% to 36% of the total 
global population was using English in 2005 (Kachru, 2006, p. 452).1
The situation is the same with IR. Indeed, English seems to be indis-
pensable for understanding contemporary IR, as well as for publishing 
local knowledge internationally. Chris Brown, in his discussion of British 
IRT, succinctly summarizes this situation by stating that while Britain’s 
quasi-hegemonic status has disappeared, the “English language remains 
the language of the discourse of IR” (2011, p. 310). This happened not 
because of the ease of teaching IR in English, or any recent re-acceptance 
of the English School by the world audience, but because of American 
dominance over the discipline (Hoffman, 1977). The English School 
should be referred to, in this context, as a partial counter-movement to 
Hoffman’s idea of “IR as an American discipline” (Brown, 2011, p. 311), 
although this confrontation is occurring between two self-identified 
English-speaking groups.
However, the domination of English over the discipline is found even 
in the case of non-Western or post-Western IRT literature (Acharya & 
Buzan, 2007; Chen, 2011; Shani, 2007, 2008; Shilliam, 2010) and one 
naturally expects the future to see more publications in English in this 
particular academic area.
Pedagogical practice is one of the most important dimensions of the 
relationship between IR scholarship and English. As has been observed 
for a long time, IR is taught mainly in English in the Anglophone world 
as a Western, or American, discipline. However, even elsewhere, English 
is gradually becoming the dominant language. In the Asian region, 
for example, English is becoming the language of IR education. This 
is caused partly by the lack of appropriate teaching materials for IR in 
local languages (Hadiwinata, 2009, p. 57), and partly by the gradually 
increasing recognition in scholarly publications of what “international” 
means to the concept of subjectivity, which is exclusively based on the 
assumption of individualistic and self-centered actors in world affairs 
rather than collective and group-oriented ones (Wæver, 1998, p. 721). 
How is IR presently taught in Asia? The teaching methods for IR in 
Asia vary according to region. With respect to Southeast Asia, Chong 
and Hamilton-Hart (2009) argue that IR course content is sometimes 
inclined towards certain schools of thought in the region, either 
because of the influence of national educational policies or because 
of the educational background of teachers. A good example of the 
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former is Vietnam, where Marxism is treated as the central theory. In 
the case of the latter reason, realism is mainly taught in some countries 
in Southeast Asia because the teachers, who were trained in Western 
institutions, internalize the Western perception of the non-Western 
world that these countries have unstable regional political relations and 
insecure governments (Chong & Hamilton-Hart, 2009, pp. 5–6). The 
latter reason is particularly important for the purpose of the present 
article. Consequently, the issue of classroom language becomes central 
in teaching IR to local students. Indeed, teaching is occasionally con-
ducted in English elsewhere, such as in Thailand (Prasirtsuk, 2007, p. 98), 
while countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia use local language text-
books that are translations from English (Balakrishnan, 2009, p. 117; 
Hadiwinata, 2009, p. 57). Even in Japan—where it is common knowl-
edge that IR has been taught mainly in the local language with locally 
written textbooks—teachers started teaching IR in English, using text-
books distributed by Western publishers.
In terms of research, it is worth mentioning that the two leading jour-
nals of Asian IR—The Pacific Review and International Relations of the Asia 
Pacific—are published in English (Chong & Hamilton-Hart, 2009, p. 2). 
Further, we find more English-language journals in this field listed in the 
Social Science Citation Index—e.g. the Chinese Journal of International 
Relations, Korean Observer, and Asian Perspectives. The number of Asian 
scholars producing published works in English shows, in general, an 
increasing trend, although others do face difficulties, mainly because 
of the language barrier and heavy workload. In the case of the Japanese 
Association of International Relations (JAIR), about one hundred mem-
bers out of roughly two thousand published their books in English, and 
over three hundred members published articles in English. One expects 
the number to increase even more if the rate of increase remains the 
same in the future (Inoguchi, 2007, p. 374). However, some argue that 
this is an exceptional case. Hadiwinata, for instance, contends that 
academics and researchers in Indonesia still suffer from a lack of qual-
ity research and publications that meet international standards, despite 
the encouraging development of IR as an academic subject receiving a 
growing appreciation in many universities (Hadiwinata, 2007, p. 57). 
The situation is essentially the same in other Asian regions. In China, 
despite the country’s growing presence as a political power in the inter-
national arena, related to its successful economic development, scholars 
seem to be reluctant to reach an international scholarly audience. David 
Shambaugh contends, “Chinese scholars have little voice or impact on 
the international IR studies community” because, besides linguistic 
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barriers, they make “no effort whatsoever to publish in English or other 
foreign language journals and newspapers abroad” (2011, p. 366). In 
addition, the international output of Chinese scholarship is so tightly 
controlled and regulated by the government that a rela tively small 
handful of China’s IR scholars have received government approval to 
attend international meetings (Shambaugh, 2011, p. 366).
In the case of Asian IR, English is certainly an impediment. Acharya 
and Buzan write:
For those having to work in English as a second or third language, 
they may feel like it is a barrier, both because of the additional work 
necessary to put one’s thoughts into a foreign language and because 
of the high rejection rates in the leading English-language IR jour-
nals. (2007, p. 296)
These factors certainly keep those working in the “rest of the world” 
away from engaging in IR in English. This results in relatively low 
rates of attempts to publish one’s writing in a foreign language. This 
phenomenon is, in a sense, international. The prevalent reluctance to 
publish one’s work in English is not confined to Asia. Indeed, there are 
some reports that similar trends can be found in the case of IR in non-
Anglophone European countries (Friedrich, 2004; Wæver, 1998).
Is English really an impediment for IR scholars in non-Anglophone 
regions? Should we give up any attempt to announce to a global audi-
ence that there are different, and in some cases more convincing, 
interpretations of IR in these regions? Although the number of scholars 
engaging in IR research and teaching in English in these areas is still 
limited, this engagement contains the possibility of an immense impact 
on IR literature itself when we further investigate the relationship 
between English and politics.
5.3 What does it mean to study IR in English? 
Cultural hegemony
As the development of IR is mainly confined to specific areas—the UK 
and the US—the widespread recognition that English is a lingua franca 
leads us to focus on the issue of politico-cultural hegemony in the 
Gramscian sense. Because IR as an academic subject is mainly organ-
ized in English, it is clear that academic work and publications cannot 
affect the international audience unless they are written in the domi-
nant language or are translated into it. However, editorial boards and 
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publishers determine and tightly control what is deemed to meet the 
“international standard,” and proficiency and fluency in English are 
indispensable determinants in international publications and confer-
ences. Scholars publishing articles and books in English receive large 
numbers of emails every day from companies providing translation and 
proofreading services.
The ascendance of English in the field of IR leads us to an argument 
of cultural hegemony, in the (Gramscian) sense that “the use of any 
language privileges a certain pattern of thought, a specific culture, and 
particular way of constructing truth” (Friedrich, 2004, p. 8). In other 
words, the achievement of worldwide recognition in the IR community 
requires a profound understanding of a certain pattern of thought inhe-
rited from a specific geographical area, of a specific cultural background 
and of the influence of the language on truth constructions. Therefore, 
to understand IR, we naturally feel the need to internalize not only the 
language structure but also its historical and cultural background. This, 
of course, shapes our language pattern and the logical arrangement of 
knowledge production. Thus, when we write our ideas in English, the 
arguments we make often result in subconsciously representing, or at 
least partially representing, the culture and history shared by English-
speaking societies.
This leads us to suggest that there is indeed a hegemony of 
Anglophone IR theories—of the US in particular—in the contemporary 
academic discipline of IR.
This situation regarding the language and the hegemony of Anglophone 
IR stays the same if the current mutually reinforcing relationship 
remains. However, this narrative does not seem to be inevitable if we 
take into account the recent development of “World Englishes” theory 
in the study of second language acquisition. The term “World Englishes” 
here refers to an academic sub-field that accepts localized indigenous 
English as a legitimate language and encourages the diversification of 
English, ranging from dialect to creole and pidgin. This theory was ini-
tially developed in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, and now seems 
to have been increasingly accepted in the field of applied linguistics. 
The term “World Englishes” is often mistakenly assumed to be inter-
changeable with “World English,” but the two terms have very different 
meanings. The latter refers to English as the lingua franca in business, 
diplomacy, and other forms of global activity, while the former refers 
to English in a variety of localized forms, including hybrids and creoles.
The arguments that support World Englishes theory inevitably involve 
focusing on the former British colonies, where English is still used on 
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a regular basis. Theorists of World Englishes often concentrate on the 
power relationship between the former colonizers and the colonized. 
Thus, the arguments are highly political and some scholars working on 
this new development often cite postcolonial critiques in explaining the 
power relations embedded in language use (Dhillon, 2006).
From the beginning, as seen in Edward Said’s Orientalism, postcolonial 
critique has been profoundly influenced by Gramsci’s theory of hegem-
ony, as well as Michel Foucault’s use of “genealogy.” By citing these 
philosophical works, Said dramatically revealed that the Western political 
powers constructed both the representation of the “Orient” and the iden-
tity of the “Occident” (Said, 1978). The critique of Orientalism intersects 
with the broad intellectual movements contesting the homogeneity and 
essentialism that Enlightenment humanist values were said to assume, 
and the wide-ranging acceptance of Said’s Orientalism represents a mani-
festation of the crisis of Western humanism in both its Enlightenment 
and modernist forms. Said argues that, as a discourse of power, 
Orientalism constrained and shaped the ways in which the object of its 
vision, the non-Western other, was perceived and represented (Dhillon, 
2006, p. 531). This critical project involved two distinct operations. The 
first was Foucault’s re-visioning of Enlightenment science as that which 
generated a series of “othering” discourses and was thus deeply involved 
with the project of control. The second program involved revealing the 
supremacist implications of the Enlightenment idea of progress (Dhillon, 
2006, pp. 531–532). This, in turn, transformed the intellectual field of 
Oriental Studies and Colonial Studies by pitching the discussion in a 
new way (Spivak, 1988). By bringing this theory into the discussion of 
language and IR, we inevitably become aware of the power relationship 
between the “self” and “other.”
However, it is often said that Said’s theory of Orientalism is based 
upon a perception that assumes a rigid dichotomy between the West 
and the Orient. His explanation, therefore, repeatedly renders an image 
of the world with inelastic boundaries and continuous confrontations 
over these boundaries. However, culture is not rigid or inflexible. 
Indeed, it often changes through encounters with other cultures and 
this generates the dynamism of cultural politics.
5.4 World Englishes and the politics of language
When we focus on the World Englishes literature more thoroughly, 
the dichotomy of the Occident and Orient becomes less sharp. One of 
the main architects of this theory is Braj Kachru, who, as I mentioned 
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earlier, explains contemporary English by using three concentric circles, 
and his concept is the key to overcoming the dichotomy. In Kachru’s 
three circles model, the inner circle consists of Anglophone countries 
like the UK, US, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, where societies 
developed on the socio-linguistic foundation of English and English has 
been the first language. The outer circle refers to areas that have adopted 
English and used it as the first or second language because of their colo-
nial past. These areas include India, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
and Singapore. The expanding circle involves Japan, China, Russia, and 
the non-Anglophone portion of the EU (Kachru et al., 2006).
These categories are closely related to four types of diaspora. Kachru 
and Smith (2008) write: 
The first (diaspora) was to Ireland, Scotland and Wales, where local 
languages were supplanted by English; the second was to regions of 
North America, Australia, and New Zealand; the third to places such 
as India, Nigeria, Singapore, and the Philippines; and the fourth to 
countries such as China, Japan, Korea, Brazil, Germany, and Saudi 
Arabia, to name only a few in this category. (p. 5)
In this way, the inner circle was mainly constructed by the first and 
second diasporas, while the outer circle was constructed by the third 
and the expanding circle by the fourth. The existence of diasporas as 
mediators means that these three circles are in constant transformation. 
As different people intermingled with each other, so did the languages 
they used.
More interestingly, Kachru assigned different functions to each circle. 
He saw the inner circle as “norm-providing,” which means that these 
countries provide what is regarded as Standard English. The outer circle 
is defined as the “norm-developing” zone, which develops its own local 
and endocentric variant of English norms. The third circle consists of 
“norm-dependent” countries that are seen to rely on the set of stand-
ards of English initially developed by the norm-providing countries 
(Kachru, 1992).
Although there has been a considerable amount of criticism of 
Kachru’s three circles model (Higgins, 2003; Jenkins, 2003; Modiano, 
2006; Pennycook, 2003; Seidlhofer, 2001), the model has played the 
vital role of questioning the existence of a uniform and inflexible 
English. Questioning the universality and uniformity of English leads 
us to the next question, namely, that of the diachronic evolution of lan-
guage. Underlying this approach is the notion that any given language 
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has never been and never will be static (Chew, 2010, p. 46). It is always 
in the process of transformation. The ever-changing nature of language, 
in turn, directs us to focus on the way in which a language is ceaselessly 
reformulated by socio-political forces.
The impact of the English language as an instrument of intellectual 
hegemony should not be overstated: it is possible to make good use 
of English without being over-conditioned by the linguistic medium. 
More than any other language, English has become neutralised 
with regard to the specific culture and/or patterns of thought in the 
mother country, so much so that one may even speculate whether, 
in addition to British and American English, a new branch of global 
and/or European English is in the making. (Friedrich, 2004, p. 9)
In a sense, English is probably one of the languages most influenced 
by the political and economic state of world affairs. Kachru, for instance, 
suggests that “English has not colonized us but we have colonized the 
language,” quoting Philippine writer Francisco Sionil Jose, and argues 
that there is a “new revival, and a fresh awakening, about the use of a 
liberated English in the Philippines” (2006, p. 454).
In this sense, Kachru’s statement that “the sun has already set on the 
Empire but does not set on the users of English” (2006, p. 452) certainly 
seems true, and this raises another question about the relationship 
between English and English-speaking societies in the norm-providing 
nation-states. Indeed, some argue that the separation of English as a lan-
guage from English as a cultural representation is essential in teaching 
English. Asmah Haji Omar (1996) argues that English should be looked 
at “as an entity which can be separated from English culture,” and she 
therefore advises those who are learning English “to learn English but 
not to ape the Western culture” (p. 532). If culture and language are 
distinguishable from each other, as Omar claims, then English is by 
no means the exclusive property of those living in the norm-providing 
areas and whose lives are embedded in English culture.
In this way, the theory of World Englishes provides contemporary 
English with a moment of disjuncture between culture and language, 
and this has major political implications for IR. First, the Westphalia 
system, which has long been regarded as a political arrangement based 
on the “Western” method of power distribution, can be revisited as the 
abstract form of an inter-state system because we can see that nation-
states have been applied to and adopted by those areas that do not sub-
scribe to the alleged “Western” political norms. Rather than perceive all 
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nation-states, regardless of their geographical location, as standardized 
and homogenized in the way that the Westphalian norms prescribe, 
hybrid forms of nation and state are far more likely in reality. In fact, 
many writers from the outer circle, such as Salman Rushdie, Rohinton 
Mistry, Shashi Tharoor, Amitav Ghosh, and Arundhati Roy, employ 
hybrid forms of English and question the monolithic image of nation-
hood. Dissanayake contends:
These writers are seeking to gain entrance to their multifaceted sub-
jectivities by “decolonizing” the English language and the sedimented 
consciousness that goes with it. Many of them regard the English 
language as the repressive instrument of the hegemonic colonial 
discourse. They wish to emancipate themselves from its clutches by 
probing deeper and deeper into their historical pasts, cultural herit-
ages, and the intricacies of the present moment. Through these means, 
they seek to confront their protean selfhoods. What is interesting 
is that these writers are striving to accomplish this liberation through 
the very language that has in the past shackled them to what can be 
characterized as an ambiguous colonial legacy. (2006, p. 557)
In the stories of these writers, we can locate the counter-narratives of 
nation and the passionate endeavor to destabilize the political maneu-
vers through which imagined communities with essentialist identities 
become possible. This pluralized English here becomes the strategic 
means by which the given identity of the nation-state is questioned. We 
can say here that English is no longer the exclusive property of those 
residing in the core, but is owned by the entire population, who use it 
every day as a device for communication.
Second, if the theory of World Englishes not only transfers our focus 
onto a new awareness of the subjectivity of the periphery, it also ques-
tions the subjectivity of contemporary world affairs in general. As the 
above quotation reveals, the theory of World Englishes, in the age of 
postcoloniality, dismantles a fundamental notion. Identity is seen as 
neither rigid nor robust; rather, it is often protean and amalgam-like. 
This protean self often strategically takes an identity in one place and 
substitutes it with another identity in a different context.
These writers are constantly crossing and recrossing boundaries both 
topographical and linguistic so as to capture the complex dynamics 
of the present historical conjuncture and cultural moment. Some 
of them move back and forth between home and exile, at times 
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interchanging their ontologies. They are exiled from home but at 
home in the language that over-determines the exilic experience, 
and their identities are shaped in the tensional interstices of two 
cultures. This liminality, in-betweenness, appears to be vital maker 
of postcolonial spaces. (Dissanayake, 2006, p. 558)
Those who hold different identities at different points in time and 
space move through and cross over the pre-set boundaries of cultures. 
They continuously generate the space of encounters, conflicts, and 
amalgams for various cultures and traditions. Therefore, cultures, like 
languages, undergo social construction and are subject to continuous 
transformation.
The idea of ever-transforming cultures and languages has an immense 
impact not only on the periphery of the concentric circles but also at 
the very core. In fact, harsh reactions have erupted from the core against 
the idea of transformative cultures and languages. Samuel Huntington, 
for instance, argues that the English spoken in certain areas is 
“unintelligible” (1996, p. 62). Quirk calls for “universally recognized 
standards” of English so that the language retains its “reliability” (2003, 
pp. 13–14). This reaction also involves economic interests. Kachru (2006) 
rightly talks about “English as a commodity, with immense value in 
the international language market.” Those who “own” the commodity 
demand the right to “safeguard it and preserve it in terms of pounds and 
dollars” (Kachru, 2006, p. 463). In such cases, ideas about “standard” 
and “normative” English are a part of the production of economic profit.
The problem here is that safeguarding the boundaries of English con-
flicts with the hybridity of English that we can see around the world. 
What we should focus more on is instead creativity, which the pluralization 
of English brings into being; this focus in turn forces us to reorient our 
perception towards “what constitutes a harmonious, cohesive, integrated, 
and motivated speech community” (Kachru, 2006, p. 463).
5.5 From confrontation to relationality
The controversy over World Englishes is characterized by the rigidity of 
the contestants, both those who strive to protect the privileged status 
of norm-providing cultures and those who shake the pre-given structure 
of domination through the means of language as explained above. Both 
sides have their own justifications and rationalizations. Those trying 
to protect the dominant regime of English argue that the concept of 
varieties of English leads to unintelligibility and incommensurability 
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among the users, while those attempting to portray the hybrid nature 
of identities through their defense of localized English contend that 
the idea of varieties of English is essential in constituting democracy in 
the newly emerging cosmopolitan culture.
What permeates both positions, however, is a subjectivity constructed 
prior to the confrontational encounter between the two sides of the 
World Englishes dispute, and the subjectivity that each side focuses 
on is presumably constructed by socio-political factors and elements 
elsewhere. Some may argue against the statement that the hybrid forms 
of identities are not set a priori, in the sense that their subjectivities are 
constituted through the practice of crossing over cultural boundaries. 
This is correct, and this is precisely the reason why I contend that their 
identities are pre-set. Their subjectivities are assumed to exist before the 
dispute. What is missing in this argument is the awareness that subjec-
tivity is constituted and discovered through the World Englishes dispute 
over who owns the language. In other words, the presumed dialectical 
relationship between the core and periphery misses the point of the 
construction of subjectivity through the investigation of relationality. 
It is not local history, heritage, and the experience of crossing over 
boundaries that perform an essential role in the construction of subjec-
tivity. Rather, one can say that those engaged in the dispute in search 
of these elements discover these subjectivities, which account for their 
peculiar identities that then must be distinguished from the “other.”
In this sense, the concept of World Englishes clarifies a system of rela-
tionality, which includes the subjectivity of the disputants in the World 
Englishes dispute, where the emergence of relationships constructs the 
subjects. Therefore, the important issues here are how relationships 
shape and engender the subject, and how this process of subjectivity 
production ensures the emergence of an inclusive public domain in 
world affairs.
The idea of relationality, which constitutes subjectivity, is relatively 
visible and is often understood as common sense in the peripheries of 
the contemporary hegemony. Perhaps one of the archetypal examples 
in this context is Nishida Kitaro’s philosophical concept of the “place 
of nothingness.” Nishida, one of the most prominent Japanese philoso-
phers, claimed that individuals do not exist prior to experience, but, 
rather, experiences construct individuals (Nishida, 1947, p. 4). Thus, 
individual identity relies entirely on its experiences. In society, the 
experiences that produce individual identities are, by definition, social, 
and therefore relational. This means that the relationality of subjects 
becomes the central focus of inquiry into socio-politics.
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How, then, do socio-political relations constitute the subject? Here, 
probably, it is important to distinguish self-image from self-identity. 
Shih (2012) contends that self-identity is about drawing boundaries 
between the self and others in order to distinguish between them (p. 25). 
Identity construction is therefore intended to discover something 
different from the character of everyone else. This becomes a cause of 
violence, whether physical or discursive. In sum, identity making is a 
practice of violent “othering.” Imamura (2008) goes even further, argu-
ing that violence is caused by what he calls the “original division,” and 
this original division resides in the use of the “I” that draws a boundary 
between “I” and “You.” This original division is inherently violent in the 
sense that it engenders a distance between entities, and this distance is 
stabilized and institutionalized through the universalization of specific 
subjects through a standardized vocabulary (Imamura, 2008, p. 73).
Image, by contrast, is about the “evaluation” of others. In this context, 
the subject “performs in accordance with a certain consensually agreed 
upon role, explicitly as well as implicitly, between one and other who 
presumably evaluate” (Shih, 2012, pp. 25–26). Because others are the mir-
ror that reflects the image of the subject, the latter is inevitably involved 
in relationships with others. While identity is rigid in the sense that it 
is presumably an a priori construction existing before the formation of 
relationships, image is, by definition, context-sensitive and, therefore, 
flexible with respect to the relationship (Shih, 2012, p. 26).
In this system of relationality, the subject is always changing and so 
is the system. Thus, “order” means the continuous transformation of 
subjectivity and relationality. There is no pre-given order or norms, but 
instead an interminable flow of relations. A reification of this system in 
IR is China’s tributary trading system.
Hamashita (1990) defines the tributary system as an always-changing 
system based on trade relations, which is inclusive of different elements. 
This inclusivity emanated from the core of the system, which actually 
had a relatively weak centripetal force (Hamashita, 1990, pp. 32–33). All 
relationships among member countries were bilateral rather than multi-
lateral, so that no member faced exclusion as a result of the violation of 
universal norms and regulations, simply because there was no such thing. 
Rather, all bilateral relationships were dealt with on a case-by-case basis 
(Shih, 2013) and this resulted in constant systemic transformations. Since 
this system was not constructed on a foundation of strong centripetal 
power, unlike the hegemony generally familiar to the contemporary IR 
audience, all members in the tribute system were allowed to have their 
own “centres” (Hamashita, 2003, p. 20).
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What becomes the central theme in comprehending this complex 
system is the “periphery,” as in the case of World Englishes. By focusing 
on the periphery of the system, it becomes clear that “inclusiveness,” 
“mediation,” and “differentiation” are the essential characteristics of a 
tribute structure of multiple centers (Hamashita, 1994, p. 3). According 
to Hamashita, what characterized the indispensable functions that 
those peripheries performed in the tributary system was the spontane-
ous relationship among ports. The intricate network was composed of a 
web of maritime trading routes between the center and the periphe ries, 
and between one periphery and another, in each case on a bilateral 
basis. Unlike the general perception that prevails in the contemporary 
geographical understanding of oceans, which sees them as obstacles 
and impediments to trading, the perception presented by Hamashita 
(2003) is one in which the oceans shaped a public sphere in Asia before 
the sudden arrival of Western modernity and civilization.
The region’s socio-political and socio-economic dynamism was 
mainly generated at the peripheral areas instead of at the center. This is 
because there were multiple centers in the system; the entire structure of 
tribute-cum-trading was constructed on the premise of multiple circles 
overlapping with the major system (of concentric circles) and with each 
other. The peripheries thus occurred at the intersection of the various 
circles, and were characterized by mixed cultures.
The above analysis reveals the blurred core of the tribute system, and 
resembles the concept of diffuse centers of World Englishes. The World 
Englishes theory suggests that the dynamism of English is mainly gener-
ated in the “outer circle.” Similarly, the primary functioning part of the 
tribute-cum-trading system was the periphery. This in turn reveals the 
inflexible perception of the hegemony of contemporary IR, and raises 
serious doubts about the unquestioned superiority of the subjectivity 
residing at the core of the system of IR.
How could we theorize the blurred subjectivity evident in both the 
theory of World Englishes and the tribute-cum-trading system? This 
vague image of the subject is completely opposed to that assumed by 
traditional Western philosophy—an autonomous and sovereign sub-
ject with strictly demarcated boundaries. In order to find a possible 
answer to this question, we have to go back to what Nishida Kitaro 
calls the “place of nothingness.” Nishida argues that the subject is 
not autonomous or independent. The subject in the ordinary sense 
is always to open to society and depends on relationality for its con-
struction. However, at the same time, this subject encompasses all 
the relationality that appears to the subject. Therefore, the subject is 
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constructed by interactions with others while also providing the space 
for such interactions. This space is, in a sense, not a subject, however, 
because it only accepts and permits these interactions to take place. 
Therefore, it is a place (Nishida, 1949).
This is, in a sense, a double subjectivity, which consists of a con-
structed and an encompassing subject. These two are contradictory, but 
are integrated simultaneously. This contradiction is absolute rather than 
relative, because this contradiction involves the self’s opposition to 
itself. There is nothing in this place prior to the interactions, and thus 
Nishida sometimes describes it as the “place of absolute nothingness,” 
which is in sharp contrast to “relative nothingness,” which is indeed 
antonymous to “being.” In this sense, a place of nothingness is based 
on the concept of the absolute nothingness, and in fact Nishida later 
used a different concept to refer to the same idea, namely, “absolute 
contradictory self-identity” (Nishida, 1965).
It is possible to say that Nishida’s concept of the “place of noth-
ingness” is the key to understanding the political meaning of World 
Englishes and the tribute system of China. Both are inclusive towards 
others and have a blurred center. Nevertheless, they function as systems 
with coherence and continuity. They transform themselves into some-
thing new in a continuous manner. In this sense, using Englishes as a 
communicative device for comprehending contemporary world affairs 
is equivalent to saying that IR is a place that is inclusive towards differ-
ent narratives and the discourses of others.
Introducing the concept of the “place of nothingness” and the 
tribute system of China into our intellectual activities is more of a 
thought experiment than the provision of a concrete policy pro-
gram. It is suggestive, however, in considering the future paradigm of 
research methodology. In order to transform IR into a more diverse and 
democratic discipline, we have to ready ourselves for the forthcoming 
changes that will presumably take place at the peripheries. Rather than 
turn down arguments and theories of non-Western traditions mainly 
because of their “imperfect” English quality or logical inconsistency, 
we have to focus more on elements, whether intentional or coinciden-
tal, generated by new and unfamiliar forms of representation. IR will 
otherwise become one of those means of unification and standardiza-
tion at the world scale that, according to Hannah Arendt, are a typical 
feature of the disappearance of the public and totalitarianism. Thus, 
we can conclude here that it is not others who need to be transformed 




In this chapter, I have tried to explain how language easily becomes a 
device for the totalizing and unifying power of modern politics, while 
nevertheless also containing the potential for transformation and diver-
sification of our perception of the contemporary world. I also strived to 
clarify that the transformative elements often appear not in the center of 
the world, but in the relationship with peripheries. It is in this relationship 
between the core and peripheries that diversification processes initially 
take place. The diversification of perception is of particular importance in 
the context of contemporary multiculturality in the region in the sense 
that it presumably creates a more democratic sphere for intersubjectivity. 
Without the democratic intersubjective space, conflicts and confronta-
tions in the substantive world would seem to be more likely.
However, this diversification is by no means an easy task, because 
language is often associated with and controlled by nation-states with 
established subjectivities. When we focus on Japanese, for instance, it 
automatically gives us the impression that we are to deal with Japan as a 
nation-state, Japanese culture as maintained by Japanese nationals, and 
Japanese history as something continuous and linear. This is the con-
ceptual power of the nation-state that severely controls our intellectual 
lives. In this sense, conducting critical investigations into language—
and subsequent critical analysis of subjectivity—must inevitably involve 
a critical inquiry specifically into the concept of the nation-state. 
Therefore, the next questions to address in this context include the fol-
lowing: Why does the concept of the nation-state hold such a strong 
power over human thinking? Why is it extremely difficult to think of 
the world without the concept of the nation-state? What sort of world 
could we imagine if we consciously avoided the use of the concept? 
These questions obviously pose a serious challenge to researchers, but 
I firmly believe that they are worth trying to answer.
Note
1. The population estimates are from 2004.
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Preservice and Inservice English 
as a Foreign Language Teachers’ 
Perceptions of the New Language 
Education Policy Regarding the 
Teaching of Classes in English at 
Japanese Senior High Schools
Toshinobu Nagamine
6.1 Introduction
To date, Japan has attempted to create national-level standardiza-
tion so as to consolidate the quality of education. One reason for 
this is an awareness of “global competitiveness” (Hargreaves, 1994, 
p. 5). Knowledge of science and technology is assumed to promote 
Japan’s productivity and prosperity and to stabilize its national posi-
tion in international affairs. Thus, the government, especially after 
the Second World War, carried out a series of education reforms in 
order to institutionalize “scientific disciplines after Western models” 
(Figal, 1999, p. 77). As a result, national conformity in the quality of 
education has made it possible for Japan to claim excellence in basic 
education founded on the rigid compulsory education system (see 
Lucien, 2001).
It cannot be denied, however, that such educational conformity has 
generated some negative repercussions. For instance, scientific knowl-
edge and mathematical certainty are excessively valued and actively 
sought in the education system, while humanistic aspects of education 
are undervalued, particularly in the area of the liberal arts (McCarty, 
1995; cf. Toulmin, 1990). Furthermore, since the quality of teachers 
was for a long time left unquestioned, what the Japanese call shishitsu 
(i.e. the quality of teachers) has recently been called into question. 
This issue has become a crucial theme in today’s educational debates in 
Japan (e.g. Grossman, 2004). This fact, among others, clearly indicates 
OPEN
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that the top-down approach to education reforms should be replaced 
with a bottom-up approach (Nagamine, 2008).
The new version of The Course of Study (national curriculum guidelines) 
was announced by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, 
and Technology (MEXT) in March 2009 (MEXT, 2009). The new version 
includes measures to improve students’ communicative competence in 
English in Japanese senior high schools. One of the measures is to man-
date that senior high school English as a Foreign Language (EFL) teachers 
conduct all classes in English. Chapter 3, provision 4 of the common 
content for all subjects in the new Course of Study states the following:
When taking into consideration the characteristics of each English 
subject, classes, in principle, should be conducted in English in order 
to enhance the opportunities for students to be exposed to English, 
transforming classes into real communication scenes. Consideration 
should be given to use English in accordance with the students’ level 
of comprehension. (MEXT, 2011)
This new language education policy has been implemented since the 
2013 academic year. Even before the enactment, however, it had already 
generated repercussions among preservice and inservice EFL teachers 
and teacher educators in Japan (Yamada & Hristoskova, 2011). 
Many scholars and researchers alike asserted that the new policy 
was developed and introduced abruptly by MEXT in a top-down 
fashion and that it does not reflect the reality facing EFL teachers in 
local school settings. Glasgow (2012), for instance, highlighted native 
English-speaking teachers’ and Japanese EFL teachers’ uncertainty 
about their roles in implementing the policy, and implied the pos-
sibility of an unsuccessful policy implementation. It was also argued 
that the quality of English education would likely decline as a result of 
the policy enforcement (cf. Shin, 2012). This argument appears to be 
based primarily on the presupposition that the use of students’ mother 
tongue or first language in class (i.e. teachers’ and students’ use of 
Japanese in Japanese EFL contexts) plays a crucial role in develop-
ing Cognitive Academic Language Proficiency (CALP); thus, the new 
language education policy was criticized as merely forcing teachers to 
emphasize the development of Basic Interpersonal Communicative 
Skills (BICS) (see Cummins, 1979, 1984).
As Yamada and Hristoskova (2011) mention, MEXT’s new language 
education policy has indeed become the subject of heated debates in the 
field of English education. What is missing in the nationwide debates, 
Preservice and Inservice English as a Foreign Language 101
however, is in-depth, constructive discussions not only on how inservice 
EFL teachers perceive the new language education policy, but also on 
how preservice EFL teachers perceive it in teacher education settings. The 
new language education policy certainly requires EFL teachers to change 
their beliefs regarding English learning and teaching, as well as their 
pedagogical approaches and teaching practices. Nevertheless, while the 
voices of policy makers and academics (people who hold more power) 
can be heard, the voices of critical stakeholders, such as preservice and 
inservice EFL teachers (people who hold less power), are rarely heard. In 
other words, a dialogue in which the critical stakeholders can engage 
each other is lacking.
This observation is crucial because, as Freire (1993, pp. 92–93) asserts, 
“[w]ithout dialogue there is no communication, and without com-
munication there can be no true education.” Another remark by Freire 
(1993, p. 90) may be pivotal to cite here: “How can I dialogue if I am 
closed to—and even offended by—the contribution of others? How can 
I dialogue if I am afraid of being displaced, the mere possibility causing 
me torment and weakness?” It can therefore be argued that the voices 
of critical stakeholders should receive greater attention, and that these 
voices need to be taken into consideration and reflected in the process 
of policy making and implementation (cf. Mâţă, 2012; Mahboob & 
Tilakaratna, 2012).
Gorsuch (2000) claims that conditions in schools and classroom set-
tings tend to affect teachers’ perceptions of pedagogical approaches. 
Unless such context-bound, socioeducational, and often political factors 
are taken into account, our arguments for and against the new language 
education policy may ultimately prove fruitless. Or, even worse, English 
teachers (both preservice and inservice teachers) will most likely end up 
as the main barrier to educational change (cf. Shin, 2012; Pan & Block, 
2011). Therefore, a qualitative case study was designed and conducted 
to explore and investigate preservice as well as inservice EFL teachers’ 
perceptions of the new language education policy.
This chapter discusses the major research findings of the study. 
Primary data were gleaned from multiple sessions of semi-structured, 
in-depth interviews with four participants: two preservice teachers (one 
male and one female) and two inservice teachers (one male and one 
female). The collected data were analyzed employing the grounded 
theory approach (GTA) (Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 1998). In what follows, 
the research design and its rationales are explained, and the major research 
findings presented. Based on the research findings, some implications are 
also proposed for policy makers, administrators, and teacher educators to 
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develop and implement language education policies successfully in Asian 
EFL contexts in general and Japanese EFL contexts in particular.
6.2 Research methodology
6.2.1 Qualitative research design and case-study approach
According to Maxwell (1996), five major research purposes typically 
appear in qualitative research: (a) to understand meaning(s); (b) to 
understand a particular context; (c) to identify unanticipated phenom-
ena and influences; (d) to understand processes; (e) to develop causal 
explanations. Considering such purposes and the nature of the pre-
sent study (i.e. descriptive, particularistic, and heuristic), a qualitative 
research design was employed. In addition, a case-study approach was 
applied by regarding “case” as “a thing, a single entity, a unit around 
which there [were] boundaries” (Merriam, 2001, p. 27). The present 
study aimed to provide an “in-depth insight into complicated situated 
and social issues” (Mann & Tang, 2012, p. 477) involved in enacting the 
new language education policy in Japanese EFL contexts.
Since four participants were investigated, the present study may be cat-
egorized as a collective case study (Stake, 2005) allowing the researcher 
to examine “both the uniqueness and similarity” (Mann & Tang, 2012, 
p. 477) of the participants. This study was a small-scale study that incor-
porated four cases. Hence the primary goal was not “generalization in a 
statistical sense” (Merriam, 2001, p. 61) (cf. Maxwell, 2002), but instead, 
the particularization of observed and interpreted phenomena (cases) 
was considered the main goal (see Davis, 1995).
6.2.2 Participants
As noted earlier, the participants comprised four EFL teachers; two 
preservice EFL teachers (one male and one female) and two inservice 
EFL teachers (one male and one female). All participants were selected 
in such a way that the researcher could increase the opportunity “to 
identify emerging themes” (Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, & Allen, 1993, p. 82) 
embedded in the context, choose “information-rich cases” (Patton, 
2002, p. 230), and achieve typicality or representativeness of Japanese 
EFL contexts and EFL teachers (both preservice and inservice teachers). 
Rather than using probability sampling or random sampling, purpose-
ful sampling was used to select the participants (see Creswell, 1998; 
Eisenhardt, 2002; Maxwell, 1996; Merriam, 2001). Their biographical 
information is presented in Table 6.1, in which pseudonyms are used to 
protect the identity of the participants.
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6.2.3 Data collection and analysis
Primary data were collected through multiple sessions of individual 
in-depth interviews. Each in-depth interview had a semi-structured 
format and was conducted in Japanese. All interview sessions were 
recorded using an Integrated Circuit (IC) recorder. Recorded data 
were then transcribed for later data analysis. The data analysis was 
conducted following GTA procedures (see Strauss & Corbin, 1994, 
1998). Prior to the implementation of the present study, there were 
no hypotheses or theories on which this study could be based due to a 
lack of research on preservice EFL teachers’ perceptions regarding the 
new language education policy. In other words, there was no a priori 
theory on which any hypothesis could be deductively formulated 
for testing (Eisenhardt, 2002). Thus, a deductive, hypothesis-testing 
Table 6.1 Participants’ biographical information
Sayaka Yuji Tomoko Makoto
Age 28 36 24 23
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Not yet passed Passed Passed Not yet passed
Source: Primary data collected by the author.
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research design was speculated to be inappropriate. Accordingly, the 
present study aimed at “theory building.”
The researcher of this study made an attempt to construct a grounded 
theory consisting of essentially conceptual categories. Strauss and Corbin 
(1998, p. 12) describe the rationale as follows: “[t]heory derived from 
data is more likely to resemble the ‘reality’ than is theory derived 
by putting together a series of concepts based on experience or 
solely through speculation (how one thinks things ought to work).” 
Suddaby (2006, p. 634) adds that it is appropriate to use GTA when 
the researcher wants “to make knowledge claims about how individu-
als [social actors] interpret reality.” Therefore, the study focused on 
the interpretive process of the collected data by analyzing “the actual 
production of meanings and concepts used by social actors in real set-
tings” (Gephart, 2004, p. 457).
All transcribed interview data were segmented in consideration 
of every utterance’s meaning and subtle nuances (translation from 
Japanese to English was carried out in this stage). Open coding was 
then performed. Open coding is the part of data analysis concerned 
with identifying, naming, categorizing, and describing phenomena 
found in the transcribed interview data. Open coding is usually done 
based on identified features of the phenomena under investigation 
(the properties and dimensions of all segmented data) (see Table A6.1). 
Referring to the identified properties and dimensions of the data, axial 
coding was performed to verify the relationships/connections among 
the categorized data (i.e. sub-categories and core categories). After the 
axial coding, selective coding was carried out. In the process of selective 
coding, core categories were selected, identified, and systematically 
related to other categories. During this stage, the relationships among 
targeted phenomena (which included sub-categories and core catego-
ries connected by common properties and dimensions) were verified 
and validated to construct a theory.
During the data coding, a concept map (category diagram) was 
developed (see Figure A6.1). The concept map underwent several revi-
sions, mainly due to some modifications of labels and categories. The 
researcher’s interpretations of the obtained data were checked for accu-
racy by consulting the participants throughout the term of the inves-
tigation (member checking). Finally, story lines were developed taking 
into consideration the three aspects of the analyzed data, namely con-
dition, action/interaction, and consequence. According to Strauss and 
Corbin (1998), these three aspects collectively constitute a “paradigm” 
(the paradigm model).
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6.2.4 Research questions
Prior to the investigation, the following three research questions were 
formulated:
(a) How do participants perceive the development process of the new 
language education policy of conducting EFL classes in English at 
Japanese senior high schools?
(b) How do participants perceive the implementation of this new policy?
(c) How do participants perceive school and classroom conditions, 
particularly in relation to the enactment of the new policy?
6.3 Major research findings
Salient, recurring themes that represent “information-rich cases” 
(Patton, 2002, p. 230) are presented in this section. Among multiple 
meta-themes that emerged in the present study, the following three 
were chosen: (a) native speakerism; (b) resistance to change; and 
(c) teachers’ practical knowledge and lack of information-sharing. For 
each meta-theme, the research findings are described and documented 
in the form of story lines. Pseudonyms are used to refer to the partici-
pants (see Table 6.1). As will be seen, each theme shows the uniqueness 
of individual participants’ cases: the uniqueness of the participants’ 
perceptions of the new language education policy, which were deeply 
rooted in context. Moreover, it is evident that the participants’ percep-
tions were greatly influenced by socioeducational and political factors.
6.3.1 Native speakerism
When asked how they felt about the development of the new language 
education policy, Sayaka, Yuji, Tomoko, and Makoto all expressed vari-
ous levels of pressure as well as anxiety regarding their teaching prac-
tices. One of the themes that emerged in the participants’ data was their 
perception of the position of non-native English teachers. It was evident 
that they had started to regard their position as disadvantageous and 
inferior to that of native English speakers in conducting all classes in 
English. Sayaka, for instance, mentioned as follows:
There are many weaknesses that I can find in being a non-native 
speaker [of English]. The level of my speaking proficiency is not 
high enough. If MEXT can allow native English speakers to teach 
all English classes in [senior high] school, I would appreciate that! 
If there is a role that a Japanese English teacher can play … maybe 
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the role of providing instruction on test-taking techniques for entrance 
exams. That’s all.1
It was reported that in the field of teaching English to speakers of other 
languages, non-native teachers tend to perceive and identify themselves 
and native English-speaking teachers more or less in the same fashion 
(see Gebhard & Nagamine, 2005; Moussu & Llurda, 2008). As Sayaka 
implied, this tendency might have been intensified by the introduc-
tion of the new language education policy. What should be noted here 
is that Sayaka, Yuji, Tomoko, and Makoto commonly perceived the 
development of the new policy as a “critical incident” (Farrell, 2008). 
Critical incidents in professional experience are known to trigger teach-
ers’ awareness of professional identities (cf. Sakui & Gaies, 2002; Vavrus, 
2002) and prompt them to become more concerned about who they 
are as persons and teachers than about what they know (knowledge 
and skills) (Connelly & Clandinin, 1999). In addition, the awareness 
of professional identities determines teachers’ motivation to stay in 
the profession. Accordingly, it is a legitimate action to change the way 
teachers (both preservice and inservice) are supported in terms of their 
professional identity formation (Nagamine, 2012).
As the above quote from Sayaka exemplifies, all participants showed 
a similar tendency to limit their teaching role to a specific area of 
instruction, such as grammar and entrance-exam preparation. It was 
also found that Sayaka and Yuji (the inservice teachers) emphasized 
non-native EFL teachers’ superior role in classroom management and 
disciplining students. By (re-)conceptualizing their role in comparison 
to that of native English speakers, Sayaka and Yuji possibly tried to 
maintain their self-esteem and avoid losing face.
When asked what level of English proficiency would be required to 
teach EFL classes in English, Makoto answered, “Ideally, a native speaker 
level,” without hesitation. He continued as follows:
People may say, ‘You’re a Japanese teacher! It’s definitely OK if your 
English is not as good as native [English] speakers!’ There is no way 
I would ever accept that idea. So, I think Japanese English teachers 
must improve their English skills … I don’t think it’s possible to 
become like a native [English] speaker. No matter how hard I study … 
If there are native [English] speakers who have learned very well about 
English education in Japan, we [referring to a prefectural board of edu-
cation] should employ them as senior high school English teachers. 
I think it’s the best [idea].
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Tomoko commented on the same issue, alluding to her belief that 
MEXT has the ultimate intention of laying off Japanese senior high 
school English teachers whose English proficiency is not up to the level 
of native English-speaking teachers.
Any educational change thus necessitates that teachers change 
because an individual teacher is “the acting subject of change” (Carson, 
2005, p. 6). Such transformative change implicates teachers’ profes-
sional identity formation (Carson, 2005). The observed perceptual 
characteristics (particularly, perceiving and identifying non-native 
speaker teachers’ position in a specific manner) indicate that teachers’ 
self-images, as well as their self-esteem, might be at stake due to the new 
policy implementation.
6.3.2 Resistance to change
Sayaka and Yuji, in particular, expressed a strong feeling of dislike 
toward MEXT and the new language education policy. Yuji, for exam-
ple, stated that MEXT does not fully understand local school situations 
and the variety of problems that inservice teachers face on a daily basis 
(e.g. parents’ and students’ expectations and needs, class size, dealing 
with students’ different levels, lack of cooperation with junior high 
school teachers) and that the realities as perceived by inservice teach-
ers are not taken into consideration in the process of policy making. 
All participants implied that they felt a sense of distance from MEXT, 
especially when they learned about the new language education 
policy. Yuji criticized MEXT for starting a teacher-certificate renewal 
system in 2009:
The Democratic Party [of Japan] promised the abolishment [of the 
teacher-certificate renewal] system. But, it never happened. I trusted 
politicians then … Our burden has already increased since then 
[April 2009]. And, now we have the new policy.
The coalition government of the Liberal Democratic Party and the 
New Komeito Party decided to start the teacher-certificate renewal 
system. The government then experienced a governmental change in 
2009, when the Democratic Party began a new administration. As Yuji 
asserted, the Democratic Party publicly announced prior to its adminis-
tration that the teacher-certificate renewal system would be abolished, 
and that alternative measures would be undertaken to ensure preservice 
and inservice teacher quality (shishitsu). The aforementioned remark 
by Yuji implies that teachers’ expectations of the government were 
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effectively violated and that they may have been demotivated to seek 
positive changes in the field of education.
Sayaka, Tomoko, and Makoto argued that teaching all EFL classes in 
English would only be effective in helping students to improve their 
listening skills, and that the policy implementation would likely lower 
the quality of English education. Such negative attitudes toward the 
policy implementation were possibly born out of teachers’ negative 
feelings (i.e. disappointment and frustration) about the descrepancy 
between what was pledged and what was done by the politicians.
Furthermore, Tomoko stated:
I didn’t tell you this last time [in the previous interview session]. 
I took a teacher employment exam this year, and I passed it … My 
dream was to become a senior high school [English] teacher. I think 
I told you that. But, I took an exam for [prospective] junior high 
school [English] teachers … That’s right! I gave up!
Even though Tomoko’s initial intention was to become a senior high 
school English teacher, she changed her mind because of the new policy: 
“I couldn’t imagine myself using English fluently to teach [English] 
classes, so I intentionally avoided aiming for a senior high school posi-
tion.” Yet another type of resistance was observed. Sayaka, for instance, 
reported that she made a firm decision to continue using Japanese in her 
EFL classes. Sayaka also confessed that she had never even thought about 
using English to teach EFL classes, and that the percentage of time spent 
using her spoken English in class was “probably close to zero.”
6.3.3 Teachers’ practical knowledge and lack 
of information-sharing
Sayaka, Yuji, Tomoko, and Makoto demonstrated, though in different 
ways, their perception of the necessity to change their pedagogical 
approaches and teaching practices in senior high school settings. What 
they did not demonstrate was a consistent explanation of MEXT’s 
expectations for change. The need to incorporate communicative activi-
ties into EFL classes is clearly mentioned in the recent versions of The 
Course of Study, and the necessity to enrich the quality of communica-
tive activities is similarly articulated in the latest version. Moreover, it is 
clear that MEXT is trying to generate a shift from traditional approaches 
(e.g. the teacher-centered, textbook-based grammar translation method) 
to student-centered, communicative approaches (cf. Stewart, 2009). 
As Nishino (2012) argues, this attempt appears to conflict with 
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teachers’ familiar teaching practices and beliefs about English learning 
and teaching. Tomoko mentioned as follows:
It’s just extremely difficult [for me] to plan a lesson in which I use 
English to teach … Perhaps, I’m thinking that … I will need to apply 
the grammar translation method at the same time as using English 
to explain … grammatical structures. Vocabulary. Correct translation. 
Perhaps, because I’m thinking this way, I can’t imagine myself con-
ducting English classes in English. I can’t stop thinking … if I were a 
student, I wouldn’t want to be taught in English. I wouldn’t be able to 
understand what the teacher was saying. I wouldn’t feel comfortable.
Struggling to find possible explanations for MEXT’s expectations for 
change, Tomoko frequently referred to her previous in-class learning expe-
riences. In her junior and senior high school days, the teacher-centered, 
textbook-based grammar translation method was primarily used to teach 
English subjects: “We were often asked to read aloud English texts in both 
[junior high and senior high] schools. But, there were very few communi-
cative activities in senior high school.” The grammar translation method 
was therefore the most familiar teaching approach for her. In other 
words, her “practical knowledge” (Golombek, 1998) of English teaching 
was formed when she was a junior and senior high school student, and 
it still affected the way that she, as a preservice teacher, thought about 
the possible approaches for teaching EFL classes in English. Similar phe-
nomena were also observed in the other participants’ data. Lortie (1975) 
argues that prior learning experiences in schooling play a crucial role in 
determining teaching beliefs and practices, and that teaching beliefs are 
formed on the basis of one’s prior learning experience as a student rather 
than as a teacher (i.e. the apprenticeship of observation).
What appeared to be another crucial factor affecting the participants’ 
perceptions was the lack of authentic experiences of being taught in 
English (see Table 6.1). It was hence speculated that gaining authentic 
experiences of being taught in English would positively affect teachers’ 
attitudes and motivation toward using English as the medium of instruc-
tion in EFL classes. Makoto, however, pointed out the meaninglessness 
of such speculation. He had a study abroad experience with an English 
as a Second Language (ESL) program in Canada, stating that “Of course, 
classes were taught in English there.” Makoto continued:
Every lesson included many types of communicative activities. I really 
enjoyed interacting with my classmates and instructors through these 
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activities. I couldn’t understand everything, though. If you ask me to 
teach the same way as those instructors did, I don’t think I can do it … 
First of all, I don’t remember how they explained grammatical points … 
The environment [indicating the distinction between ESL and EFL con-
texts] is different. We don’t need to use English to live here [in Japan]. 
I think that … the need to use English must be created. 
Tomoko suggested that MEXT should make English an elective subject, 
and that “only students who are really motivated to learn English as a 
communication tool” should take EFL classes in senior high school. By 
doing this, MEXT may be able to support students who are interested in 
learning a different foreign language(s), while students who are highly 
motivated to learn English may be grouped and taught together in EFL 
classes. Sayaka implied that there were few opportunities for teachers to 
share information regarding class preparation procedures and instruc-
tional ideas to make English teaching effective. She also expressed the 
idea that there might be a “Japanese way” of teaching English that 
values the development of “linguistic sensibilities” and language aware-
ness; hence it was not surprising when she said that she had decided 
to continue using Japanese as the medium of instruction in her EFL 
classes. Sayaka further mentioned that MEXT had sent a DVD to every 
senior high school so that inservice teachers could watch and learn from 
successful teaching practices with the use of English. However, detailed 
descriptions of class preparation procedures were not recorded on the 
DVD. Accordingly, context-sensitive, locally appropriate approaches may 
be called for; however, preservice as well as inservice teachers are not 
given ample opportunities to share information (particularly, informa-
tion regarding instructional processes), transform practical knowledge, 
and develop as professionals in a cooperative or collaborative fashion.
6.4 Implications
Based on the research findings, the following implications can be 
proposed for policy makers, administrators, and teacher educators to 
develop and implement language education policy successfully in Asian 
EFL contexts in general and Japanese EFL contexts in particular:
(a) Policy makers, in collaboration with administrators, should recon-
sider students’ right to choose a foreign language(s) to learn in school.
(b) Policy makers and administrators should conduct needs analyses 
of foreign language(s) in local school settings to clarify parents and 
students’ needs.
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(c) Policy makers should present opportunities for students, parents, 
teachers, administrators, and teacher educators to be involved in 
meaningful, constructive dialogue in the process of policy making.
(d) Teacher educators, possibly in collaboration with administrators, 
should provide ample opportunities for teachers (both preservice and 
inservice) to experience awareness-raising, reflection-type activities 
so that teachers can share process-oriented information and trans-
form their practical knowledge and teaching beliefs.
(e) Teachers (both preservice and inservice) should explore and negoti-
ate descriptive ways of teaching (as opposed to prescriptive ways of 
teaching) that are context sensitive and locally appropriate.
Collaboration and/or cooperation among policy makers, adminis-
trators, and teacher educators is vital to ensure the effectiveness of 
the implementation of any language education policy (Mahboob & 
Tilakaratna, 2012). All critical stakeholders need to become involved in 
discourse or discursive practices so that the process of policy making, as 
well as the implementation of policy, can be a collaborative/cooperative 
endeavor. Hence, policy making and implementation should be an 
inclusive, multi-stakeholder process. In addition, considering that de 
facto foreign language education is “English education” in Japan, it 
cannot be denied that students’ right to select and study a foreign 
language(s) of their choice in school settings has been prejudiced. This 
problem should be solved (or at least, it should be politicized) as soon 
as possible in order for Japan to develop as a multilingual and multicul-
tural society. It is hence suggested that policy makers, in collaboration 
with administrators (such as officers of prefectural boards of education), 
conduct needs analyses to investigate students’ and parents’ needs 
regarding foreign language learning at the local-school level. It is imper-
ative and urgent for the government to create a system that reflects the 
outcomes of needs analyses in policy making and implementation.
In spite of the enactment of the new language education policy, sen-
ior high school teachers (both preservice and inservice teachers) may 
continue teaching EFL classes in exactly the same way as they were taught 
themselves, that is, using Japanese (i.e. through a teacher-centered, 
textbook-based grammar translation method) (cf. Pan & Block, 2011). 
By providing inservice and preservice training in which teachers can 
fully explore and effectively transform their practical knowledge and 
teaching beliefs, teacher educators and administrators can play an 
important role in the implementation of the new policy. The action of 
teacher educators and administrators may thus become a determining 
factor in the successful enactment of the policy.
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In addition, as is evident in the present study, teachers will most likely 
end up as the main barrier to educational change unless they are given suf-
ficient opportunities to explore and negotiate descriptive ways of teaching 
(i.e. context-sensitive, locally appropriate teaching approaches). Moreover, 
as this study implies, there is a tendency that teachers “often believe 
that they have little power to effect policy and do not view themselves 
as implementers of macro-level policies” (Mahboob & Tilakaratna, 2012, 
p. 8). Therefore, it seems urgent to equip teachers with the knowledge and 
skills to take part in political dialogue and discourse pertaining to educa-
tion. More specifically, teachers need to acquire astute analytical skills 
to scrutinize the macro-structures of their educational, political context 
( Johnson, 2009). Teachers also need to acquire political tactics to engage in 
discursive practices so as to negotiate and change realities (see Shin, 2012).
6.5 Conclusion
The new language education policy, which has been enacted by MEXT 
in 2013, mandates that senior high school EFL teachers conduct all 
their classes in English. This new policy has generated repercussions 
among preservice teachers, inservice teachers, and teacher educators. 
There is no doubt that it adds to the pressure on both preservice and 
inservice teachers. The level of associated anxiety and pressure may vary 
among teachers due to differing school settings, employment status, 
teaching beliefs, and/or the way that they perceive realities. Likewise, 
how teachers react to the new policy implementation may also vary. 
Contextuality (Packer & Winne, 1995) of realities and issues is uniquely 
recognized and perceived by individual teachers.
Furthermore, the new policy certainly requires teachers to change their 
beliefs regarding English learning and teaching, as well as their pedagogi-
cal approaches and teaching practices. While the voices of policy makers 
and academics can be heard, the voices of teachers are rarely heard, and a 
dialogue in which teachers can engage with each other is especially lack-
ing. This lack of dialogue is detrimental because it is local teachers, not 
policy makers, who have direct access to students and translate a top-down 
imposed policy into practice. This chapter hence presented an argument 
in support of the possibility of recognizing local teachers’ roles and voices 
as an integral part of government policy making (cf. Farrell & Kun, 2007).
The limitation of the present study may be attributed to the low 
number of participants (i.e. four cases). All participants were Japanese 
teachers in an EFL setting. Furthermore, although the research methodo-
logy (particularly, the employment of GTA and member checking) 
might have minimized this possibility, it is likely that the researcher’s 
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role (interviewer) affected the objectivity of the data analysis and 
interpretations. Therefore, even though it was not a primary goal of 
this study, generalizability may be called into question. It should be 
stressed, however, that particularization, as opposed to generalization, 
was the research goal. A remark by Davis (1995, p. 441) is relevant here: 
“[o]ne of the common criticisms of qualitative studies is that they are 
not generalizable. On the one hand, a strength of qualitative studies is 
that they allow for an understanding of what is specific to a particular 
group, that is, what cannot possibly be generalized within and across 
populations.” In this regard, the particularization of the studied cases 
should be taken as a strength. 
Appendices
Table A6.1 Coding sample of Yuji
Segmented data Property Dimension Label
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Note
1. “[ ]” signifies information added by the researcher; “…” denotes places where 
part of the interview data is omitted.
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7
An Alternative Approach to 
Foreign Language Education 
in Japan with a View toward 
Becoming a Multicultural Society
Mitsunori Takakuwa
7.1 Introduction
In compulsory education in public schools in Japan, foreign language 
education formerly began in lower secondary schools in principle. 
From 2011 it was introduced in elementary schools as well. Thus 
Japanese students in public schools are supposed to have the chance to 
learn foreign languages for at least several years during their compul-
sory education. Nonetheless, in reality, their choices are limited: they 
can learn only English, not other foreign languages, under the current 
national curriculum. English education is the foreign language educa-
tion provided in compulsory education in Japanese public schools, 
and other foreign language education has been neglected. However, 
Japanese society is not as ethnically homogeneous as it has appeared 
to be (Burgess, 2007; Okubo, 2008; Tsuneyoshi, 2004). There are about 
two million foreigners registered in Japan, and more importantly, they 
are from various countries and regions, including where English is not 
primarily used (Ministry of Justice, 2012). Thus it can be said that Japan 
has now become a linguistically and culturally diverse society. Should 
we still continue to adhere to the “English education only” policy?
This study surveys foreign language education in Japanese compul-
sory education under the current national curriculum. It then examines 
the effectiveness of foreign language education in the context of Japan 
as a multicultural society, with special emphasis on schools with foreign 
children who have no knowledge of the Japanese language. Finally, the 
study sets forth an alternative approach to foreign language education, 
which is in line with Japanese society becoming increasingly multicul-
tural and multilingual.
OPEN
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7.2 English education as the de facto foreign language 
education
In the academic year of 2011, starting in April and ending in March 
the following year, English education was officially introduced in 
elementary schools in Japan. Although the grade in which students 
start learning English varies from place to place, the national curricu-
lum, or the Course of Study, for elementary schools specifies what is to 
be learned in grades five and six. This means that Japanese elementary 
school students will have started to learn English by the time they are 
in grade five at the latest. It should be noted that English education 
in elementary schools is formally called “Foreign Language Activities.” 
Therefore, any other foreign language instead of, or in addition to, 
English could theoretically be taught. However, in reality, English is 
the choice of language as specified in the national curriculum for-
mulated by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and 
Technology (hereafter MEXT): “In principle English should be selected 
for foreign language activities” (MEXT, 2010). Thus in Japan “Foreign 
Language Activities” in elementary schools is practically synonymous 
with English education.
Japan adopts a nine-year-long compulsory education system from 
grade one to grade nine. Japanese students have an additional three 
years of “foreign” language education after graduating from elemen-
tary school. However, even at the lower secondary school level 
(grades seven through nine), foreign language education usually 
implies English education. The national curriculum for lower sec-
ondary schools lists “Foreign Languages” as the name of the subject 
to be taught along with other subjects, such as Japanese language, 
mathematics, and science. However, it is easy to recognize that only 
English is intended in the curriculum. There are three sections in the 
“Foreign Languages” curriculum for lower secondary students: over-
all objective, objectives and contents for each language, and lesson 
plan design and treatment of the contents (MEXT, 2011a). The first 
and third sections are brief, and much of the space is reserved for the 
second section. This extensive section is unevenly divided into two 
parts: “English” and “Other Foreign Languages.” The way English edu-
cation is implemented is explained in great detail. For example, one 
of the three subsections under the heading of “English” is “contents,” 
which contains how four skills of English should be incorporated in 
language activities, how pragmatic functions of language should be 
treated in those activities, what phonological, lexical, or grammatical 
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items of English should be taught, and how these items should be 
treated in class.
Compared to this detailed treatment of “English,” the explanation of 
“Other Foreign Languages” in the same section, “Objectives and con-
tents for each language,” of the curriculum is markedly brief. Under the 
heading of “Other Foreign Languages” there is only one sentence, say-
ing “Instruction for foreign languages other than English should follow 
the objectives and contents of English instruction” (MEXT, 2011a, p. 8). 
MEXT is the only agency in Japan to control education in general. As 
Seargeant (2009) pointed out, the Japanese educational system is highly 
centralized. Even when local governments set their own educational 
goals, they should follow the national curriculum. With the power and 
control that MEXT has, it specifies what to teach and how to teach 
it in great detail in the national curricula for academic subjects, as is 
the case with “English” described above. Thus, if MEXT had indeed 
intended to implement foreign language education other than English 
at the lower secondary level, it would have laid down the contents and 
the methodology of language teaching for other languages as well in the 
national curriculum. Instead, as we saw above, MEXT provided a very 
brief explanation in a single sentence. This lack of detailed explanation 
on foreign language education other than English suggests that MEXT 
does not take its implementation into serious consideration.
One could argue that MEXT’s inclusion of this brief sentence implies 
that they are serious about implementing foreign language education 
other than English. However, this interpretation is highly unlikely, 
because it is practically impossible to follow the objectives and con-
tents of English instruction when teaching other foreign languages. As 
mentioned above, the current national curriculum introduces English 
education in elementary school. The previous curriculum empha-
sized inculcating listening and speaking abilities in English. However, 
because English education would now be introduced at the elementary 
level, a revision was made to the curriculum such that lower secondary 
school students could develop their abilities in all four English language 
skills, because these skills would be built on the foundation of students’ 
communication abilities, which were intended to be formed at the ele-
mentary school level (MEXT, 2011c; National Institute for Educational 
Policy Research, 2012). However, since foreign language activities at 
the elementary level are synonymous with English education, there is 
virtually no basis for foreign languages other than English. How can 
learners of a foreign language who have no knowledge of that language 
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learn it effectively by following a curriculum that assumes they already 
have some prior knowledge of the language? This is akin to novice 
learners of a foreign language being forced to start their very first lesson 
at an intermediate level. If MEXT were serious about implementing 
foreign language education other than English, the organization would 
have developed another curriculum in which the objectives, instruc-
tions, and contents differed from those of English. Therefore, in reality, 
during the period of compulsory education in Japan both “Foreign 
Language Activities” in elementary schools and “Foreign Languages” 
in lower secondary schools are practiced solely through English education, 
and MEXT cannot be considered to be serious about implementing 
foreign language education other than English in compulsory educa-
tion, despite the fact that Japan is a multicultural society.
7.3 English education for whom?
As we saw above, English education is the de facto foreign language 
education in the compulsory education system in Japan. It is true that 
English is among the most influential languages in the world today in 
the sense that it is primarily used in international communications in 
politics and businesses. However, it is also true that not everyone will 
be involved in such international communications. Among the biggest 
reasons to reallocate initial English education to elementary school 
level was that many Japanese people did not have good command of 
English even after about six to ten years of English education, includ-
ing higher education, before it was introduced to elementary schools 
(Seargeant, 2009), and that starting to learn English at an earlier age 
was thought to be the solution to the Japanese people’s lack of profi-
ciency in English. That is, it was assumed that extending the period of 
English study would enable Japanese people to become proficient in it. 
This solution may work in some contexts, and may not in others. For 
the solution of making the period of English learning longer to work 
effectively, it should also be assumed that Japanese people’s relatively 
poor English proficiency level, if indeed it exists, is due to the limited 
amount of time spent learning English. However, the factors that affect 
second language learning are more complicated (e.g. Andreou, G., 
Vlachos, & Andreou, E., 2005; Ellis, 2004). If one has no contact time 
with a target language, one is not likely to acquire it. If one lives in an 
environment in which the target language is primarily used and has 
much contact time with it by using it daily, one is likely to acquire it. 
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In this sense, increasing contact time with the target language may lead 
to enhancing learners’ proficiency levels. But it is unknown how much 
contact time is enough for them to become proficient in the language 
on the continuum of contact time between zero and every day. Under 
the current national curriculum, Japanese fifth and sixth graders will 
experience English education for 35 periods (each a 50-minute class) per 
year—the same amount of time as is dedicated to “Moral Education.” 
Would it be considered a significant amount of time to add 70 periods 
(roughly equaling 58 hours) of English lessons in the last two years of 
elementary schools?
Motivation is also an important factor in second language learning 
(e.g. Dörnyei, 2001; Gardner, 2010). In Japan many people do not need 
English to live their daily lives (Yano, 2008). Although some people 
may use English at work, they do not need it when buying groceries, 
commuting, going to hospitals, banks, or public offices, and so on. Two 
types of motivation can be introduced here: integrative and instru-
mental motivations concerning second language learning (Gardner & 
MacIntyre, 1991). Some learners are interested in the target language 
itself, the countries or regions in which it is primarily used, and the 
cultures associated with those who use it. Such learners can be said to 
have integrative motivation to learn the target language. Other learn-
ers tend to regard the language as some instrument or tool by which 
they can fulfill their desires to accomplish tasks in, say, business. These 
learners are thought to have instrumental motivation to learn the target 
language. In Japan, many people whose first language is Japanese do not 
have to use English. In such a situation, it appears difficult to encourage 
learners to maintain either type of motivation long enough for them 
to become proficient in the target language. Of course, there are some 
people who were able to learn it successfully with either or both types 
of motivation. It is likely that language teachers are among them. Other 
professionals or workers who use it for their business may also have 
been successful in maintaining motivation to learn it (Kubota, 2011; 
Seargeant, 2009). However, it is not as easy to maintain motivation to 
learn the target language as those who have been successful in being 
motivated may think it is.
Terasawa (2011) pointed out that the view that Japanese people have 
aspirations to learn English is misleading. A large-scale social survey of 
n  2,507, which investigated the behaviors and thoughts of Japanese 
people based on the two-stage stratified random sampling ( JGSS Research 
Center, n.d.), showed that about 40% of Japanese valued English skills 
either for their work or their personal life while the remaining of about 
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60% did not. More detailed analyses showed that, according to type of 
job, those who were professional workers valued English skills highly, 
whereas people in other occupations did not. In the “Professional” cate-
gory, 69.9% of 113 male workers and 60.4% of 134 female workers put 
a relatively high valuation on English skills for their jobs. Also 63.7% of 
113 male workers and 51.8% of 137 female workers valued English skills 
highly for their hobbies or personal relationships. The category of types 
of job that comes after “Professional” is “Managerial.” In this category, 
52.5% of 40 male workers and 25.0% out of four female workers valued 
English skills for their jobs, and 57.5% of 40 male workers and 75.0% 
of four female workers valued English skills highly for their hobbies or 
personal relationships. It should be noted here that the relatively high 
percentage of 75.0% may be due to the small sample sizw, that is n  4 
for this category. Thus caution is needed to evaluate this figure. For 
workers in other types of job (“Agricultural,” “Skilled,” “Semi-skilled,” 
“Unskilled,” “Clerical,” and “Sales”), the highest percentage was 54.2% 
out of 168 male clerical workers who valued English skills highly. Thus 
it is safe to conclude that, except for those who are professional workers, 
the majority of Japanese people do not think English skills are impor-
tant for their jobs and/or their personal lives.
From a slightly different perspective, it can be pointed out that 
among the parents of students who go to school and study English, 
the majority do not value English skills highly. The students also know 
that Japanese people do not need to use English in their daily lives. 
How can they be motivated to learn English then? It could be argued 
that English will be useful when visiting foreign countries or regions. 
However, the number of people who go overseas should be consid-
ered. Table 7.1 shows the total number of Japan’s population, Japanese 
nationals overseas who stay overseas longer than three months, and 
Japanese overseas travelers (Japan National Tourism Organization, n.d.; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2011; Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications, n.d.).
In Table 7.1 the number of Japanese nationals living in Japan is used 
to show a rough measure of how many Japanese people may need to 
use English after they study it under the national curriculum. Japan’s 
total population is slightly larger than the number of Japanese nation-
als since the former includes other nationals living in Japan. As we can 
see, the number of Japanese nationals overseas is very small compared 
to Japanese nationals in Japan. Its ratio is less than 1%. The number of 
Japanese overseas travelers is much larger than that of Japanese nation-
als overseas. Still the number of Japanese overseas travelers accounts for 
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no more than 14% of that of Japanese nationals in Japan. Of course, 
it is unlikely that every one of the Japanese nationals overseas and 
Japanese overseas travelers has to be proficient in English, since some 
of them may go to countries or regions where English is not used pri-
marily. However, for the sake of discussion, let us assume that everyone 
in these two categories would need to use English. Still the proportion 
of Japanese who need English is relatively small, and the conclusion 
that the majority of Japanese do not need English for their daily lives is 
tenable. Then why do Japanese students have to study English, among 
other foreign languages, for at least five years of compulsory educa-
tion (grades five through nine), and probably for three additional years 
(grades ten through twelve) in upper secondary school? Do all of them 
have to learn it even when the majority of them are unlikely to need it? 
Maybe now is the time to consider whether English education should 
be the de facto foreign language education in Japan.
7.4 Diversity in Japanese society
As we have seen so far, the majority of Japanese people do not need 
English for their daily lives. Are there any other foreign languages they 
might encounter in Japan? Table 7.2 shows the number of registered for-
eigners and the breakdowns by nationalities (Ministry of Justice, 2012).
As Figure 7.1 shows, the number of registered foreigners gradually 
increased from 2001 and peaked in 2008, when over 2.2 million foreign 
residents were registered. After that the number declined, and, as of 
2011, just over two million foreign residents were registered (Ministry of 
Table 7.1 Japanese population, Japanese nationals overseas, and Japanese overseas 
travelers




2001 125,930,000 837,744 16,215,657
2002 126,053,000 871,751 16,522,804
2003 126,206,000 911,062 13,296,330
2004 126,266,000 961,307 16,831,112
2005 126,205,000 1,012,547 17,403,565
2006 126,286,000 1,063,695 17,534,565
2007 126,347,000 1,085,671 17,294,935
2008 126,340,000 1,116,993 15,987,250
2009 126,343,000 1,131,807 15,445,684
2010 126,382,000 1,143,357 16,637,224
Sources: Japan National Tourism Organization (n.d.); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
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Figure 7.1 Total number of registered foreigners in Japan
Source: Ministry of Justice (2012).
Justice, 2012). Out of the total number of 2,078,508 registered foreigners, 
Chinese constitute about 33%, Koreans constitute about 26%, and both 
Brazilians and Filipinos constitute about 10% (see Figure 7.2).
Table 7.2 and Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show that the majority of registered 
foreigners originally came from Asian and South American countries. 
Because no data are available for the first language of these registered 
foreigners, we cannot be sure of which languages they use primarily. 
However, the fact that in these Asian and South American countries 
English is not primarily used as the first language of those who live there 
suggests that not everyone from these countries is proficient in English 
to the extent that they can live their daily lives using English without 
any difficulty. Then what would happen in terms of communication if 
the majority of Japanese who do not need and thus do not use English 
for their daily lives meet these foreigners from Asia and South American 
countries in Japan? Theoretically, it is possible to use English to commu-
nicate with each other. However, this type of communication requires 
that both parties be proficient in English. Whether the foreigners can 
use English or not, the majority of Japanese do not. Thus this type of 
communication seems rare in reality. Another scenario is for both par-
ties to use Japanese. Anecdotally this type of communication seems 
much more common than the first one (Kubota & McKay, 2009). This is 
not surprising in that there are many foreigners who have lived in Japan 
and become proficient in Japanese. Even those foreigners who are not 
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so proficient in Japanese are likely to be aware that it is primarily, and 
exclusively in most cases, used in Japan, and that they are expected to 
communicate in Japanese while they are in Japan. This type of commu-
nication is consistent with the language policy with which the Japanese 
government has put assimilation pressure on them (Tsuneyoshi, 2004; 
Vaipae, 2001). Japan has not actively accepted immigrants (Kanno, 
2008; Sato, Okamoto, & Miyao, 2009). As it is rapidly becoming an 
aging society (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, n.d.), it seems to 
have come to realize that, without people from outside the country, it 
is very difficult to sustain such a rapidly aging society. Currently there 
are about two million registered foreigners, which accounts for less 
than 2% of Japanese population. Thus these foreigners are considered 
minority groups compared to the mainstream Japanese nationals. For 
the minority groups, about 79% of whom are people from Asian and 
South American countries, the Japanese government has been trying to 
help them acquire Japanese. Also at present many local governments, 
along with the Japanese government, offer important notices and 
instructions concerning the civil service in Chinese, Korean, Spanish, 















Figure 7.2 Percentage of registered foreigners by nationality in 2011
Source: Ministry of Justice (2012).
128 Mitsunori Takakuwa
relatively large number of other minority groups whose first language 
is not among those listed above, the local governments may translate 
notices and instructions into languages used by these groups as well 
or instead. However, apart from translated documents, face-to-face 
services in the minority languages are very limited. Such services by 
which foreigners will receive assistance in the civil services in their first 
languages are often provided by local organizations, including NGOs 
and NPOs, not by local governments (Burgess, 2007; Tsuneyoshi, 2004). 
The fact that services in minority languages are limited in Japan is not 
surprising given that the majority of Japanese people are not proficient 
even in English, which they learn at school for several years, let alone 
in other languages, which are virtually neglected in foreign language 
education in compulsory education as we saw above. However, would it 
not be qualified as another type of communication in the present Japan 
that both Japanese and foreigners should try to learn each other’s lan-
guage? That is, while foreigners keep learning Japanese, Japanese people 
could also try to learn other foreign languages in addition to English. 
This would allow both parties to interact with each other in two-way 
communication.
7.5 Foreign language education in line with 
internal internationalization
Like the English, the majority of Japanese do not need other foreign 
languages either since they can live their daily lives in Japanese unless 
they swiftly become aware of the necessity to learn foreign languages 
mentioned above. Thus English and other foreign languages are simi-
lar in terms of usefulness for the majority of Japanese in their daily 
lives. However, a difference between them can be found in terms of the 
number of registered foreigners living in Japan, as we saw in Figure 7.2. 
Although no data are available for how many of these registered foreign-
ers actually have a language closely associated with their countries of 
origin as their first language, it can be safely estimated that there is at 
least a slightly larger chance for Japanese to encounter foreigners whose 
first language is, or who have a good command of, Chinese, Korean, 
Portuguese, or Spanish than those with English. In this sense Japan can 
be regarded as a multicultural and multilingual society. Thus it is just as 
well worth learning other foreign languages as it is to learn English. The 
word kokusaika, which literally means internationalization, is often heard 
in many contexts in Japan (Ertl, 2008). However, internationalization is 
usually associated with English, not with other foreign languages. This 
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seems to be due to the assumption that internationalization occurs when 
Japanese people go abroad, that is, when the direction of internationali-
zation is outbound. Japanese people have an image of their going abroad, 
and thus they come to a conclusion that they need English outside 
Japan. However, as we saw above, internationalization does not occur 
unidirectionally. The opposite form of internationalization occurs when 
foreigners come from outside Japan. In this type of internationalization, 
which is called internal internationalization (Tsuneyoshi, 2004), the 
direction is inbound, and knowledge of the first languages of the foreign-
ers will enhance communication between them and Japanese people. 
In other words, there is a sizable conflict regarding internationalization 
for Japanese people. In internationalization in its traditional sense, they 
believe they have to use English, although this is not always true, and 
thus they try to learn and use it for communication with foreigners, 
even when they go to countries or regions in which English is not pri-
marily used. Thus Japanese people may believe that learning English is 
important, and English education as the de facto foreign language subject 
in compulsory education in Japan supports this view. In contrast, in 
internal internationalization, Japanese people believe they have only to 
use Japanese, and English if necessary, and thus they do not try to learn 
other foreign languages even if the foreigners who use them as their first 
language outnumber those who use English as such. This may be partly 
because Japan tries to assimilate foreigners into Japanese society by mak-
ing them learn Japanese on one hand and neglecting foreign language 
education other than English in the compulsory education system on the 
other. Implementing foreign language education other than English in 
compulsory education may lead to resolving this conflict.
7.6 Foreign children in schools
There is another valid reason to teach foreign languages other than 
English in the compulsory education system in Japan. As we saw above, 
at present there are about two million registered foreigners in Japan. The 
number of these figures has been decreasing slightly, partly because of 
the recession after the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008 and because of 
the Great Earthquake in Japan in 2011. However, the number of children 
whose first language is not Japanese and who need special assistance 
in the Japanese language at school has not decreased. MEXT (2011b) 
reported the following numbers of those children (see Table 7.3).
The numbers in Table 7.3 show students in all the public elementary 
schools, lower and upper secondary schools, and other types of schools, 
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which include schools for the educationally challenged. Data for 2009 
are missing because MEXT decided to conduct this survey every other 
year after 2008. A glance at this table suggests that the number of foreign 
students who need Japanese language instruction peaked in 2008, and 
it may have started to decline, given that the total number of registered 
foreigners peaked in 2008 and has declined since then (see Table 7.2 
and Figure 7.1). However, we cannot be sure about this, since, as stated 
above, the data are missing for 2009, and will be missing every other 
year after that, and thus we do not and will not have sufficient data to 
verify the interpretation of the data given above.
There is one thing we can reasonably conclude. Whether the number 
of foreign children who need Japanese language instruction stays the 
same or is decreasing, the total number of schools that host such students 
has increased since 2005, as in Table 7.4.
In other words, the possible decrease in numbers of such children, 
which might be related to the decrease in the total number of registered 
foreigners, does not affect the number of schools that host such stu-
dents. Of course, it is possible that the number might have been higher 
in 2009 than in 2010, and we cannot be sure about this since no data 
is available for 2009. Still we can safely conclude that the number has 
increased since 2008, when the number of registered foreigners has, and 
the number of foreign students who need Japanese language instruction 
also seems to have, started decreasing. This brings up another issue for 
discussion. That is, how do schools accommodate foreign students who 
need Japanese language instruction? As Burgess (2007) pointed out, 
additional teachers are dispatched for those schools that host a certain 
Table 7.3 Number of foreign children who require Japanese 
language instruction










2009 ( – )
2010 28,511
Source: MEXT (2011b).
An Alternative Approach to Foreign Language Education in Japan 131
number of such students. This assistance does not seem sufficient, but it 
still is better than providing no support. About 80% of the schools that 
host such foreign students have four or fewer of them (MEXT, 2011b), 
and it is often the case that no additional teacher is dispatched for them 
(Burgess, 2007; Tsuneyoshi, 2004). Does having four foreign students 
require the school’s teachers to make significantly less effort than having 
five of them? The line drawn between these cases is arbitrary. In fact, 
even having one such student requires teachers to make tremendous 
efforts. In the Japanese compulsory education system, at least one 
teacher is assigned to each class as a homeroom teacher, who takes care 
of the students in the class in terms not only of the students’ academic 
progress but their school lives in general. Even when there is only 
one student in a class who needs Japanese language instruction, if the 
homeroom teacher does not speak their first language, the teacher has 
to make extra effort just to communicate with the student, let alone to 
take care of the student’s school life in general. To make matters worse, 
it is often the case that the parent or parents of such a student may not 
have knowledge of the Japanese language. Thus, if the teacher wants to 
talk to the parent(s), an interpreter may be needed. Otherwise, nego-
tiations between them would be likely to fail. Apparently, the teachers 
and the schools need much more support than they now receive from 
both national and local governments. Currently, local volunteers who 
have knowledge of the first language of the students who need Japanese 
instruction come to school and help them in class. However, not every 
school has those volunteers nearby. The most important thing is for the 
schools and teachers to be able to offer such support to those students.
Table 7.4 Number of schools hosting foreign children requiring 
Japanese language instruction














So how can teachers and schools systematically accommodate these 
students and negotiate with their parent(s) when local volunteers are 
not available? This is when we should come back to the discussion of 
foreign language education in Japan.
7.7 Conclusion
As we saw before, English education is the de facto foreign language 
taught in elementary and lower secondary schools in Japan. That is, in 
Japan’s compulsory education system, students in public schools study 
English as a foreign language, but not other languages. It is true that 
English is widely used around the world and, thus, to learn English 
is potentially useful. However, the majority of Japanese can live their 
daily lives without it. That is, English is a language that is useful, but 
not always necessary, for them. If so, they do not have to learn English 
to the extent that they are expected to become as proficient in it as 
those who use it as their first language. As we saw before, Japan is 
now a multicultural as well as multilingual society to a certain extent. 
For the majority of Japanese there are slightly higher chances to com-
municate in languages other than English inside Japan, although the 
likelihood is still low. Whether the target language is English or any 
other foreign language, it is not easy to become as proficient in it 
as those who use it as their first language with merely a few years of 
foreign language education in the country. This is mainly due to the 
fact that no foreign language is prevalent in Japan. However, if we can 
set the goal of foreign language education as to become proficient in it 
to the extent that Japanese people use it according to their goals and 
purposes, we can safely reduce the number of class periods for English 
in the compulsory education system, and make room for other foreign 
language education.
Thus, by introducing education in other foreign languages as well, 
we can not only teach other foreign languages to Japanese students, 
but also make them realize that English is not the foreign language but 
simply one of the foreign languages in the world. If Japanese students 
have knowledge of other foreign languages, students who come from 
overseas and use them as their first languages may feel more comfort-
able at school. It is also possible that some of the Japanese students 
may become teachers with such knowledge and help those students 
who come from outside Japan in their first languages. Because Japanese 
society is rapidly aging, it is anticipated that an even larger number of 
foreigners will be needed to sustain it. This will make Japan increasingly 
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multicultural and multilingual. Knowledge of foreign languages will 
then become key in the near future.
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Blown in by a windstorm from the East, Mary Poppins came to the 
Banks’ home at Number 17 Cherry Tree Lane, London. The main char-
acter of P. L. Travers’ children’s novel, published in 1934, is allegedly 
the world’s best-known “nanny.”1 The Banks’ household is a traditional 
one. Mr Banks works in a bank in the City of London, leaving the 
task of hiring a suitable nanny for their children to Mrs Banks alone. 
Mrs Banks places a job advertisement in the newspaper, specifying 
a strong letter of recommendation as a requirement. Thus, a female 
employer decides the employment conditions of and negotiates with 
the female employee—a woman directing another woman.2 In the 
Banks’ home, the nanny is to work in a live-in environment, sleep 
in a nursery room, and have one day off every other Thursday. Even 
then, of course, it is not a full day, but only the afternoon between 
1:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. In the eyes of the nanny’s employer, there exists 
neither labor standard legislation nor any basic rights for laborers or 
employees.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that today 
there are up to 100 million Mary Poppinses around the world. It claims 
that these women are forced to bear even tougher conditions than the 
main character of Travers’ children’s novel.3 It is an airplane, not an 
east wind, that brings them to developed countries, such as Britain, 
from developing countries such as the Philippines. They arrive in high 
numbers to look after families in host countries, leaving their own fami-
lies behind. Female overseas workers are also increasingly participating 
in other sectors traditionally considered to be “women’s work,” such 
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as health care and nursing for the sick and elderly (Ehrenreich & 
Hochschild, 2002; Kingma, 2006). Their basic rights, including days off 
each week, set hours, and minimum wage, have often been ignored, as 
if they have been forced into modern-day slavery.
This chapter analyzes the situation of today’s Mary Poppinses in 
developed countries and beyond from an international relations 
scholar ship perspective. In doing so, it focuses on the household as 
the basic unit of social reproduction, and aims to reveal the causes and 
effects of its reconfiguration beyond national borders. The conditions 
of female migrant workers are by no means simply a deal between a 
powerful and a not-so powerful woman. Rather, both women form part 
of a rapidly growing phenomenon described as “global householding.”4 
Such a phenomenon is not confined to one region, but is prevalent all 
over the world. Asia is certainly not immune from it.
This chapter concentrates on three tasks. First, by examining the 
“security”5 and “insecurity” of female overseas domestic workers 
(FODWs), it aims to incorporate the perspectives of both “gender”6 and 
migration studies into the discipline of security studies. Within the study 
of International Relations (IR), security studies have traditionally focused 
on the military concerns of states. Recently, towards and since the end of 
the Cold War, security studies has undergone enormous changes, its 
scope of study being greatly expanded to cover non-military dimensions 
of security (Buzan, 1991). The field may nonetheless still lack analytical 
frameworks that integrate these wider issues into a holistic notion of 
security. “Global householding” is a vastly understudied, if not com-
pletely ignored, subject within security studies, despite involving an 
increasing number of countries and affecting so many people’s lives both 
in positive and negative ways.
Second, this chapter attempts to explain how constraining regimes 
are in fact currently constructed in a multi-layered form, subsequently 
strengthening the “insecurity” of FODWs. It then demonstrates that 
these multi-layered regimes at national, regional, and global levels, 
whether upheld in practice or circumvented, have become a constitu-
tive part of this “global householding” phenomenon. “Insecurity” for 
FODWs stemming from legal restrictions is found not only at a national 
level, but also within additional layers of regional and global jurisdiction. 
Scholars in gender and migration studies have examined the legal as well 
as psychological elements of the insecurities of women, especially female 
migrants, who accept live-in domestic jobs and are forced to work long 
hours under tough working conditions.7 IR scholarship can further show 
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that the processes of “global householding” are increasingly occurring 
all over the world, and these women are subject to the multiplicity of the 
constraining national, regional, and global regimes.
Third, this chapter tries to challenge the state-centric academic analysis, 
and concentrates instead on the household as the space where individuals 
of different backgrounds meet and pool diverse resources for the purpose 
of ensuring the continuity of the collective unit. Within the household, 
we communicate and negotiate daily with one another, with efforts to 
establish what this volume calls the interactive “multiculturality,” on 
which the basis of the convivial relationship is formed. By demonstrat-
ing that households are undergoing transformation due to population 
movements (one of the main forms being labor migrations), this chapter 
highlights how our differences are currently confronted and overcome 
through our daily contacts and interactions. Specifically, this analysis 
demonstrates that “global householding” has become a prevalent live-
lihood strategy in both developed and developing countries. Mary 
Poppinses are no longer localized characters in one region, but have 
been globalized and regulated. While such workers might help to secure 
access to the world for those who can afford to hire them, this process 
also makes the workers themselves and their families become even more 
insecure. By underestimating the impact of “global householding,” either 
localized or temporary, we risk missing the “actually existing” struggles 
caused by global population movement and transactions.
The next section explains the causes of the widespread “feminization” 
of migration and introduces the concepts of “global householding” 
and “global de-householding.” The chapter then examines how the 
disciplines of international relations and security studies deal with the 
“security” and “insecurity” of FODWs. To explore the “security” and 
“insecurity” of FODWs, this chapter draws on gender studies by adopt-
ing the analytical framework of the so-called “gendered geographies 
of power” (Pessar & Mahler, 2003, pp. 812–846), a research concept 
focusing on the ability of each female individual to act as an agent in 
today’s world. It questions the extent to which each female individual 
is capable of acting as a potential agent, i.e. what determines their 
agency and what influences their ability to fulfill their power as an 
agent? This leads to the following section, which focuses on the way 
national, regional, and global regimes do indeed constrain such agency 
and thereby threaten the “security” of FODWs.
In conclusion, this chapter argues that whenever mothers or daugh-
ters go abroad as FODWs, their family members back home are exposed 
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to “insecurity,” most likely to a similar degree as the FODWs themselves. 
Possibly some FODWs in host countries become empowered, (re-)gaining 
an agency they never possessed in their home nation. Nonetheless, the 
“insecurity” of the family back home can only be overcome through 
substantial changes in the “geographies of power” in both the host 
and home countries. With both FODWs and their families in sight, 
this chapter suggests in its final analysis that we cannot conclude that 
the emerging activities of FODWs represent a great sign of “insecurity 
reduction” if one thereby ignores the inherently double-sided dimen-
sion of the problem. It also emphasizes that the nexus of global 
householding and global de-householding affects our lives in today’s 
globalized world, and no one, whether in Europe, Africa, or Asia, can be 
free from the changes—and even crises—caused by the reconfiguration 
of the household beyond national borders. Thus, we are hard-pressed 
to find a new framework in which to analyze this global phenomenon.
8.2 The “feminization” of international migration
8.2.1 The “feminization” of international migration explained
For Castles and Miller (2009), “feminization” is one of six key words 
describing the international movement of people since the 1980s.8 
It is true that women have been moving abroad for as long as their male 
counterparts. However, these two scholars emphasize the increasing 
volume of female migration since the 1980s as remarkable. Structural 
changes in the industry sector and more active female participation in 
the labor market, as well as new demands from aging populations in 
developed countries, have made overseas female workers an increas-
ingly indispensable workforce in the care and homemaking fields 
(Pessar & Mahler, 2003). These fields are traditionally defined as “women’s 
work.” They tend to pay very little and involve hiring temporary or 
even irregular workers. A large percentage of overseas female workers are 
employed in live-in situations. Altogether, their unique plights—being 
underpaid, insecure, dependent, and isolated—have received little aca-
demic attention so far.9
Numerous studies have already revealed the reasons for the increasing 
number of female overseas workers (Gregson & Lowe, 1994; Enloe, 2000, 
pp. 177–194). Building on such scholarship, this chapter emphasizes that 
the social and economic conditions of the sending countries contribute 
to the trend as much as those at the receiving end. Two contributing 
factors are the introduction of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) in the 
1990s and the existing “domestic servant culture” among middle-class 
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families in many less developed countries. Generally, welfare spending has 
been reduced to meet the targets set by SAPs. Thus, the poor become poorer 
and their standard of living plummets.10 Foreign companies in export 
promotion zones tend to create high demand for young female workers, 
but lower demand for their male counterparts. Once young women 
then enter the waged labor market, they naturally aim for higher wages, 
whether the jobs they seek are offered domestically or abroad. As long as 
they are well paid, they might not hesitate to venture overseas and send 
more money back home. Without public welfare support, it is they who 
need to fend for their aging parents and young siblings.
In addition, it has long been quite common in the developing world 
to hire home servants. As such, a so-called “domestic servant culture” 
has prevailed for some time. It is often the case that FODWs had already 
worked as domestic servants in their own countries when they took the 
step of going abroad (Connell, 2008). While working as a servant in a 
middle-class family in their home countries, many FODWs at the same 
time allot a portion of their income to employing a servant to look after 
their own family. Hence, an economic “food chain of domestic work” 
emerges. At all levels of the chain, people become accustomed to relying 
on outside helpers in their own houses, whether they actually like it or 
not. With family care in the hands of waged servants, it is the drive for 
the highest wage, be it in the home country or in a foreign land, that 
entices them to work abroad. At the upper end of the chain, wealthy 
families in the developed world successfully obtain low-waged domestic 
workers by extending their hunt globally. In so doing, they may raise 
their standard of living, resulting in more time and money for them-
selves. To support the high standard of those now rich in time and cash, 
the FODWs, in contrast, suffer global separation from their own loved 
and treasured families.
8.2.2 “Global householding” and “Global de-householding”
In this chapter, the key concepts used to analyze female migration 
are “global householding” and “global de-householding.” The con-
cept of “global householding” was developed by Michael Douglass of 
Hawaii University and his present research group (Douglass, 2006). 
With increasing global movements of people, he renews his focus on 
the concept of “household.” The importance of “household” in the 
world-system was emphasized by Immanuel Wallerstein more than two 
decades ago (Smith, Wallerstein, & Evers, 1984). According to Douglass, 
today’s “household” is undergoing enormous changes due to low ferti-
lity rates and the longevity prevalent throughout the developed world. 
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In addition, governments worldwide have increasingly privatized social 
services, and thus providing care for the elderly and infants has become 
too great a burden for each household to bear on its own. With the 
population rapidly aging and shrinking, the households of developed 
countries are seeking help from abroad, mostly from developing coun-
tries. As a result, quite a few “households” in this globalized world are 
supported by financial and physical inputs beyond national borders, 
and are thereby successively transformed into “global households,” or 
rather forms of “global householding” (Douglass, 2006, pp. 421–425). 
Douglass summarizes the major features of “global householding” as 
the increasing attempts to form and sustain households through global 
movements and transactions among household members through 
various means such as marriage, child-bearing and adoption, and hiring 
foreign domestic helpers and caregivers (Douglass, 2006, pp. 424–425).
To supplement this idea, this chapter introduces an additional dimen-
sion to “global householding,” namely “global de-householding.” By 
hiring FODWs, an employer’s family indeed experiences “global house-
holding.” It clearly improves their quality of life by having FODWs do 
the cooking and cleaning, for example. At the same time, however, 
the FODWs’ own families back home face “global de-householding,” 
losing an important family member who could have looked after them 
and improved their quality of life as well. In a sense, one of the most 
important features of today’s “insecurity” of FODWs is that it is by 
nature globalized beyond national jurisdiction. The conditions for both 
concepts, “global householding” and “global de-householding,” occur 
simultaneously and are inseparably interlinked. Furthermore, whether 
it is regarded as “global householding” or “global de-householding” 
depends on whose viewpoint we assume and the extent to which we 
see ourselves as autonomous agents in the process.
“Global householding” and “global de-householding” are relational 
concepts in that they involve the countries and family units at both the 
sending and receiving ends. The extent of their effects depends on the 
relationship between those who move across and those who stay within 
national borders. As pointed out, it has long been common for upper 
class families in developed Western European countries to hire live-in 
maids. The same can be said for the wealthy in developing countries. In 
developing countries, such live-in maids were also often alienated and 
exposed to long working hours under tough conditions. Today’s Mary 
Poppinses, nonetheless, are mainly from developing countries, leaving 
their families behind to work long and hard in the rich world. Thanks 
to FODWs, those who live in developed countries may be freed to 
Female Domestic Workers on the Move 143
concentrate their energies on waged jobs and enjoy more leisure time. 
Thanks to “global householding,” they can choose what to do and what 
not to do. Furthermore, some may actively further advance “global 
householding” by sending their own children to study or work abroad 
in the quest for higher wages. Ultimately, they choose whether or not to 
expose themselves to the “global householding” phenomenon. In con-
trast, most FODWs venture abroad toward something they cannot gain 
in their home countries, such as economic advancement, or social or 
political freedom.
From the viewpoint of FODWs coming from the Philippines, for 
example, the “global householding” of their employer in Britain is 
based on their own “global de-householding.” Under these circum-
stances, such Filipinas are deprived of the choice of caring for their 
aging parents and growing children. Some academics are concerned 
that the children of FODWs may suffer psychological loss, thus falling 
into “insecurity” in return for the economic gains accrued (Parreñas, 
2005). Essentially, the “global householding” of families in developed 
countries always exists against the background and mostly at the 
expense of the “global de-householding” of those in less affluent coun-
tries. Moreover, as pointed out earlier, FODWs are denied the oppor-
tunity to act as independent actors with the ability to claim their own 
rights and their own “security” in host countries. Consequently, the 
actual costs of upholding a high level of “security” for those families 
who opt for “global householding” are simply transferred, in the form 
of “global de-householding,” to the FODWs and the families they leave 
behind. These two concepts should therefore be examined together to 
demonstrate that these developments are two sides of the same coin. 
When viewed as a pair, they present a complete picture of the rewards 
and penalties arising from these global phenomena.
8.3 The “security” and “insecurity” of FODWs
8.3.1 What do we mean by the “security” 
and “insecurity” of FODWs?
Since the UNDP Human Development Report was published in 1994, its 
key concept, “human security,” has inspired a heated debate among 
scholars and practitioners. Numerous studies have attempted to clarify 
the relationship between “human security” and the conventional 
understanding of “national security” in IR. Some scholars argue that 
the newly suggested concept of “human security” could be further dif-
ferentiated to distinguish between “human security,” which is provided 
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by societal institutions and services, and “personal security,” which 
comprises the maintenance of life and existence (Hatsuse, 2003). With 
regard to FODWs, the immigration legislation and policies of the receiv-
ing country often assume their dependency on the male member of the 
family, simply ignoring the fact that the FODWs travel independently 
to work and support themselves. This often results in the denial of their 
capacity and their legal right, as individuals, to claim “human security.” 
Such deprivation of institutional protection and societal services con-
sequentially leads to the erosion of their “personal security,” ultimately 
their very life and existence. In this chapter, “security,” unless specified, 
refers to “human security,” deprivation of which ultimately threatens 
the “personal security” of FODWs and their families.
It is important to note that immigration, nationality, and labor-related 
legislation and policies in most countries today are unlikely to be explic-
itly discriminatory against women. In their written form, they appear to be 
value-neutral. However, as mentioned, when actually implemented they 
became gendered in the sense that women are regarded as individuals who 
do not work or reside on their own account. Their entry statuses are often 
based on that of male members of the family, preventing women from 
accepting a waged job or remaining in the country if they get divorced or 
lose their male partner. In reality, as previous research has demonstrated, 
FODWs are placed under the triple burdens of gender, ethnicity/race, and 
occupation (Anderson, 2000, pp. 1–8). Thus, neutral-sounding legislation 
and policies play a key role in rendering FODWs’ “insecurity” invisible, 
leaving the triple burdens of FODWs intact.
Worse, as the following section demonstrates, FODWs today face 
not only national legislation and policies that implicitly exploit and 
discriminate against them in comparison to male migrants, but also 
regional and global regimes. In combination, they remove the plights 
and exploitation of FODWs from public view. This triple layer of 
national, regional, and global regimes, which enhances the “insecurity” 
of FODWs, is the main characteristic of today’s migration control mech-
anism. It is therefore vital to shed light on this complex multi-layered 
mechanism by unwrapping it, layer by layer, and examining how each 
layer works in combination with the others to prevent FODWs from 
pursuing their “security.”
8.3.2 What does security studies learn about the “insecurity” 
of FODWs from migration and gender studies?
Towards and since the end of the Cold War, according to Krause and 
Williams (1996, p. 229), three main factors have determined the course 
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of development in the field of security studies: first, dissatisfaction 
among some scholars of security studies regarding the emphasis on 
states and the traditional military-centric approach of neo-realists; 
second, an urgent need to respond to the challenges arising from a 
post-Cold War security order; and third, a strong desire for the security 
studies discipline to become more relevant to contemporary concerns. 
Broadly, Krause and Williams point out three directions in which the 
so-called “new thinking on security” debate is heading (Krause & Williams, 
1996, pp. 229–230). The first approach aims to broaden the scope of 
security studies with the purpose of including non-military issues under 
the concept of “security.” The second trend is to deepen the agenda of 
security studies by flexibly adjusting the level of analysis from that of 
individual or human security to that of international or global security. 
The third group maintains the state-centric approach, but focuses its 
analysis on diversified forms of inter-state security cooperation, such 
as common, cooperative, collective, and comprehensive cooperation 
(Krause & Williams, 1996, p. 230). The traditional approach in the field 
sees states, groups, or individuals as givens, and treats threats external 
to these givens in the search for solutions to remove such threats. 
In contrast, the first and second approaches mentioned above focus on 
the process through which threats against an individual or group are 
constituted as “social facts” (Krause & Williams, 1996, pp. 242–243). Their 
interest therefore lies in who—a government, business enterprise, or 
charismatic person—defines “security” for particular issues—economic 
well-being, military build-up, or environmental degradation—and 
in the process, under what conditions do they effectively provide it 
(Krause & Williams, 1996, pp. 242–243).
Among the scholars within this “new thinking on security,” Buzan and 
those who contributed to his work (1998) engage in “the most thorough 
and continuous exploration of the significance and implications of a 
widening security agenda for security studies” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 480). 
Nonetheless, even their efforts are criticized for failing to pay attention 
to the concept of “security” on the basis of gender.11 This lack of atten-
tion, Hansen (2000) insists, results from one of the two main shortcom-
ings of security studies, namely “security as silence.”12 According to 
Hansen, “security as silence” occurs in situations where the potential 
subject of security is forced to either remain silent or likely face even 
greater “insecurity” if the particular situation should receive attention. 
FODWs fit well into this category. As “women,” they face enormous 
pressures to tolerate lesser “security,” whether in their home country 
or receiving countries. In addition, as “overseas workers,” their entry 
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status often depends entirely on their employers, thus depriving them 
of any chance of challenging their bosses. In particular, for “irregular” or 
“illegal” female workers, the only remaining option is to remain silent 
in spite of their constant “insecurity.” Regardless of whether remaining 
silent is instigated by force or by one’s own will, unless the resulting 
“insecurity” surfaces, the phenomenon will never become a subject of 
security studies. Consequently, the “insecurity” of FODWs has remained 
under-studied until very recently. Those researchers who try to intro-
duce gender perspectives into security studies argue that the concept of 
“security” needs to be redefined in a way that reflects the economic, politi-
cal, or social conditions surrounding a particular individual or group.13 
Whether one feels “secure” or “insecure” depends on one’s position. 
Thus, what should really be examined are the economic, political, and 
social structures within which “security” and “insecurity” are constructed 
(Tickner, 1997, p. 624).
In the 1990s, migration studies researchers began to learn from gender 
studies, thus becoming exposed to a new understanding of “security.” 
Since the late 1980s, they had already begun rectifying the stereotype 
of a migrant being male and single. Yet, their efforts fall short of trans-
forming their analytical approach wholeheartedly; female migrants are 
still often simply added alongside their male counterparts as further 
issues of concern. Some critics thus described this new approach in 
migration studies as “adding women and stirring” (Curran et al., 2006, 
p. 209). In the early 1990s, academic interest within the field further 
shifted to network formation in a transnational setting, especially on 
the basis of, and with an emphasis on, race, ethnicity, and nationality. 
Meanwhile, those academics sympathetic and devoted to gender per-
spectives became concerned that what they had learned in the late 
1980s might once again be forgotten in the new agenda. This time, in 
paying attention to gender issues in the context of transnational set-
tings, they attempt to present analytical frameworks under which one 
does not merely “add women and stir,” but that rather bring “gender” 
as a relational concept into a holistic perspective. This new analytical 
framework focuses on the way in which gender relationships are con-
structed beyond national borders. Henceforth, the treatment and 
identity of FODWs also becomes subject to transnationally constructed 
gender relationships (Donato et al., 2006, pp. 3–26).
Among various scholarly works that aim to bring gender into migra-
tion studies, that of Pessar and Mahler presents an analytical framework 
based on “gender geographies of power (GGP)” (Pessar & Mahler, 2003, 
pp. 812–846). This deserves special attention. The GGP framework has 
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four key concepts as its main constitutive pillars. These are “geographical 
scales,” “social location,” “power geometry,” and “imagination.” First, 
according to Pessar and Mahler, gender—a relational concept—operates 
within “geographical scales” that comprise multiple spatial and social 
scales across transnational spaces. At the same time, gender ideologies 
and relations are continuously reaffirmed and reconfigured within 
each constituent “geographical scale.” “Social location,” as the second 
component of this analytical framework, refers to people’s positions 
within interconnected power hierarchies, which are created through 
various socially stratifying factors such as history, politics, economics, 
geography, and kinship. Since the hierarchies of each factor operate at 
various levels and affect the “social location” of individuals or groups, 
Pessar and Mahler emphasize that social location is always fluid and not 
fixed. Certain advantages and disadvantages are conferred according to 
one’s “social location.” Furthermore, “social location” determines the 
types and degrees of agency one can exercise. Pessar and Mahler call 
this “power geometry,” which is the third component of their frame-
work. The fourth component is “imagination.” In examining agency, 
they emphasize that it not only implies people’s ability to influence 
others and their surroundings, but also their cognitive power to initi-
ate change. Suppose that two people are in the same “social location.” 
One might simply be buried, whereas the other might intend to fight 
back thanks to “imagination.”
Focusing on “power geometry” makes us aware that it is not only 
crucial how transnational “geographical scales” are formed; it is also 
who and what controls their formation that plays the key role in 
understanding the “security” and “insecurity” of today’s FODWs. This 
general understanding draws our attention to multiple-layered migra-
tion regimes, which are touched on in the next section. Such layers of 
legality reflect the intentions of the powerful within today’s “geographi-
cal scales.” Given that various regimes intend to keep FODWs in their 
current “social position”—invisible—it may still be possible for FODWs 
themselves to transform their “power geometry” through “imagination.” 
Taking “imagination” into consideration, the GGP framework suggests 
that not all FODWs should remain powerless, exploited, and controlled 
by employers and governments in their host and home countries. It 
recognizes that their “social location” can shift. “Power geometry” is 
malleable, and some FODWs could someday fulfill the roles of initiators, 
refiners, and transformers. To frustrate such challenges from FODWs, 
however, powerful players—national governments being the main players 
in this case—continue to strengthen confining mechanisms, among 
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which migration regimes comprise the most explicit and concrete form. 
They play an important role in depriving FODWs of “imagination” and 
maintaining the current “power geometry.” In building multiple-layered 
migration regimes at the global, regional, and local levels, national 
governments of both developed and developing countries aim to control 
the transnational “geographical scales” in which they are predominant.
8.4 National, regional, and global regimes 
surrounding FODWs
8.4.1 National regimes
Currently, governments in Western developed countries adopt citizen-
ship- and immigration-related legislation and policies that reflect an 
“anti-immigrant, pro-immigration” nature.14 The purposes of these types 
of policies in relation to FODWs are two-fold. First, to keep them mar-
ginalized in the society, they force FODWs to accept only certain types 
of occupation and working conditions. Second, they enable the host 
government to increase the volume of incoming FODWs for the purpose 
of upholding the “security” of its nationals in exchange for the FODWs’ 
“insecurity.” For example, the work permit system not only distinguishes 
between immigrants with legal or illegal entry status, but also ties the 
former to certain jobs and certain working conditions. In the view of 
governments in developed countries, what they need is not “immigrants 
in general” but “those who fulfill a certain job.” Thus the main aim of 
currently implemented immigration regimes is to link immigrants to 
precisely those jobs that nationals neither wish to have nor dare to fill. 
In this way, host governments can enjoy the benefits of introducing 
foreign workers who will work for the nation’s citizens and raise their 
level of “security” at very little cost.
Taking the British case as an example, British legislation and policies 
in the migration-related field no longer include explicitly discrimina-
tory terms and provisions against female migrants. On further scrutiny, 
however, some legislation and policies are applied in a way that might 
be disadvantageous to women. Three areas where discriminatory prac-
tices against immigrant women may abound are the right of entry, 
residence, and employment; of family reunion; and of family formation 
in the form of marriage. First, given that a woman enters the country 
as the “spouse” or “child” of a legal male entrant, her right to enter 
and reside subsequently depends on the right of her husband or father. 
Under the status of “spouse” or “child,” such women are consequently 
prevented from accepting paid work. Suppose a woman enters a country 
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as a legally independent immigrant. In this case, a typical job for her, 
such as domestic worker or carer, tends to be less likely than other jobs 
to confer her with permanent residency. As a result, migrant women are 
subject to a higher risk than their male counterparts with regard to los-
ing their legal entry status and being deported, for example in the case of 
divorce for married women or unemployment for independent migrant 
women. In 1979, the British government abolished the visa category 
for overseas domestic workers (ODWs). Instead, they created a special 
category to allow the wealthy to bring their domestic workers with 
them (Bhabha, 1994, pp. 173–184; Anderson, 2000, pp. 86–107). This 
category, however, was specifically linked to wealthy entrants, and their 
accompanying domestic workers were not allowed to change employer 
lest their entry status be stripped. Until 1998, when immigration regu-
lations regarding ODWs were amended, such workers had to endure 
severe working conditions and even violence from their employer for 
fear of being deprived of their legal status and thus being deported.
The second set of barriers experienced by immigrant women arises 
in connection to family reunion. The fundamental right to family 
reunion is enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights, 
for example. However, it is usually provisional and governed by a 
set of regulations. The required access to adequate accommodation 
and the necessary proof of sole responsibility for childrearing are two 
examples that often work against women in Britain. With their low 
wages, FODWs find it difficult to secure their own accommodation 
to fulfill the requirements of immigration rules. Worse, most FODWs 
often live with their employers; thus, they have no option of bringing 
their children even if they wished to. A thornier regulation that impli-
citly discriminates more against women than the housing one does is 
that of “sole responsibility,” a regulation introduced in 1968. Under 
the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, immigration rules allowed 
immigrants to bring their children only if they as parents residing 
in Britain had “sole responsibility” for the child’s upbringing (Home 
Office, 2005, Chapter 14.5). These provisions, although unintended by 
the then government, worked against many immigrant women from 
Caribbean countries. Some researchers suggest that immigration officers 
either consciously or subconsciously believe in the male breadwinning 
model, and thus think that the male member of the family (father or 
grandfather in this case) determines where the family should be located 
(Bhabha, 1994, pp. 31–39). It is therefore difficult for mothers to bring 
their children to Britain if their fathers or grandfathers, unemployed as 
they may be, reside in their home countries.
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The last case of implicit disadvantage for migrant women relates to 
international marriage. The British government introduced the “primary 
purpose rule” in the 1980s. Until this rule was abolished in 1997, those 
who wished to bring spouses or fiancé(e)s had to prove the genuineness 
of the marriage and that it was the primary reason for coming to Britain. 
Although this rule itself did not include sexually discriminatory phrases 
or conditions, its application tended to be harsher towards women. 
A general stereotype was that male immigrants were more of a threat to 
the labor market than their female counterparts. In consequence, when 
immigrant women applied to the Home Office to invite their husbands 
or fiancés, they were investigated more thoroughly than immigrant 
men were. It was also the case that British immigration rules in relation 
to marriage were based on the prevalent understanding of marriage 
under British law. Consequently, women in polygamous marriages were 
not considered as wives, and second wives were prevented from enter-
ing Britain as spouses. Also, so-called child wives under 16 years of age 
were not admitted as either a spouse or fiancée.
Regardless of the long history of female migration, female migrants 
even today remain invisible with regard to policy making and research. 
As pointed out in the previous section, governments select certain types 
of migrants, and in receiving them, they attempt to maintain the cur-
rent “power geometry.” Inflows of live-in overseas domestic workers 
may reduce the burdens of domestic chores and appear beneficial to 
female nationals with waged jobs. In reality, reliance on FODWs keeps 
intact and reinforces traditional stereotypes of “women at home doing 
housework” and “women taking care of the elderly and childrearing 
at home.” All in all, this may actually prolong the unfair treatment 
of women. In sum, “anti-immigrant, pro-immigration policies” not 
only determine the “social location” of female migrants but also that 
of female nationals at the same time. Women, whether nationals or 
immigrants, are kept in a weaker “social location” and their agency still 
depends on male members of the family. In general, only a few lucky 
women take up paying jobs, forcing other unlucky women to take 
over domestic chores, doing so under the conditions set by the current 
“power geometry” of male dominance and female subjugation.
8.4.2 Regional and global regimes
Traditionally, national governments have claimed the exclusive autho rity 
to control who enters, stays in, and leaves their territory. Yet, national 
governments are now aware that they need to act together to tighten 
control over the international movement of people. Thus, they have 
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established a form of inter-state cooperation to deal with the growing 
volume. In the field of migration control, therefore, both regional and 
global levels of control mechanisms are added, complementing national 
policy instruments designed to uncover undocumented or overstayed 
foreign migrants and deter asylum-seekers. It is true that national govern-
ments are also delegating policy implementation to municipal and 
local sectors, conferring upon them, for example, the competence and 
authority to check suspicious cases.15 Nevertheless, such sectors are subject 
to their national governments and do not generally take their own 
policy initiatives. This chapter thus concentrates on the development 
of regional and global migration control policies, focusing on those of 
the European Union (EU), and on global cooperation in the form of 
international conventions.
It may be true that regional and global institutions such as the EU and 
the United Nations (UN) exert only an indirect and non-compulsory 
influence on national policies. Nevertheless, they may play an impor-
tant role in advancing some kind of agenda and changing our mental 
frame of perception. The idea of universal human rights is the prime 
example, and has been greatly promoted since the end of the Second 
World War by international and regional organizations and through 
various international conventions (Donnelly, 1986, pp. 599–642). 
Human rights activists and groups, in the face of domestic deadlocks, 
bypass national governments. They seek support from international 
organizations to have them exert pressure from abroad to change 
national policies. Through the “boomerang effect” (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998), they wish to ensure that national governments admit cases of 
human rights violation and rectify them. This certainly also applies to 
the subject of this chapter. When the maltreatment and invisibility of 
FODWs come to light, regional and global institutions may be able to 
affect national policies. Possibly, the current “power geometry” may 
shift through these regional and global regimes, and FODWs might 
finally be able to speak up and improve their “security.”
Recently, the UN and regional organizations such as the EU have 
become extremely active in promoting multinational cooperation to 
combat the trafficking of migrants (United Nations General Assembly 
[UNGA], 2000a, b). Although promoters of multinational cooperation 
claim that remedies for victims of trafficking are the prime purpose, the 
actual practice of existing cooperation appears to concentrate on con-
trolling and regulating the international movement of people. Actual 
help for the victims is supposed to be left to national governments, but 
concrete actions seem to be slow to evolve. Contrary to the high hopes 
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of human rights academics and activists, neither regional nor global 
regimes in the field of migration are aiming to shift the “power geo-
metry” in favor of migrants. They are more likely to deny the potential 
agency of migrants who have already been rendered powerless, and 
to uphold the very “power geometry” that works against them. Some 
academics even suggest that national governments deliberately advance 
regional and global regimes with the intention of avoiding the national 
judiciary and furthering control over migrants (Guiraudon & Lahav, 
2000, pp. 163–195). In a sense, the establishment of regional and global 
regimes diversifies the means of national government, and expands 
the merits of the existing “power geometry.” Furthermore, the levels of 
control mechanisms interactively strengthen each other.
If we look at the actual provisions of international conventions, we 
find that the term “gender” appears frequently within them. Relevant 
international organizations, such as the UN, have for some time actively 
promoted awareness of “gender-related” issues. After nearly 20 years’ 
preparation, the UN finally adopted the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families (ICMW) in 1990. As the “first comprehensive universal 
codification of migrants’ rights” (Cholewinski, 1997, p. 199), a migrant 
worker is defined in Article 2(1) as “a person who is to be engaged, is 
engaged, or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of 
which he or she is not a national.” This definition of migrant workers 
is considered the most comprehensive in any international instrument 
concerning migrants, and is thus praised in itself as a “major accom-
plishment” (Hune, 1987, pp. 123–124). Obviously, migrant women 
form part of the category of “migrant workers” and should be protected 
as such. They are also supposed to receive protection as members of 
migrants’ families (Article 1). Specifically, Article 1 declares that the 
ICMW applies to all migrant workers and their families “without dis-
tinction of any kind,” such as on the basis of sex. Article 7 also prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of sex with respect to the rights provided 
for in the ICMW. To clarify the intent of sexual equality, the drafters of 
the convention decided to use the terms “he or she” and “his or her” 
instead of “he” and “his” towards the end of the preparatory process 
(Hune, 1991). They could not have made it clearer that all the conven-
tion’s provisions are applicable to both migrant men and women.
Migrant workers are, according to the convention, to be treated 
equally to nationals with regard to economic, social, and cultural 
rights. For example, employment conditions (Article 25), social security 
(Article 27), emergency medical care (Article 28), and access to education 
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(Article 30) are specifically mentioned as areas where equality should be 
guaranteed. Furthermore, Articles 26 and 40 provide migrant workers 
with the right not only to partake in trade union activities, but also to 
“form associations and trade unions in the State of employment.” The 
right to education is also widely conferred upon migrant workers, as 
seen in Article 43, for example. It grants migrant workers and nationals 
equal access to vocational guidance, training, and retraining facilities. 
Migrant women who had been treated as invisible even in their home 
countries might be able to make use of the opportunities provided by 
the convention to improve their “social location.”
Even as a member of a migrant’s family, female migrants can receive 
access to vocational guidance and training under Article 45, although 
the extent of access is limited in comparison to that stipulated in Article 
43. In addition, the convention provides the possibility for migrant 
women who have entered a country as a dependent or spouse to remain 
and reside there even after the death of a migrant worker or the dissolu-
tion of their marriage (Article 50). To save family members in the case 
of a migrant’s death or divorce, the provision imposed the obligation 
on states to take into account the length of their stay and authorize 
them to remain and even work. Even though it does not grant them 
an absolute right to remain in the country of employment, this special 
consideration to family members was a welcome addition for migrant 
women whose residential status was conditionally based on the status 
of their husbands or fathers.
Despite these provisions, the ICMW has received considerable criti-
cism for not paying sufficient attention to migrant women since its 
enactment (Hune, 1991, pp. 800–815). The biggest criticism arises from 
the fact that the convention fails to go beyond the “add women and 
stir” approach. As Hune (1991, pp. 812–813) suggests, the ICMW draft-
ers did not consider that the concept of “labor” may not mean the same 
to women as to men. As mentioned earlier, a number of migrant women 
are employed in the care and housekeeping fields. These fields have 
for a long time been considered as “women’s fields,” in which they are 
supposed to excel by nature. As a result, jobs related to domestic chores, 
childrearing, and elderly care, for example, are often paid very little or 
next to nothing. To some people, these jobs do not qualify as “waged 
labor,” as they do not require any special skills or talent, since women 
are supposed to be born with such skills. The ICMW simply aims for 
sexual equality, but does not intend to tackle these implicit assumptions 
or the notion that “female-type work” is inferior to “male-type work.” In 
addition, the convention does not consider that female migrants have 
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to play the role of primary caregiver for children and family members, 
spending more time than their male partners at home to perform 
household chores. Given that equal access to “labor” between nationals 
and migrants is guaranteed, female migrants, in contrast to males, need 
further public support from their host countries before they can accept 
employment. Without waged employment, migrant women may con-
tinue to rely on their spouses and remain invisible in the host society. 
As previously pointed out, seemingly neutral terms such as “labor” and 
“laborer” are often defined in a way that might disadvantage women, 
and thus require redefinition to change the existing “power geometry.” 
Ultimately, the ICMW does not aim for the fundamental transforma-
tion of the “power geometry,” but rather for the alleviation of the 
plights of migrants within given circumstances.
At the level of regional regimes such as the EU, issues relating to 
migrant women are also handled with the “add women and stir” 
approach. The frequent appearance of the term “gender” in EU publi-
cations might not yet have resulted in the improvement of the “social 
location” of women in general. EU social policies have gone to great 
lengths to establish equality between women and men, especially in 
terms of access to labor markets (Ackers, 1998, p. 2). Not only policy 
makers but also academics are seeking the best way to achieve equal 
treatment between the sexes at the EU level. A voluminous amount 
of research has been conducted on gender equality in labor markets 
for quite some time.16 As mentioned with regard to the global regime, 
while current EU policies may improve the “social location” of EU 
working women in employment, they are not intended to challenge 
the current “power geometry” of FODWs. They simply allow EU 
women with a job to be treated in the same way as EU men, as long as 
the traditional “white male breadwinning model of family relations” 
remains intact. In other words, according to Ackers, all residents of 
the EU are classified into several categories on the basis of citizenship, 
gender, and access to employment, and are prioritized according to a 
combination of these three factors (Ackers, 1998, p. 40). Within the 
hierarchy of people legally resident in the national territory, those 
males who contribute to the labor market and hold citizenship are 
ranked first. Next are female spouses with citizenship, as they are act-
ing as women are “supposed to”—that is, being supportive of male 
citizens. Illegal migrants aside, the remainder of the pecking order 
is as follows: working female citizenship holders, citizenship hold-
ers not active in the labor market—single mothers and the elderly, 
for example—employed legal male migrants, and a small number of 
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female migrants holding skilled jobs. Unfortunately, FODWs are still 
at the very bottom (Ackers, 1998, p. 40).
Finally, seemingly neutral concepts and categories such as “labor,” 
“laborers,” and “waged labor” have all been defined in a male-dominant 
world. Thus, they intentionally or unintentionally tend to lower women’s 
“social location.” Peterson declares that regimes based on male experi-
ence and male understanding cannot really account for women (1996, 
pp. 11–28). Accordingly, three options are suggested: “either females 
cannot be added (they are marginalized), or they must become ‘like 
men’ (they are masculinized), or they are included, and the meaning of 
the category is transformed to include femaleness.” (Peterson, 1996, p. 17, 
emphasis in original). So far, the current regional and global regimes 
include women by forcing them to “masculinize” themselves for fear of 
being “marginalized.” It is obvious that traditional concepts, categories, 
and stereotypes need to be transformed to include femaleness if we are 
to aim to fundamentally challenge the “power geometry” on women’s 
behalf and to improve their “social location.” Currently, regional and 
global regimes might work favorably for some women who become 
“masculinized.” To other women, the vast majority perhaps, they 
merely complement national regimes that make women accept more 
“insecurity” than men. For FODWs, today’s multiple-layered regimes—
national, regional, and global—form an even more starkly oppressive 
environment than before.
8.5 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to make three points. First, today’s FODWs 
are not singularly glued to a certain “social location” by national 
regimes. Rather, they are triply fixed in their social and legal cage by 
the two additional layers of regional and global regimes. At a super-
ficial glance, the emergent regional and global regimes in the field of 
migration offer a glimmer of hope in that they seem concerned with 
the plights of FODWs and appear to offer a remedy for them. In reality, 
they are favorable only to a small group of women who are willing to 
accept the current “power geometry.” FODWs remain, as always, pow-
erless and invisible. Worse, their “insecurity” is triply fixed. Second, 
emergent regional and global regimes do not aim to challenge the 
current “power geometry” and FODWs’ resulting “social location” at 
the very bottom in any host country. Regional and global regimes may 
only indirectly influence national governments and policy makers, pro-
vided their “boomerang effect” is felt. Yet, today’s regional and global 
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regimes relevant to migration are established to protect “laborers” and 
“migrants” as they are currently understood. By accepting these concepts, 
these regimes, albeit inadvertently, may be supporting, reinforcing, and 
cementing the current “power geometry.”
Third, as migrant women move across national borders, so too does 
their “insecurity.” Unfortunately, space limitations restrict this chapter 
from providing further examination of the above cases in Britain or 
additional examples outside of Europe. We nonetheless find in today’s 
world the prevalence of “insecurity” that crosses borders to the families 
of FODWs back home in return for the “security” of nationals in their 
country of employment. As mentioned earlier, the benefits of “global 
householding” are reaped by people in developed countries at the 
expense of the damage of “global de-householding,” which is shouldered 
by those in developing countries. Of course, the perception of the phe-
nomenon as “global householding” or “global de-householding” differs 
depending on timing and the focus of analysis. Yet, by presenting the 
two concepts together, we can highlight a lopsided relationship between 
FODWs and their families back home vis-à-vis their employers in the host 
countries. Once aware of the zero-sum elements of “global household-
ing” and “global de-householding,” we can take a further step to reveal 
how these are currently consolidated and even strengthened. Emerging 
regional and global regimes neither guarantee “security” for FODWs nor 
prevent “insecurity” from being transferred to their own families, let 
alone saving them. Worse, most FODWs are from developing countries 
where social welfare systems are barely existent. While the family members 
left behind—especially the elderly and infants—may benefit economi-
cally by receiving money, they certainly lose out psychologically.
The previous section cited Peterson, who stressed the need to trans-
form traditional concepts and categories, as they were formed through 
male experience and thus oblivious to the experience of women. 
Otherwise, the current “power geometry” surrounding FODWs will 
remain unchanged. Recently, some academics have paid attention to 
networking and the mutual assistance in which FODWs are actively 
engaged, claiming that they constitute burgeoning “political activi-
ties” and portraying them as signs of change (Kofman et al., 2000, 
pp. 163–191). In line with this argument, Kofman and others, for exam-
ple, dispute conventional understanding with regard to the political 
rights of migrants. They insist that while FODWs might be devoid of 
voting rights, they are devoid of other types of political activities within 
the host society as well. Through community groups and networks, 
FODWs are in constant contact with each other and even with the 
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host population. Taking a wider definition of “politics,” Kofman and 
others try to perceive FODWs not as “objects of political discourse,” 
but as “participating subjects” (p. 163). Since most FODWs in their 
home countries were afforded limited access to any kind of political 
activity, they may be more liberated in their countries of employment, 
thus finding themselves in a much stronger “social location.” To some 
academics, therefore, FODWs might be accredited with the “power to 
effect change” (Hardy-Fanta, 1993, p. 30). Undoubtedly, FODWs are 
not always submissive, invisible, and passive objects of exploitation and 
oppression. Legal exclusion from the formal political process without 
the right to vote in a way encourages FODWs to become more active in 
forming associations and networks in their daily lives.
Pessar and Mahler’s analytical framework—“gender geographies of 
power”—introduced and applied in this chapter, presents “imagina-
tion” as one of the four main components. Considering people in 
similar “social positions,” some remain subdued while others take the 
initiative to challenge the system. The root of these different reactions 
lies in “imagination.” Therefore, FODWs’ networks and community 
campaigns might some day provide a strong initiator for change and 
result in a more tangible challenge to the current “power geometry.” 
Even so, one of the three main arguments of this chapter was the 
emergence of multiple-layered regimes that threaten the “security” 
of FODWs. Whatever activities FODWs may be involved in within 
their country of employment and residence, such activities need to go 
beyond national borders before they can ever lead to a shift in “power 
geometry” in a transnational arena. There is no doubt that we should 
encourage the burgeoning political activities of FODWs, but at the same 
time, we should not expect too much from them. Ultimately, chal-
lenges to and alteration of the “power geometry” should come from 
those with power. Only they can build counter-regimes of transnational 
“geographical scales” and transform the “power geometry” in favor of 
the powerless. Only with their concession and willingness can we estab-
lish a truly multicultural space in which differences in power, gender, 
wealth, and so on are intensively negotiated, and even reconciled.
Notes
Professor, Faculty of Policy Studies, Kansai University. This chapter is based on 
a presentation given at an international conference—“Global Migration and the 
Household in East Asia”—in Seoul, on 2–3 February, 2007. The author is grateful 
for all the comments from the floor.
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1. Persons who look after children on a contract basis are referred to in various 
ways, for example as a “nanny,” “au pair,” “maid,” and “child-minder.” The 
definitions of these terms may differ according to the country and era. In 
Britain, for example, “au pair” is a legal immigration status, denoting a person 
who matches the required conditions of age, country of origin, and employ-
ment details. “Child-minders” are required to register themselves in Britain, 
while “nannies” and “maids” lack any form of legal definition. “Nannies” 
usually concentrate on childrearing at the employer’s house, whereas “maids” 
are responsible for all kinds of housework chores as well.
2. Anderson (2000, p. 7) emphasizes the role of a “female” employer who often 
hires female overseas domestic workers (FODWs) under oppressive working 
conditions.
3. The ILO convention concerning decent work for domestic workers (no. 189) 
came into entry in 2013 in order to combat deplorable working conditions, 
labor exploitation, and abuses of human rights. Although the number of 
domestic workers is steadily increasing all over the world, only 12 countries 
so far have ratified this convention.
4. Douglass (2006). Professor Michael Douglass’ research program at Hawaii 
University introduces the term “global householding.” The term “house-
hold” includes members based on fictive family relationships, such as nan-
nies, who take the childrearing role over from birth parents, and live-in 
overseas carers, who look after elderly members of a family. In contrast, the 
term “family” is usually restricted to biological members. Nowadays, many 
“families” in both developed and developing countries may have members 
working or residing abroad. As the volume of movement of people beyond 
borders increases, so does the number of families who, for their liveli-
hoods, depend on money sent from abroad by family members or who hire 
workers from abroad to perform their household chores. In sum, it is more 
appropriate to use the term “household” or even “householding” than 
“family” to describe how people in the globalized world live and conduct 
their daily lives.
5. “Security” can mean both “human security,” which is protected by social 
institutions, and “personal security,” which implies the maintenance of one’s 
life. In the case of FODWs, the threat to their “human security” by global, 
regional, and national regimes tends also to threaten their “personal secu-
rity,” leading them into conditions of “insecurity.”
6. There does not yet exist an authoritative definition for “gender.” The author 
follows Pessar and Mahler and defines “gender” as a “process, as one of 
several ways humans create and perpetuate social differences.” Pessar and 
Mahler (2003, p. 813) also consider “gender” as a structure “embedded in 
institutions.” The author agrees with this view, seeing “gender” as part of a 
complex web of institutionalized social relationships that determines one’s 
power within a society.
7. For the case of Britain, see Bhabha and Shutter (1994) for example.
8. Castles and Miller (2009, pp. 8–9). Five other characteristics are “globaliza-
tion,” “differentiation,” “acceleration,” “politicization,” and “proliferation of 
migration transition.”
9. Kofman et al. (2000). Their work is one of the recent pieces of academic 
research to have systematically surveyed the plights and treatment of FODWs.
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10. Chang (2000) emphasizes the impact of SAPs on pushing female laborers in 
developing countries to developed countries to seek higher paid jobs.
11. Hansen (2000), Steans (2006, pp. 63–77), Tickner (1997, pp. 611–32, 2001, 
pp. 36–64). These scholars emphasize the importance of combining gender 
and security studies in general.
12. Hansen (2000, pp. 287, 294–9). The other shortcoming, according to Hansen, 
is what she terms “subsuming security.” She argues that gender-based insecu-
rity tends to be treated as an aspect of national or religious security, and that 
female victims are not regarded as a “referent object.” Unless recognized as a 
“referent object,” they cannot become the subject of security studies.
13. Tickner (2001, pp. 36–64) provides a thorough survey on the way security 
studies is developing by learning from feminist perspectives.
14. Chang (2000, pp. 30–31) points out the differences between pro-immigration 
policies and pro-immigrant policies. According to Chang, the former simply 
encourages the inflow of immigration, which does not necessarily mean 
that it is friendly toward immigrants. It is therefore possible to have a pro-
immigration and anti-immigrant policy at the same time.
15. Guiraudon (2000, pp. 249–69). Since the 1980s, quite a few developed coun-
tries in Western Europe have begun to involve local and municipal govern-
ments in migration control mechanisms. Concentrating on the case of the 
EU, Guiraudon, for example, has worked on the vertical diversification of 
migration control mechanisms, both upward to an international level and 
downward to a local level.
16. See, for example, Gregory, Sales, and Hegewisch (1999) and Council of 
Europe (1996). These works are typical examples of research conducted in 
the 1990s.
References
Ackers, L. (1998). Shifting spaces: women, citizenship and migration within the 
European Union. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Anderson, B. (2000). Doing the dirty work? The global politics of domestic labor. 
London: Zed Books.
Bhabha, J. & Shutter, S. (1994). Women’s movement: Women under immigration and 
nationality and refugee law. London: Trentham Books.
Buzan, B. (1991). People, states and fear. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A new framework for analysis. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Castles, S., & Miller, M. J. (2009). The age of migration: International population 
movements in the modern world (4th edn). London: Macmillan.
Chang, G. (2000). Disposable domestics: Immigrant women workers in the global 
economy. Cambridge: South End Press.
Cholewinski, R. (1997). Migrant workers in international human rights law: Their 
protection in countries of employment. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Connell, J. (Ed.) (2008). The international migration of health workers. London: 
Routledge. 
Council of Europe (1996). Joint specialist group on migration, cultural diversity 




Curran, S., Shafer, S., Donato, K., & Garip, F. (2006). Mapping gender and migra-
tion in sociological scholarship: Is it segregation or integration? International 
Migration Review, 40, 199–223.
Donato, K., Gabaccia, D., Holdaway, J., Manalansan, M., & Pessar, P. (2006). A glass 
half full? gender in migration studies. International Migration Review, 40, 3–26.
Donnelly, J. (1986). International human rights: a regime analysis. International 
Organisation, 40(3), 599–642.
Douglass, M. (2006). Global householding in Pacific Asia. International Development 
Planning Review, 28(4), 421–45.
Ehrenreich, B., & Hochschild, A. R. (2002). Global women: nannies, maids, and sex 
workers in the new economy. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
Enloe, C. (2000). Banana, beaches and bases: Making feminist sense of international 
politics (2nd edn). Berkley: University of California Press.
Gregory, J., Sales, R., & Hegewisch, A. (1999). Women, work and equality: The chal-
lenge of equal pay in a deregulated market. London: Macmillan.
Gregson, N. & Lowe, M. (1994). Servicing the middle classes: Class, gender and 
waged domestic labour in contemporary Britain. London: Routledge.
Guiraudon, V. (2000). European integration and migration policy: Vertical 
policy-making as venue shopping. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2), 
249–269.
Guiraudon, V. & Lahav, G. (2000). A reappraisal of the state sovereignty debate: 
The case of migration control, Comparative Political Studies, 33(2), 163–195.
Hansen, L. (2000). The little mermaid’s silent security dilemma and the absence 
of gender in the Copenhagen School. Millennium, 29(2), 285–306.
Hardy-Fanta, C. (1993). Latina politics-Latino politics. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press.
Hatsuse, R. (2003). “Nihgen no anzenhosho” ron no houkousei [Directions 
for the studies of “human security”], Gendaishakai kenkyu [Contemporary 
Research], 4/5, 81–95.
Home Office. (2005). UK visas diplomatic service procedures entry clearance vol. 1 
general instructions (Chapter 14.5).
Hune, S. (1987). Drafting an international convention on the protection of the 
rights of all migrant workers and their families. International Migration Review, 
21, 123–127.
Hune, S. (1991). Migrant women in the context of the international convention 
on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their 
families. International Migration Review, 25, 800–815.
Huysmans, J. (1998). Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the creative development of 
a security studies agenda in Europe. European Journal of International Relations, 
4, 479–505.
Keck, M. E. & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.
Kingma, M. (2006). Nurses on the move: Migration and the global health care econ-
omy. London: ILR Press.
Kofman, E., Phizacklea, A., Raghuram, P., & Sales, R. (2000). Gender and interna-
tional migration in Europe. London: Routledge.
Female Domestic Workers on the Move 161
Krause, K. & Williams, M. C. (1996). Broadening the agenda of security studies: 
politics and methods, Mershon International Studies Review, 40, 229–254. 
Parreñas, R. S. (2005). Children of global migration: Transnational families and 
gendered woes. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Pessar, P. R. & Mahler, S. J. (2003). Transnational migration: Bringing gender. 
International Migration Review, 37, 812–846.
Peterson, V. S. (1996). Shifting ground(s): Epistemological and territorial remapping 
in the context of globalization(s), In E. Kofman, & G. Young (Eds), Globalization: 
theory and practice (pp. 11–28). New York: Pinter.
Smith, J., Wallerstein, I., & Evers, H. D. (1984). Households and the world-economy. 
London: Sage Publications.
Steans, J. (2006). Gender and international relations: Issues, debates and future direc-
tions (2nd edn). Cambridge: Polity.
Tickner, J. A. (1997). You just don’t understand: troubled engagements between 
feminists and IR theorists. International Studies Quarterly, 41(4), 611–632.
Tickner, J. A. (2001). Gendering world politics. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.
United Nations Development Program (1994). Human development report 1994: 
New dimensions of human security. New York: Oxford University Press. 
United Nations General Assembly (2000a). Protocol against the smuggling of 
migrants by land, sea and air, supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against transnational crime. Treaty Series. (Vol. 2241, p. 507, Doc. A/55/383). 
New York: United Nations.
United National General Assembly (2000b). Protocol to prevent, suppress and 
punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing 
the United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime. Treaty 
Series. (Vol. 2237, p. 319, Doc. A/55/383). New York: United Nations.
Except where otherwise noted, this work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view 
a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
162
9
Multiculturalism Policies and the 
Stepwise International Migration 
of Filipino Nurses: Implications for 
Japan
Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos
9.1 Introduction
As a result of globalization, labor migration and migrant integration 
are inevitable yet uncomfortable bedfellows. From the point of view 
of the host society, the entry of workers from another nationality or 
culture might solve a domestic labor shortage, but at the same time it 
will raise serious questions regarding how migrants can be integrated 
in the society. In what aspects of the community and to what extent 
will they be allowed to participate in the host society? Multiculturalism 
policies have been established as frameworks for integration; some have 
earned praise for their success in some migrant-receiving countries and 
endured criticisms in many other countries. This chapter presents the 
case of stepwise migrant nurses from the Philippines to provide one per-
spective on how multiculturalism policies becomes important predictor 
of the pattern of international labor migration.
The objectives of this chapter are three-fold: (1) to examine the 
stepwise migration behavior of Filipino nurses, especially how and 
why it happens; (2) to determine how multiculturalism policies impact 
the choice of transit and final destinations in the process of stepwise 
migration; and (3) to look at the links between stepwise migration 
and multiculturalism policies, specifically in Japan, which has begun 
accepting Filipino nurses under a government-to-government arrange-
ment called the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement 
(JPEPA). Given the tendency toward stepwise migration among Filipino 
nurses, the weakness of the JPEPA scheme as a source of a stable long-
term nursing workforce, and the limited capability of the Japanese 
government to effectively and immediately implement “top-down” 
OPEN
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multiculturalism policies, this chapter suggests a strategy of encouraging 
circular migration of foreign nurses in order to alleviate shortage of 
nurses in the future and at the same time to promote multiculturalism 
in this country.
An emphasis of this chapter is on the “stepwise” migration of nurses, 
where they sequentially work in several countries as transit points 
or stepping stones until they reach their most preferred and final 
destination. The “stepping stone” strategy has been mentioned in 
several previous works on nurse migration (see Buchan, Jobanputra & 
Gough, 2005; Buchan et al., 2005; Dumont & Zurn, 2007; Kingma, M., 
2008; Matsuno, 2009), but few have elaborated on how and why this 
phenomenon occurs. Nurses from the Philippines do follow (and are 
likely to follow) the stepwise migration pathway. By going through 
several transit points rather than straight to the most preferred des-
tination, they are able to use their time efficiently while waiting for 
opportunities in the most desired destination and to accumulate 
resources—human, financial, social, and political—for use in the transit 
points or to be transferred to the next destination.
There is also the question of how stepwise migrants distinguish 
between a transit destination and a final one. This is particularly rele-
vant considering the emerging issue of nurse retention. Two factors 
prompt stakeholders’ deep concern on the retention issue. First, in 
light of the aging population, it is important to have a stable source 
of experienced nurses in the workforce. Therefore, ongoing training 
of foreign-educated nurses can be one strategy for overcoming future 
projected shortages. Second, training nurses takes time and incurs 
costs, and the longer the nurse stays, the higher the possibility of 
recovering this investment. Even in Japan, the attention of policy-
makers and those on the ground has been gradually shifting from 
recruiting and employing foreign nurses to retaining them in the 
workplace.
The multiculturalism policies (or lack of them) that nurses consider 
important in their choice of final or transit destinations are explored 
in this chapter. Specifically, three basic components or aspects of 
multiculturalism policies and practices will be investigated, namely, 
(1) access to labor markets and equal treatment of locals and foreigners 
in the workplace, (2) access to citizenship, and (3) family reunification. 
These multiculturalism policies on the national level as well as multi-
cultural practices in the workplace influence migrant decisions through 
their impact on the economic (salary, labor conditions, and security of 
tenure) and social (availability of family support, recognition, sense of 
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self-worth, and belongingness in the workplace) determinants of step-
wise migration.
Japan began receiving foreign nurses in 2008 under a government-
to-government economic partnership agreement. Under this scheme, 
nurses from the Philippines and Indonesia are initially accepted as 
“candidates,” and their stay beyond three years is only permitted if they 
pass the National Licensure Examination conducted in the Japanese 
language. Five years have passed, but the results are very limited in 
terms of the number of nurses who were recruited, the number who 
qualified to stay beyond three years, and the number of those who 
chose to stay after getting the Japanese license. While multiculturalism 
policies are deemed important in attracting and retaining foreign nurses 
in this country, their formulation and more so their implementation 
has been slow, primarily because of the political, economic, and social 
implications, of which the Japanese stakeholders are wary. Given these 
domestic circumstances, coupled with the tendency for Filipino nurses 
to engage in stepwise migration, this chapter suggests the alternative, 
albeit mid-term, measure of encouraging “circular migration.” This 
will not only create a stable pool of foreign nurses, but also introduce 
and contribute to multiculturalism on the ground (multiculturalism 
from below). This undertaking, in turn, can be an instrument for this 
country’s national and local governments to initiate complementary 
“top-down” multiculturalism policies.
The empirical evidence on the dynamics of the stepwise migration 
pattern and its relationship with multiculturalism will be drawn from 
data gathered from fieldwork conducted in Singapore, Australia, the 
UAE, Japan, and the US. The fieldwork component comprises two 
parts: (1) implementation of a common survey questionnaire (through 
snowballing), with a few items redesigned to be compatible with the 
current labor migration policies of a specific destination; and (2) semi-
structured interviews with some of the respondents and stakeholders. 
The questionnaires were implemented as follows: Singapore (March 
2010, March 2011); Dubai, the UAE (October 2010); and Sydney and 
Darwin, Australia (October 2012). The numbers of nurse respondents1 
are as follows: 72 in Australia, 53 in Singapore, and 48 in the UAE. 
In the US, interviews with stakeholders were conducted in June–July 
2012 in Washington DC, Los Angeles, CA, and Union, NJ. Information 
on multiculturalism policies, immigration rules and procedures was 
taken mostly from announcements in official government websites and 
newspapers.
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This chapter is organized as follows: in the next section, the analytical 
frameworks on stepwise migration, multiculturalism, and multicultural-
ism policies to be used in this chapter will be presented. In Section 9.3, 
results of a study on the working of stepwise migration are analyzed, 
followed in Section 9.4 by a discussion of how multiculturalism policies 
affected nurses’ choices of transit and final destinations. In Section 9.5, 
Japan’s current scheme for accepting Filipino nurses is examined from 
the perspectives of its labor shortage of nurses and multiculturalism. 
The final section summarizes and concludes this chapter.
9.2 Analytical framework—stepwise migration 
and multiculturalism
Simply defined, stepwise international migration is a pattern, pathway, 
or strategy in which migrants move from one transit country (the 
stepping stone) to the next until they reach the most preferred desti-
nation. It is a series of rational decision-making processes that involve 
constantly assessing the labor and migration conditions and policies in 
several destination countries as well as the migrants’ own capabilities 
and resources with the objective of moving to a better or more pre-
ferred destination, until the most preferred final destination is reached 
(Carlos & Sato, 2010, 2011).
A stepwise migration pattern differs from the conventional patterns of 
migration in three ways. First, this migration pattern consists of multiple 
stages, with the migrant’s movement from one stage (destination) to 
another following some form of hierarchy. This differs from a one-time 
movement from the origin to the destination by permanent migrants 
or from circular migration wherein the migrant moves back and forth 
between one origin and one destination. Second, stepwise migrants are 
not simply “transients” who spend just a week or a month in one destina-
tion. Third, this pattern has a dynamic nature in which the migrants them-
selves actually make a series of decisions—either at the beginning of their 
journey (departure from the source country) or along the way to the most 
preferred and final destination. Their journey may be planned, to some 
extent, from the beginning, but it may also be unplanned (Paul, 2011).
Recent empirical studies, such as Carlos and Sato (2010, 2011) and 
Paul (2011), show that nurses’ decisions on how they treat a destina-
tion depends on the country’s economic performance, its historical and 
political affiliation with the sending country, and its ambiguous and 
unpredictable policies on the recruitment and employment of foreign 
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workers. This chapter looks at multiculturalism policies in the destination 
as another important factor that strongly influence the migrant’s decision 
on whether to stay in one destination or to leave for the next one.
The concept of multiculturalism was introduced in the 1960s, and in 
the years that followed debates on what multiculturalism is and why 
and how it should be implemented have gradually become the center 
of discussions about migrant integration. In recent times, the 9/11 
incidents in the US and social unrest involving migrants in France and 
Germany necessitated the re-examination of multiculturalism as a form 
of integration. Some alternative, but equally controversial, ideas such 
as “interculturalism,” “civic integration,” and “social cohesion” have 
been introduced. They are not completely distant in meaning from 
multiculturalism, but they build on, and are therefore, compatible with 
multiculturalism. Moreover, multiculturalism programs and practices 
have only changed their titles, and are still based on the same ideas and 
principles (Banting & Kymlicka, 2012, p. 15; Cantle, 2012).
The working definition of multiculturalism that is adopted in this 
study is derived from Tariq Modood:
Multiculturalism refers to the struggle, the political mobilization but 
also the policy and institutional outcomes to the forms of accom-
modation in which “differences” are not eliminated, are not washed 
away but to some extent recognized. Through both these ways, group 
assertiveness and mobilization, and through institutional and policy 
reforms to address the claims of the newly settled, marginalized groups, 
the character of “difference” is addressed; ideally, a negative difference 
is turned into a positive difference, though in most contemporary 
situation(s), something of each is likely to be simultaneously present 
[emphasis added]. (Modood, 2013, p. 36)
For Modood, multiculturalism is one mode of integration,2 in which 
cultural, political, and other forms of (negative) differences, as identi-
fied both by the integrating group (often the newly settled minority) 
and the other groups (majority and the “traditional” minority groups), 
are recognized and put to use for the good of the larger group (positive 
difference). Moreover, these differences are addressed by using two main 
tools, as follows: through assertion by and mobilization of all groups 
(not only the integrating group), and through the implementation of 
a set of policies by the government on the national and local levels. 
Effective multiculturalism policies should not be meant to eliminate 
differences among the groups; instead, they should cultivate a vision for 
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the common good of the multicultural society despite these differences. 
Neither is multiculturalism a “cure-all” prescription to prevent and resolve 
conflicts among groups in a society. Furthermore, to be able to channel 
negative differences into positive differences, groups should not just be 
recognized but also appreciated so they can feel a greater sense of belong-
ing and thus dedication to the common good.
In reality, however, it is difficult to differentiate multiculturalism 
policies from other types of policies related to immigration. In the opin-
ion of Banting and Kimlycka (2012), “there is no universally-accepted 
definition of ‘multiculturalism policy’ and there is no hard and fast line 
that would sharply distinguish multiculturalism policies from closely 
related policy fields, such as anti-discrimination policies, citizenship 
policies and integration policies” (p. 6). Therefore, we define multicul-
turalism policies on a broad spectrum; that is, as a wide range of policies 
that can be employed to accommodate new group identities and new 
norms in the public sphere. Furthermore, we limit our analysis to the 
following three areas of multiculturalism policies: (1) access to labor 
market and equal rights and benefits in the workplace, (2) access to 
citizenship, and (3) family reunification. These three areas are the most 
essential components of multiculturalism policies that motivate foreign 
workers in general and stepwise migrant nurses in particular to stay in 
a destination.3
9.3 Stepwise migration among Filipino nurses
This section will discuss how and why stepwise migration has become a 
common practice among Filipino nurses, as indicated by the results of 
the fieldwork in three destinations.
9.3.1 Do Filipino nurses engage in a stepwise 
migration strategy?
In order to determine whether Filipino nurses engage in stepwise migra-
tion, we first inquired about their work experience before coming to 
the current destination. The survey results show that some respondents 
have worked in countries outside the Philippines at least once. The 
percentage of those who have work experience abroad is highest for 
Australia at 35.4%, followed by the UAE (31.9%), and then Singapore 
(15.4%). In addition, whereas all respondents in Singapore had some 
work experience in the home country, some nurses in Australia and 
the UAE did not have any. This is because in Australia and the UAE, 
alternative migration pathways other than obtaining a working visa, 
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for which a Philippine license is often required, are available to Filipino 
nurses, as mentioned above.
Another interesting trend is that the majority of those who had expe-
rience working outside the Philippines had previously been based in 
the UK, Ireland, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and other counties 
in the Middle East. Of these countries, the KSA emerged as the most 
popular, with the exception of the UK for nurses based in Australia. 
Apparently, this is because the KSA has been actively recruiting nurses 
from the Philippines since the 1970s. From 2004 to 2010, about 70% of 
all newly hired nurses processed by the Philippine Overseas Employment 
Administration (POEA) were deployed to this country (Philippine 
Overseas Employment Administration, n.d., Table 14). Having easy 
access to nursing jobs in the KSA through POEA-accredited recruitment 
agencies, fast processing and immediate deployment at an affordable cost 
largely contribute to its popularity as an initial destination.4
For those currently working in Australia, the UK (18.5%) and Ireland 
(9.2%) also emerged as formerly popular places for Filipino nurses to 
work. These countries faced nurse shortages from the late 1990s until 
the mid-2000s, and they allowed entry of Filipino nurses on work visas 
that could later be converted to permanent residency visas and then 
citizenship. Their numbers peaked in 2001 and declined thereafter, 
when despite, the bilateral agreement on the recruitment of Filipino 
nurses forged by the two governments in 2002, recruitment was unilate-
rally stopped by the UK government, to the surprise of the Philippine 
government. There were two reasons: self-sufficiency in their nursing 
workforces has been achieved and there was competition from nurses 
coming from within the EU (Carlos, Sato & Caragay, 2009, pp. 77–81).
9.3.2 How do Filipino nurses engage in stepwise migration? 
To further understand how stepwise migration took place among the 
nurses in this study, their pathways and period of stay in each destination 
was mapped (see Appendix Table A9.1). The results revealed two trends. 
First, migrant nurses stay in one destination for a considerable period, 
usually years. This length of stay is necessary because the resources 
required to move to the next destination often take time to accumulate, 
particularly human and political resources (i.e. experience, skills, and 
citizenship). For nurses currently in Australia, the longest times spent 
in previous destinations were 13 years in the KSA, 11 in Libya, and 
11 in the UK. Stepwise migrant nurses in the UAE also spent as long 
as 15 years in the KSA. On the other hand, very few respondents in 
Singapore had more than 5 years’ experience in other countries.
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Second, compared to those who are based in Singapore and the UAE, 
many who now work in Australia had passed through several transit 
destinations, the most popular being the UK and Ireland. One inter-
viewee who left the Philippines in 2000 said that compared to those 
originating directly from the Philippines, “it was much easier and less 
expensive to come to Australia with the UK passport, UK experience, 
and a UK nursing license.” Given these advantages, we can infer that 
Filipino nurses who possess a passport from the UK or Ireland are more 
likely to engage in stepwise migration to Australia.
9.3.3 Why do Filipino nurses engage in a stepwise migration 
strategy?
Evidently, the tendency for nurses to take a roundabout pathway and pass 
through several transit destinations instead of heading directly to the most 
preferred final destination is a rational strategy. It allows for the accumula-
tion of resources in the transit destinations that are not readily available 
in the Philippines but are required in the more preferred destinations. 
Moreover, it is seen as a rational strategy in light of the unpredictable and 
ambiguous nurse-migration policies of these destinations. 
The findings imply that transferrable and useful resources in the forms 
of human resources (skills and license, as mentioned above), economic 
resources, social networks, and political resources (citizenship) can be 
accumulated in an previous (initial and transit) destinations, motivat-
ing nurses to work there first and engage in this stepwise strategy. In 
a focused group discussion (FGD) conducted among respondents who 
engaged in stepwise migration (Darwin, October 25, 2012), the nurses 
admitted that having several years of experience in one transit destina-
tion was much more preferred over the experience obtainable in the 
Philippines. Moreover, having a license appears to be a valuable asset 
in some cases because it enables the nurse to work right after arrival in 
a more/most preferred destination. Employers prefer nurses who have 
work experience overseas because it is considered proof of better nursing 
skills and knowledge, familiarity with modern medical instruments, and 
ability to work in a multicultural setting. Indeed, Filipino nurses target 
human resources in the destination to make them more marketable in 
the next destination.
The nurses also accumulate the economic resources to cover the 
expense of moving to the next destination, such as recruitment fees, 
examination and review fees, settlement costs, and transportation 
costs. Because of the low salary of nurses in the Philippines, these 
nurses prefer to work outside the country for much higher pay so they 
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can save for such expenses. Social networks (social resources) in the 
destination—such as Filipino friends and families, the Filipino com-
munity in general, international recruitment agencies, and co-workers 
from different countries—can also be easily accessed from a destination. 
These networks can provide more accurate information about other 
destinations, although recently the Internet has also become a source 
of information for recruitment, and about life and work in potential 
destinations. Some international recruitment agencies choose to estab-
lish temporary and permanent offices in the destinations rather than 
in the Philippines to avoid being subjected to the strict recruitment 
regulations of the Philippines and because employers prefer nurses with 
experience working overseas.
Most of all, many of the respondents value the citizenship (i.e. political 
resource) obtained in the destination through naturalization because 
this becomes a way for easy access to and more favorable employment 
conditions in the next destination. Traditionally, obtaining citizenship 
in a destination is highly valued by migrants because it will give them 
equal rights and privileges under the law of the destination country and 
will allow them to settle permanently without migration restrictions. 
Many destination countries also use citizenship to attract and retain 
foreign nurses. In the case of the Filipino nurse respondents, however, 
citizenship in a destination is even more significant because it enables 
them to enjoy the rights and privileges accorded by some other destina-
tions to citizens of the country where they are naturalized.
As one example, several Filipino nurse respondents in Australia have 
acquired prior citizenship in the UK, which was advantageous in find-
ing work in Australia and settling there. A respondent in Dubai planned 
to work in the UK, apply for citizenship, and then return to the UAE 
because by doing so she would receive a higher salary and could peti-
tion for her family’s entry more easily than could her fellow Filipino 
nurses in the UAE. Another respondent from Australia pointed out that 
she wants to work in the KSA temporarily because her Australian citi-
zenship and nursing license enable her to receive a salary and benefits 
that are tax free and much higher than that usually earned by Filipinos 
in the KSA. In contrast to the common notion that a migrant will stay 
if she becomes a naturalized citizen of the host country, the nurses in 
the study instead consider such access to citizenship as a way to move 
on to another destination.
Moreover, the time spent in one destination, which is considerable, is 
explained by the unpredictable labor migration policies in many preferred 
destinations. Whether, when, and how to recruit and accept foreign 
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nurses is singlehandedly decided by stakeholders in these destinations. 
Respondents pointed out that staying in one destination is an efficient 
and effective way to spend time while waiting for the opportunity to work 
in the most preferred destination, which depends largely on immigration 
policy reforms that may take years to be approved. For example, the cur-
rent visa retrogression policy (US Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
2013) of the US prevents entry of Filipino nurses, despite them meet-
ing requirements such as passing the Visa Screen Program administered 
by the Commission on Graduates of Foreign Nursing Schools (CGFNS) 
International and National Council Licensure Examination for Registered 
Nurses (NCLEX-RN). Instead of staying in the Philippines, many of them 
grab the opportunity to work first in a less preferred destination with migra-
tion that is more restrictive and labor conditions that and worse and have 
lower pay, but which has a shorter processing time and requirements that 
are easier to meet. Indeed, when the respondents were asked about their 
top three reasons for working in the current destination, 71.7% of those in 
Singapore and 59.6% of those in the UAE chose “having the opportunity 
because this country actively recruits nurses from the Philippines.” In con-
trast, only 11.3% of the respondents from Australia chose this response. 
This finding confirms that countries that actively recruit nurses from the 
Philippines easily become immediate or initial transit destinations for its 
nurses, but not necessarily their final destination.
Finally, the fact that nursing is a relatively global profession also 
contributes to the feasibility of stepwise migration. Nursing skills and 
knowledge have basic commonalities in many countries, allowing their 
accumulation and transferability among destinations. There are coun-
tries where the license is honored under a mutual recognition scheme 
so that nurses can begin working with minimal orientation from the 
new employers. Such is the case in Australia for licenses obtained in 
the UK (as explained above), Ireland, and New Zealand. The licensure 
or board examinations act as an objective way of assessing the nursing 
skills and knowledge accumulated elsewhere and evaluating their trans-
ferability across countries. 
From these findings, it can be inferred that there is indeed some 
sort of hierarchy in the preferred destinations of stepwise migrants. 
However, such rankings do not seem to be determined prior to their first 
departure from the Philippines, and they will go wherever there is an 
opportunity to work. As they move along their stepwise pathway and 
accumulate resources overseas, the succeeding decision-making process 
to determine whether to stay or move and when to move to the next 
destination becomes more systematic and predictable.
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9.3.4 To stay in the current destination or move to 
the next one?
To further verify whether the current country is a final or a transit 
destination, the respondents were asked about their future plans. The 
responses show that while only 8% of the respondents in Australia had 
plans of leaving that country to work in another destination, more than 
half of the respondents in Singapore (54.7%) and the UAE (79.6%) had 
plans to do so. Moreover, a considerable percentage of the respondents 
in these two transit countries were still undecided on whether to stay or 
move to the next destination.
Such trends were further confirmed by asking the respondents how 
long they planned to stay in the current destination to work. About 
80% of those in Australia wanted to remain in the country for more 
than an additional 10 years, and about 70–80% of those in Singapore 
and the UAE had shorter-term plans to stay in these countries no 
more than five additional years. The shorter (mid-term) plans to stay 
in Singapore and the UAE imply that the respondents consider these 
countries as transit points, and that they are potential stepwise migrants 
who will live in multiple destinations over their lifetimes. In contrast, 
respondents in Australia had a relatively long-term plan for working 
there; many even indicated “until retirement,” which suggests that this 
country is considered a final destination.
The decision to stay in the current destination or seek greener 
pastures somewhere else arises from essential differences among the 
destinations and preferences of the migrants themselves. For one, the 
destinations differ in their geographical distance from the Philippines, 
with Singapore being the nearest and the UAE the farthest. Some 
respondents value the idea that they can go home anytime if they work 
in Singapore. To be able to land a job as a nurse in Singapore, Australia, 
or the UAE several years of work experience, either in the home country 
or in another destination, is required. However, licensing procedures 
differ. Currently, in Australia, nurses who hold a license and have expe-
rience working in previous destinations, such as Canada, New Zealand, 
the Republic of Ireland, South Africa, the UK, or the USA, are exempted 
from appearing for the Australia Nursing Board Exam (Australian Health 
Practitioner Regulation Agency, 2013). On the other hand, Singapore 
requires that all nurses from the Philippines possess a Philippine nurs-
ing license and a recommendation from the employer to be eligible for 
the Singaporean Nursing Board Exam (Singapore Nursing Board, 2013). 
Respondents in the study indicated that in Singapore, obtaining a work-
ing visa before entering the country is the main pathway available for 
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Filipino nurses, whereas in Dubai (UAE), Filipinos can first enter the 
country to join relatives or as tourists, then take the Nursing Board 
Examinations after arrival and find employment. If aspirants pass and 
find an employer within a year, they can be granted a nursing license 
and a work visa (Dubai Health Authority 2013, p. 53). Australia also pro-
vides several pathways for Filipino nurses. They can come as students 
to enroll in graduate programs in accredited Australian universities, as 
dependents of a family member who is a migrant, as students taking 
the bridging program for nurses, and as nurses with a license from an 
approved country such as the UK, Ireland, or South Africa (Australian 
Government Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 2013).
In addition to these factors related to geographical distance and the 
foreign-worker recruitment system, subsequent decisions also depend on 
how they are accommodated in the destination through multicultura lism 
policies, the details of which will be discussed in the next section.
9.4 Multiculturalism policies as a determinant 
in the choice of transit and final destinations
Of the different factors that distinguish a transit destination from a final 
one, multiculturalism policies can be considered crucial, especially from 
the perspective of the retention of nurses. While Australia has been 
openly promoting multiculturalism, the UAE and Singapore seem to 
be strikingly conservative in their policies and practices, as elaborated 
below. These differences affect migrants’ long-term plans rather than 
the initial decision to migrate.
In the following discussion, countries are classified on a spectrum 
reflecting the extent to which multiculturalism is implemented and the 
nature of multicultural policies, with Australia, as an active promoter 
of multiculturalism and multiculturalism policies toward one end, and 
Singapore and the UAE toward the other end.
9.4.1 “Easy entry–easy exit” transit destinations: 
The case of Singapore
The recruitment of Filipino nurses to Singapore has been ongoing since 
the early 1990s, which is later than recruitment to Middle East countries, 
where Filipino nurses have been employed since the Marcos administra-
tion in the 1970s.5 Singapore represents a group of destinations that 
allow easy entry because of its organized recruitment system, in which 
the private sector, including hospitals and care home administrations 
as well as private recruitment agencies, are actively involved and are 
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cooperative in bringing in foreign nurses (Personal communication with 
a recruiter in Singapore: March 19, 2008). At the same time, however, 
nurses consider these destinations only as stepping stones, and their 
stay in these countries can very well facilitate their easy exit to a more 
preferred destination.
That it was relatively easy and faster to find work in Singapore com-
pared to the US, Australia, and other receiving countries was evident 
in the interviews. Because of the acute nursing shortage and need to 
fill positions as soon as possible, and the efficient and transparent 
system of processing immigration papers in terms of what documents 
are needed and the adoption of online application software, the entire 
recruitment process from application to employment usually takes one 
to two months, compared to years in the case of the US. Applications 
can be lodged through relatives in Singapore, partner recruitment agen-
cies in the Philippines, or via the Internet. Compared to their coun-
terparts in other countries, Singaporean employers and the Singapore 
Nursing Board play a greater role in recruitment. They even come to 
the Philippines to administer the licensure examination and conduct 
interviews. The recruitment fee is also less expensive and paid using an 
easier repayment scheme compared to those in other countries. In 2009, 
the recruitment fee ranged from $1,500 to $3,000, which is paid by the 
Filipino nurses in installments after their arrival in Singapore. It is also 
relatively easy for Singaporean employers to decide on hiring foreign 
nurses because they do not pay any fees to the recruiter, and they are 
also assured that nurses who do not perform well during the six-month 
probation period can be “returned and replaced with another nurse 
from the Philippines” (Personal communication with a recruiter in 
Singapore: March 19, 2008).
While Singapore sets two conditions for institutions to be eligible to 
hire foreign nurses, these do not seem to hinder their recruitment and 
employment. Based on Singaporean immigration rules, the recruitment 
and employment of a foreign nurse depends on two conditions: the 
total number of foreigners employed does not exceed the quota (called 
the dependency ratio ceiling), which is generally about 10–15% of the 
total workforce in 2008, and also that the employer is willing to pay 
a monthly foreign worker’s levy of about $250–390.6 An administra-
tor of a nursing home, when interviewed in March 2010, emphasized 
that it is more costly to employ foreign nurses because of the levy and 
housing and food subsidies. Nevertheless, they are willing to employ 
foreign nurses because there is a general shortage of nurses owing to 
the unpopularity of the profession among Singaporeans and that many 
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nurses leave nursing either to raise a family or go overseas (Interview 
with administrator of a nursing home, March, 20, 2008).
While Singapore and some Middle Eastern countries openly and 
actively recruit foreign workers, their conditions after arrival in the 
destination are often highly dependent on their salary, job category, 
nationality,7 and type of visa. By setting rules based on these criteria, 
the government is able to selectively accept “desirable” foreign workers. 
The foreign workers in Singapore are categorized according to their 
skills, with domestic helpers and construction workers at the bottom 
(categorized as unskilled) and skilled professionals on top. Filipino 
registered nurses are considered “mid-level skilled” workers. They receive 
an “S pass” visa,8 with which they enjoy a greater number of and better 
privileges than do foreign workers in the construction and other services 
sectors, but these privileges are fewer and less superior than those afforded 
to professionals engaged in IT, education and research, pharmaceuticals, 
and other high value-added sectors. For those who have a “work permit” 
(domestic helpers, healthcare assistants, and waiters/waitresses) or “S” 
pass status, the employer has to pay the foreign worker’s levy (tax). In 
contrast, the foreign worker’s levy is not required when “professionals” 
holding an Employment Pass (“E” pass) or Personalized Employment Pass 
(PEP) are employed.
One of the nurses’ privileges concerns family reunification. Nurses can 
only bring in their immediate family members (spouse and unmarried 
biological and/or legally adopted children below age 21) as dependents 
if their monthly fixed salary is at least $2,800.9 While many of the 
respondents could meet this salary requirement, they chose not to peti-
tion for dependent visas because of the high cost of living in Singapore, 
including costs of housing and children’s education, which are not sub-
sidized by the government or by the employer. They are also not allowed 
to apply for dependent visas for their parents and parents-in-law. Many 
nurses opt to bring their families in simply for a vacation, since the 
Philippines is only a three-hour flight from Singapore.
In Singapore, citizenship through naturalization is generally not 
granted to foreign workers unless they marry a local or there are extraordi-
nary circumstances.10 Dual citizenship is strictly disallowed. Application 
for permanent residency requires that the applicant holds at least an 
S pass and proof of employment, but satisfying these requirements 
is not an assurance that the application will be approved. Permanent 
residency status is important if Filipino nurses plan to stay in Singapore 
to work because they can find jobs more easily with this status. In addi-
tion, employers prefer permanent residents because they are no longer 
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included in the foreign workers’ quota and the employer does not need 
to pay the levy for them. However, ironically, permanent residency is tied 
to employer sponsorship; the permanent residency and re-entry permit to 
enter and exit Singapore are both issued with specific validity dates 
(usually three to five years), and they can only be renewed by showing 
proof of employment (Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, n.d.).
While there are no official policies discriminating against Filipino 
nurses in the workplace, respondents claimed that they are at the 
mercy of the local hospital administrators from the time they arrive 
in Singapore. Filipino nurses come to Singapore on a temporary/
probationary nursing license issued by the Singapore Nursing Board, 
which is valid for six months and renewable for another six months. 
Nurses who do not receive a good evaluation after this period will be 
repatriated. Those who are initially employed as healthcare attendants 
or nursing aides need to be promoted first to enrolled nurses and then 
to registered nurses, both of which depend on the initiative of the 
employer. If the employer deems their performance unsatisfactory, their 
initial two-year contract will not be renewed, and they will have to 
return to the Philippines. They are not allowed to find another employer, 
unless they leave the country first.
9.4.2 The preferred “in-between” transit destinations: 
The UK and Ireland
Based on the stepwise pathways revealed by the respondents, the UK11 
and Ireland are considered the more preferred transit destinations for 
Filipino nurses for many reasons. First, compared to Singapore and the 
UAE, it is not as easy to enter the UK and Ireland because they have 
more prohibitive requirements regarding work experience and licens-
ing. Second, access to recruiters for these destinations is quite limited in 
the Philippines because many are often based in other transit destina-
tions, like Singapore and the UAE, where interviews are also conducted. 
Third, these destinations offer higher salaries and better benefits than 
the initial transit destinations.
A last and perhaps most important difference from the initial transit 
destinations is that these countries provide opportunities for migrant 
workers to become citizens provided they have lived in the country 
for a specified period. Obtaining citizenship in these second-transit 
destinations increases the probability of being hired in a more desired 
destination because of favorable policies and mutual agreement 
schemes (such as those among the Commonwealth countries) concern-
ing employment and the status of citizens’ stays in these destinations. 
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One interviewee from Australia said, “When I was in the UK, everyone 
was eyeing UK citizenship because we wanted to go to Australia. It was 
easy for me to come to this country because of my UK passport. In fact, 
I began working in the wards only a week after arrival.” One interviewee 
in the UK also said, “now that I have a UK passport, I am planning 
to return to the UAE because I will earn more compared to Filipino 
nationals there.” Further studies are necessary to determine what other 
“in-between” transit countries are considered by these nurses and how 
access to citizenship not only affects their decision-making process in 
choosing destinations, but also influences their identity formation, 
sense of belongingness, and ideas on nationalism and multiculturalism.
9.4.3 Final destinations: Australia and USA
Not surprisingly, the US is the top destination because of its historical 
and cultural affinity with the Philippines.12 Buchan et al. (2005) and 
Buchan, Jobanputra, & Gough (2005) observe that a majority of nurses 
from other source countries are also inclined to target the US as a destina-
tion. It is the traditional destination for Filipinos who wish to pursue the 
American dream, as it has what Paul (2011) calls “place reputation.” In 
addition, the Philippine nursing curriculum is patterned after that of the 
US, so less adjustment is required in the workplace. A very large Filipino 
community is also available to support newly arrived nurses. Moreover, 
that foreign nurses can have varied career options and a clear career 
pathway in the US contributes to its popularity as a final destination. 
In a telephone conversation with a Filipino nurse based in Maryland 
in June 2012, he noted, “while in other countries, there are very few 
options for nurses, especially Filipino nurses, in the United States there 
is career development or job promotion. … Here in the US, if you really 
work hard, you get recognized, you get promoted, you get compensated, 
kahit sino ka pa [whoever you are].” Filipino nurses in the US not only 
find opportunities to work in hospitals, but also in other fields such as 
home nursing care, medical insurance, and nursing-related businesses. 
They have assumed important positions where they work, such as vice-
president of a health care company or head nurse in a hospital.
This study also showed that, in addition to the US, Australia was the 
other country most preferred by respondents. There are several reasons 
why Filipino nurses want to remain there for long periods. Australia offers 
one of the highest salaries and best benefit schemes, such as six weeks’ 
annual leave, among the destinations. Opportunities for career growth, 
citizenship, and family reunification are good, and Australia appeals to 
personal preferences such as the less severe weather and shorter distance 
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to the Philippines compared to the UK and Ireland. Respondents also 
mentioned Australia’s positive environment for raising children and the 
advantage of having “lots of space” when building a family.
Compared to transit destinations, there are many types of visas and 
migration pathways available to aspiring nurses, both temporary and 
permanent, in Australia.13 However, for most of these pathways, con-
siderable professional nursing experience and a high level of English 
language proficiency are necessary to obtain a professional nursing 
license and tenured employment. However, these language and skills 
requirements have become more difficult in the past decade. For exam-
ple, to avail oneself of any of the permanent residency visas, the for-
eign nurse should achieve a minimum International English Language 
Testing System (IELTS) score of six points in all skills (reading, writing, 
speaking, and listening) in one sitting. To apply for most of the visas, 
the Filipino nurses should be nominated or sponsored by an employer, 
many of whom prefer nurses who are trained in specialized fields like 
psychiatric nursing, renal care, or theatre or surgical nursing. An option 
for those who lack the skills and language is to get a nursing-student visa. 
However, while there are no initial requirements for skills and language 
proficiencies, students are required to provide proof of ability to fund 
their education. Therefore, the easier way to get to Australia is to go ini-
tially to a transit destination such as the UK, Ireland, the US, Singapore, 
or Canada to gain experience and licensure and to save money.
Once employed as registered nurses in an Australian public hospi-
tal, the salary, benefits, and labor conditions are the same as those of 
local nurses. Nurses can negotiate with hospital administrators and 
the govern ment through the nurses’ association, which all nurses are 
allowed to join. Each state or territory has its own Public Sector Nurses’ 
and Midwives’ Enterprise Agreement14 that contains provisions regarding 
the salary, allowed leave, security of tenure, and other labor conditions 
and is negotiated every three years. Moreover, the nurses’ association 
stands behind its members. One Filipino nurse noted that, “if it were 
not for the nurses’ association, I would have been laid off for alleged 
incompetency. Ipinaglaban talaga ako ng union [The nurses’ association 
really fought for me].” This kind of support by a professional group and 
the sense of “belongingness” to a group, which are not readily found in 
transit countries, are highly appreciated by the Filipino nurses.
Since family reunification has been a vital part of Australian immigra-
tion policy, nurses can include their immediate family members in their 
application for a skilled worker visa, a relative-sponsored visa, or even 
a student visa. Converting a working visa to permanent residency also 
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takes less time compared to many other destinations. One respondent 
was able to get permanent residence visas for herself and her husband 
through employer nomination barely a year after migrating to Australia 
on a working visa. This visa assures her and her family that they can 
stay and work in Australia on a permanent basis, receive subsidized 
healthcare, access certain security payments, and be eligible to apply for 
Australian citizenship. It also gives her family the opportunity to spon-
sor relatives from the Philippines. Another feature of Australia, being an 
immigrant country, is that it allows for dual citizenship. For naturalized 
Philippine-born nurses, this is an advantage if they want to enjoy the 
rights and privileges of a Filipino citizen, such as owning land and other 
real estate in the Philippines and long-term stays without the necessity 
of applying for a visa, while keeping a residence in Australia.
Finally, it is also noteworthy that the respondents cited the mul-
ticultural character of Australian communities, in terms of not only 
hosting migrants from many countries and having ethnic restaurants 
and groceries, but more importantly, in terms of the national and local 
government and the workplace providing opportunities to people of 
different origins and backgrounds to actively interact. For example, 
multicultural festivals (country days) and seminars are held to promote 
understanding of varied cultures, and free interpretation services in 
many languages are provided.
From the discussions above, it is clear that differences in multicultur-
alism policies in the destinations, particularly with regard to access to 
the labor market, citizenship, and family reunification, contribute to 
the stepwise migrant’s decision whether to stay in one destination or 
move to the next one. If a country wants to keep a pool of foreign skilled 
nurses, especially in light of a serious shortage of nurses owing to demo-
graphic issues, the implementation of favorable multiculturalism policies 
is indispensable. In the following section, we look specifically at Japan, 
which has yet to find a long-term solution rather than a mere stopgap 
measure to address the future shortage of skilled nurses in the country.
9.5 Stepwise migration and multiculturalism: 
The case of Japan
9.5.1 The migration of Filipino nurses to Japan under 
the JPEPA scheme15
Japan began accepting nurses from Indonesia in 2008 and the Philippines 
in 2009. Under the provisions of JPEPA, which is a comprehensive treaty 
covering trade, investments, cooperation, and movement of natural 
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persons, Filipino and Indonesian nurses are allowed to come to Japan 
as “candidate nurses.” It took about eight years from the time the nego-
tiations started until it was implemented, partly because the Japanese 
stakeholders were greatly divided in their opinions about whether and 
how to accept foreign nurses. Even without gaining national consensus, 
the agreement was ratified, and the first group of Filipino care-workers 
and nurses arrived in May 2009.
Under the original agreement, the Philippine government, through 
POEA, is in charge of recruiting and deploying “candidate” nurses, and 
the Japanese government, through the Japan International Corporation 
of Welfare Services (JICWELS) (2013) takes care of these nurses after they 
arrive in Japan. The Japanese government and Japanese employers share 
the cost of recruitment, deployment, education, and training, amount-
ing to an estimated US$40,000 (excluding an average monthly salary 
of US$2,000 and an annual bonus of 2.6 times the monthly salary) per 
candidate nurse for three years, the initial period of the contract. If they 
pass the Japanese National Nursing Licensure Examination (NLE) within 
three years, then they can stay to work as professional nurses. If they fail, 
then they are obliged to return to the home country.
Statistics show disappointing results for the scheme in the first four 
years of its implementation. While the quota for Filipino nurses was set 
at 200 persons annually, the number deployed did not reach even half 
of this quota. According to statistical data from the Ministry of Health, 
Labor and Welfare of Japan (MHLW) (2013) and JICWELS, in the first 
four years of implementation of the scheme, only 237 were deployed to 
Japan and only 25 of them (10.5%) were able to pass the NLE. Moreover, 
there is high rate of pre-termination of contracts. For example, of the 
93 persons who came in 2009, 31 ( 13 ) had left Japan (Carlos, 2013) 
before the completion of the initial three-year contract.
There are many reasons cited in the literature to explain this dismal 
performance, ranging from the language barrier, difficulty passing the 
licensure examination, difficulties in intercultural communication in the 
workplace, and other issues that are typical in a multicultural environ-
ment or workplace. The hospital employers also complained about the 
heavy burden imposed on them by the Japanese government to handle 
the financial expenses (which amount to more than half of the total 
expenses), education in language and skills, and training and manage-
ment of the candidate nurses.
The Japanese government has acknowledged these problems and is 
now working toward several revisions of the scheme. It must be noted, 
however, that many of the problems identified and the solutions 
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offered so far have been made on the assumption and expectation that 
the nurses will stay and become a stable source of labor in the long 
run. Below, we argue that Japan is more of a transit destination than a 
final one. It might not even be chosen as a transit destination given the 
limited transferrable resources that can be accumulated in this country.
9.5.2 Is Japan a transit point or a final destination? 
Undoubtedly, Filipino nurses will choose Japan as a destination, but 
most probably only as a transit point. It is unlikely that Filipino nurses 
will settle in Japan for good under the current JPEPA scheme because 
of the country’s substantial differences from the other potential final 
destinations mentioned above.
In addition to the lower salary and benefits in Japan compared to the 
US, Canada, and Australia, the lack of multiculturalism policies is expected 
to influence nurses’ decisions about whether to remain in Japan. Access 
to labor in Japan is highly restricted to this government-to-government 
arrangement and is initially limited to three years and 200 nurses each 
year. Unlike Australia, there are no other pathways available for nurses 
educated overseas. Filipino nurses can be treated and compensated as 
professional nurses only if they pass the difficult licensure examination. 
In the meantime, they perform in the workplace as assistant nurses or 
nursing aides. Unlike in Australia, the provisions of the labor contract are 
mostly left to the decision of the employer. Consequently, especially in 
the first two years of the implementation of the JPEPA scheme, there was 
a notably wide gap in the salary and benefits and other labor conditions 
among the candidate nurses in the same batch.
With regard to family reunification, employers do not allow foreign 
candidate nurses to bring in even immediate family members. Employers 
also generally discourage taking long holidays; candidate nurses are 
allowed only one to two weeks of return leave to visit relatives in 
the Philippines. Compared to those who are working in Australia and the 
US, the Filipino nurses in Japan need to pass the licensure examination 
within a specific period of three years. One revision to this scheme 
in 2012 allowed for those who did not pass within three years and 
returned home to come back to Japan on a short-term visa to retake 
the examination. Obtaining permanent residency is neither easy nor 
fast. Passing the NLE is a prerequisite, and foreigners with a working 
visa who do not have a special relationship with the Japanese (such as 
those who are born in Japan, are former Japanese nationals, or are the 
spouse or child of a Japanese national) are generally required to have 
worked in Japan for at least five years, before they are allowed to apply 
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for permanent residency (Ministry of Justice of Japan, 2013a). To obtain 
Japanese citizenship, foreigners have to satisfy numerous requirements 
and undergo a lengthy procedure, as stipulated in the Nationality Law 
(Ministry of Justice of Japan, 2013b). Given these conditions, Filipino 
nurses are not likely to consider Japan as a final destination.
However, Japan does have some qualities similar to those of other 
transit destinations. The JPEPA scheme provides Filipino nurses with 
the opportunity to leave the Philippines. They need pay only for their 
passport, health examination, and other documents required by the 
Philippine government for all overseas workers (subscription to health 
insurance and the migrant welfare fund) because the rest—the bulk—
of the costs for recruitment, deployment, and language and skills 
education/training are jointly shouldered by the Japanese government 
and the host institution (hospital). The requirements (a bachelor of 
science in nursing diploma, a Philippine nursing license, and three 
years’ work experience), which are similar to those of Singapore and 
other transit destinations, are relatively easy to comply with. Like the 
other transit countries, Japan shows a trend towards discouraging per-
manent settlement and favoring a guest-worker migration policy.
One serious concern, however, is that Japan may not even be chosen 
as a transit destination, especially for those whose main objective in 
staying in one destination, like Singapore, the UK, Ireland, and the UAE, 
is to accumulate “transferrable” resources. The skills gained in Japan 
and the nursing license may not be accepted elsewhere, especially in 
the potential final destinations. Japanese citizenship, while it takes a 
considerable time to obtain, may not offer as many privileges as UK or 
US citizenship, especially in terms of preferential status in some more 
preferred destinations (like the Middle Eastern countries) in such matters 
as salary, benefits, and visa status/status of stay. Not even proficiency 
in the Japanese language, achieved while in Japan, will be useful in the 
next preferred destination.
Unfortunately, in order to retain foreign nurses, Japan still has much 
to improve in terms of formulating and implementing the basic mul-
ticulturalism policies discussed in this chapter. Moreover, Japan is not 
largely a country of immigration. Thus, the Japanese, especially the 
aging generations, generally have limited interaction with and are 
therefore less accustomed to foreigners in the workplace and serving 
as care providers. The government has long postponed relaxing immi-
gration rules for foreign workers. While realizing the need for foreign 
workers to sustain economic development since the 1960s, stakehold-
ers have been divided in their opinions on whether and on what terms 
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foreign workers should be admitted. As a result, Japan has welcomed 
foreigners, not formally as “workers” from the “front doors” but from 
the “side doors” (spouses of Japanese nationals, industrial trainees, stu-
dents, and Japanese descendants) and for a time, even from the “back 
doors” (undocumented foreign workers).
Specifically in the nursing care sector, given the impending seri-
ous shortage of nurses due to the aging population and the projected 
increase in competition to attract and retain foreign nurses, Japan’s 
options may be declining. Unless steps are initiated to solve this prob-
lem now, it will be difficult to rely on foreign nurses in 10–15 years 
when the workforce shortage is expected to reach its peak. While there 
may be a large international pool of nurses willing to work in Japan, 
they may not be immediately available to work in Japanese hospitals 
and nursing homes. This is because, especially in the case of Japan, 
cultural competency and language proficiency are as important as skills 
and experience for workers in the nursing sector.
9.5.3 Circular migration as a mid-term solution?
In light of these circumstances, what can Japan do to sustain a steady 
supply of foreign nurses who are not only skilled in their jobs but also 
culturally and linguistically competent? One way is for this country 
to adopt a “revolving door” or circular migration policy in which the 
Filipino nurses are able to go back and forth between the Philippines 
and Japan to practice their profession. The requirements for passing the 
NLE could be relaxed to encourage Filipino nurses to take it; for exam-
ple, administering it partly in English or in simplified Japanese, giving 
the foreign nurses more chances to pass the examination, or giving 
more time and resources to prepare. Access to the labor market can be 
improved by exploring other feasible ways to bring in Filipino nurses, 
such as granting student loans and/or scholarships to potential nurses or 
establishing agreements between medical institutions in the Philippines 
and Japan to develop and share human resources. Like many transit 
countries, employers can develop a system to assure Filipino nurses that 
they can return to their home country for a leave longer than one to two 
weeks as part of their work contract. Given the geographical proximity 
between Japan and the Philippines, allowing this is an alternative to 
bringing the families of Filipino nurses to Japan. Filipino nurses should 
be encouraged to return, and they should be given priority in recruit-
ment. Human relations in the workplace can be improved by giving both 
Japanese and Filipino nurses opportunities for collaboration and interac-
tion. These could assist the Filipino nurses in gaining appreciation for 
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working and living in Japan despite the lack of a Filipino support group 
or family in the country. These initiatives could very well be undertaken 
by the private sector rather than the government, which has been limited 
because of its inability to gain consensus among the domestic stakehold-
ers with regard to employing foreign nurses.
Although these measures might not be an incentive for Filipino 
nurses to make Japan their final destination, they can help alleviate the 
shortage of nurses by assuring Japan of a pool of qualified and compe-
tent foreign nurses to boost its workforce in the long run. Furthermore, 
these private initiatives can encourage, and would require, the Japanese 
government to formulate and implement multiculturalism policies in 
the following three areas: access to the labor market, access to citizen-
ship, and family reunification. Finally, interaction between Filipino and 
other foreign workers with colleagues and patients in this service sector 
will be a good start in promoting multiculturalism in Japan in which 
“top-down” public policies and “bottom-up” private initiatives work 
hand in hand to promote migrant integration in this country.
Appendix
Table A9.1 Stepwise migration pathways of Filipino nurses in Australia, 
Singapore, and the UAE
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Notes: Only those respondents who have experience working in at least one overseas desti-
nation are included in this table. Numbers in parentheses indicate number of years spent 
working in the destination (except for Australia Respondent 68).
Source: Author’s compilation.
Notes
All errors remain the responsibility of the author. For correspondence, write to 
rdcarlos@world.ryukoku.ac.jp.
 1. The respondents in this study are holders of Philippine nursing licenses who 
work as staff nurses and nurse assistants/aides in the destinations.
 2. The other forms of integration as articulated by Modood are assimilation, 
individualist-integration, and cosmopolitanism (Modood, 2013, pp. 146–155).
 3. It must be added, however, that for some stepwise migrants, access to citi-
zenship may not necessarily keep them in a destination. It is paradoxical 
that in some cases, access to citizenship through naturalization drives them 
to move to a more preferred country that cannot be reached directly from 
the country of origin due to restrictive, ambiguous, or unpredictable migra-
tion policies in the destinations, as argued by Carlos and Sato (2010).
 4. The statistics exclude those who did not go through the POEA, such as those 
who left as tourists, dependents of Filipino migrants overseas, and students.
 5. It is not exactly clear when Singapore began actively recruiting nurses from 
the Philippines. However, the results of the survey show that Filipino nurses 
were already working in Singapore in 2003–2004.
 6. In June 2013, the worker’s levy was raised over a staggered period of three years, 
evidently to moderate the growth of the foreign workforce inflow. For compu-
tations of the dependency ratio ceiling and levy per sector, see the Ministry 
of Manpower, Singapore. http://www.mom.gov.sg/Documents/services-forms/
passes/Schedule_ of_Levy_Changes_2013-015.pdf, accessed September 10, 2013.
Table A9.1 Continued
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 7. For example, the approved source countries for the manufacturing sector are 
China, Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong only.
 8. For details about the S-pass, see the Ministry of Manpower Singapore 
website: http://www.mom.gov.sg/foreign-manpower/passes-visas/s-pass/before-
you-apply/Pages/default.aspx, accessed September 20, 2013.
 9. However, this minimum required amount was raised to $4,000 in September 
2012, making it more difficult for nurses to petition for their immediate family 
members. Refer to Ministry of Manpower, Singapore (2012).
10. Young foreign men may become Singaporean citizens if they complete the 
National Service military obligation.
11. For more details about the results of the survey and discussions on the 
situation and policies in the UK circa 2000, please refer to Carlos and Sato 
(2010).
12. For details about the history of Filipino nurse migration to the US, see Choi, 
2003.
13. The visas available are as follows: (a) Nurses sponsored by an employer 
(Temporary Work (Skilled) Visa (Subclass 457), Employer Nomination 
Scheme and Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme); (b) Skilled Migration 
(Independent migrant, sponsorship by an eligible Australian relative or nomi-
nated by a state or territory government); (c) Working holiday; (d) Temporary 
visa option to do a bridging program to improve skills; (e) Training and 
Research (Occupational Trainee Stream) Visa; (f) Visitor (Business Stream) 
Visa (Subclass 600); (g) Student visa (Ministry of Immigration and Citizenship 
of Australia, 2013).
14. For the current provisions of the Public Sector Nurses and Midwives’ Enterprise 
Agreement in Darwin, Northern Territories, see Office of the Commissioner 
for Public Employment of Northern Territories, Australia (2013).
15. For details, see Carlos (2013).
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10
Who Benefits from Dual 
Citizenship? The New Nationality 




An individual with dual citizenship has long been regarded as “devi-
ant” in the modern nation-state system.1 The Hague Convention on 
Nationality of 1930 established the principle of a single allegiance by 
an individual to a polity—“one nationality for one person”—in order to 
clarify to which state an individual owed a military obligation (Faist & 
Kivisto, 2007, p. 32).2 Under such a principle, a state authority reserved 
political, economic, social, and civil rights for its citizens, and only 
those who had these rights were treated as moral equals and enjoyed 
full securement of their interests, properties, and identities. As the world 
has become more and more divided and institutionalized through inter-
national law and treaties, each individual has been strongly connected 
to a specific nation-state. Dual citizenship has thus been perceived as 
an abnormal situation for the modern nation-state. However, policy 
makers today are starting to see dual citizenship as an opportunity to 
promote economic development and to solve such social problems as 
a declining birth rate and aging population, rather than as a threat to 
sovereignty and social integration.
Since an increasing number of individuals hold dual or plural citizen-
ship today, the principle of a single allegiance is being challenged and 
the state authorities are attempting to reinterpret and reconstitute the 
boundary between the nation and the citizen. This is an issue not only 
for migrants moving to a new place, but also for people in diaspora.3 
Many migrant-sending countries have been trying to build networks 
with their diaspora populations during the last few decades, including 
India, China, Italy, Russia, the Philippines, Morocco, Greece, Turkey, 
OPEN
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Hungary, Mexico, and South Korea. The development of transportation 
and communication technologies has not only accelerated migration 
but also helped those who emigrated, and their descendants, to stay 
connected to their “home country” from wherever they live. As a result, 
migrant-sending countries have introduced new policies to encourage 
emigrants and diaspora to “return” to their “home country,” although 
such policy changes are introduced not for the welfare of the diaspora 
population but are usually in the economic and political interests of 
the state authorities. The question of dual citizenship has become an 
unavoidable one for both sending and receiving countries. It is often 
seen as a sign of growing transnationalism and the declining power 
of the nation-state over individuals’ lives, since individuals with dual 
or plural citizenship are assumed to be relatively free from the con-
straints of the disciplinary and controlling power of the state while 
enjoying a transnational life beyond territorial boundaries. However, 
such an understanding appears to be misleading when we look closely 
at the growing acceptance of dual citizenship, which shows an inter-
esting duality: it is usually seen as a sign of the transnationalization 
of an individual’s activities and belongings, but it is also, in a sense, 
a new political institution to expand the power of the state beyond 
its territorial boundaries. Then, what does this change suggest? What 
impact and significance does dual citizenship have for each of the 
actors—government, immigrants, and diasporas—involved? Who bene-
fits from dual citizenship?
In order to take a step toward answering these questions, this chapter 
will look at the case of the New Nationality Law of South Korea that 
started to recognize dual citizenship, although in a limited way, and 
will consider the aims, implications, and limitations of this new policy. 
Responding to the rapid increase in non-professional migrant work-
ers and international marriages, as well as an aging population and 
declining birth rate (Lim, 2009), South Korea has introduced several 
policy changes since the 1990s. This study focuses especially on the 
dual citizenship policy introduced with the revision of the Nationality 
Law in May 2010 (effective since January 1, 2011). With this policy, the 
South Korean government seems to be trying to attract more skilled and 
talented immigrants, to develop connections with such skilled immi-
grants and with overseas Koreans, and to support the social integra-
tion of marriage immigrants and their children. While such a policy 
change shows South Korea’s move toward a multicultural society, it is 
simultaneously bringing about new problems to resolve. As it is still a 
new policy, looking at what are and will be the consequences of this 
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change may help us to gain a thorough understanding of the impact of 
dual citizenship on the modern nation-state and on the lives of modern 
individuals.
10.2 Citizenship and dual citizenship in the modern 
nation-state system
The notion of a specific territorial boundary encompassing a group of 
people, as well as the specific forms of government that developed, 
followed the advent of the modern nation-state in 16th and 17th century 
Europe. Various political institutions, such as territorial management, 
centralized authority, control of the nobility, taxation systems, and 
welfare institutions, were established in the process of state formation. 
With the development of modern nationality laws in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, it has become a common practice of the state to delineate 
inhabitants of its territory as citizens, by the institutions of citizenship 
and nationality—either by ancestral lineage or by birth. The nation-state 
came to hold the authority to decide who the “citizen” is and what rights 
and duties they possess (Hollifield, 2008; Koslowski, 2001).
As the volume and frequency of human migration has increased 
in a globalized world, more and more people today are living outside 
the country of their citizenship, and consequently the number of 
individuals who possess or seek dual citizenship is on the rise. Some 
commentators say that the question of dual citizenship is the point at 
which transnationalization of citizenship appears most prominently 
(Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 167; Faist, 2007, p. 1), and it puts states 
under pressure to reformulate traditional citizenship and encourage 
transnational activities of migrants. Is it really a sign of the declining 
power of state authority, though? If that is the case, then how do we 
explain the fact that more and more countries are starting to recognize 
dual citizenship today?
There is a growing body of literature on the issue of dual or plural 
citizenship, as more countries have started to recognize it over the past 
two decades. However, as a relatively new subject, there are not yet 
enough studies to lead us to concrete theorization. Researchers have 
addressed variously the reasons for its increase around the world. Some 
argue that those countries with a large emigrant population will allow 
dual citizenship; others argue that the increasing movement of people is 
a consequence of an ever more globalized world in the post-Cold War era, 
or the shifting character of conflicts to internal ones, or the development 
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of universal human rights norms. In addition, such domestic factors as 
the development of gender equality, pressure from emigrants, and grow-
ing social problems like labor shortages and an aging society are also 
responsible for the change (Faist & Gerdes, 2008; Koslowski, 2006). While 
some countries recognize dual citizenship, however, they do not extend 
it to immigrants living within their territorial boundaries, as in the case 
of the Philippines, Taiwan, and Poland. Others, such as the US, are not 
officially in favor of dual citizenship, but the Supreme Court and State 
Department recognized people to hold citizenship of multiple countries 
(Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 168). The question is why attitudes toward 
migration policy and dual citizenship vary between countries even 
when they share similar social, economic, and political conditions.
It is undeniable that economic and political interests are strong 
driving forces behind the recognition of dual citizenship. However, 
other factors, such as historical experiences and ideologies, have also 
had an undeniable influence on the patterns of citizenship and nation-
ality policies around the world today, as well as other social conditions, 
such as nationalist sentiment or images of immigrants as a threat to 
the native community in a given society. Recognition of dual citizen-
ship may help immigrants to be acknowledged as equal members in a 
society and may protect them from discrimination by alleviating the 
boundary between citizens and “foreigners.” However, the classifica-
tion and criminalization of migrants have been major practices of social 
control by the authorities, and the “otherness” of migrants can easily 
be translated into “fear” and “threat.” Also, if core political rights are 
reserved as a privilege of citizens, recognition of dual citizenship may 
convey a sense of devaluation of national citizenship and may appear 
as a betrayal by the state; from the perspective of native citizens with 
single nationality, those with dual citizenship may seem to enjoy more 
advantages by belonging to multiple polities.
Dual citizenship is often seen as a manifestation of transnational-
ism, or transnationalization of citizenship. In fact, the number of states 
permitting dual citizenship has been increasing in recent years, and so 
has the number of individuals who hold dual citizenship by birth or 
by choice. However, this does not instantly mean the declining power 
of state authority over citizens. Dual citizenship policy is rather an 
attempt by state authority to adjust to, and to re-establish its role and 
status in, the rapidly changing global environment. The question of 
dual citizenship is thus a field of negotiation between conflicting forces, 
including: protecting the privileges of citizens at the cost of the rights 
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of non-citizens; trying to extract more economic benefit from foreign 
labor by granting permanent residency or dual citizenship; finding a 
solution to social problems like an aging society and declining birth 
rate; increasing the options and opportunities of the diaspora com-
munity by dual citizenship; or enabling immigrants to stay mobile so 
that they can easily move to better opportunities. Although there are 
substantial differences in attitudes toward dual citizenship between 
countries, the question of dual citizenship is becoming an important 
item on the agenda of policy makers around the world, regardless of 
whether they recognize it or not. In the following section, the focus will 
turn to the dual citizenship policy of South Korea, and its implications 
for how it is changing (or will change) society. 
10.3 South Korea’s new nationality law 
and dual citizenship policy
Owing to rapid economic development since the late 1980s, labor short-
ages have been one of the urgent issues faced by the South Korean econ-
omy. The influx of foreign workers consequently transformed South 
Korea from a labor-sending to a labor-importing country. In response 
to increasing migrants and the growing social problems like declining 
birth rate, South Korea has been introducing remarkable changes into 
their immigration and citizenship policies since the mid-1990s (Lee 
et al., 2006; S. Lee, 2005). These changes have also aimed to attract more 
migrant workers to stay permanently and to prevent Korean nationals 
from renouncing their Korean citizenship. The primary goal of these 
policy changes is to promote economic development while alleviating 
social problems.
The revision of the Nationality Law in May 2010 (effective since 
January 1, 2011) opened the door to dual citizenship. It was the latest 
development in this series of changes made to immigration policies and 
related legal structures,4 including providing immigrant workers and 
foreign investors with easier access to the Korean economy, and allowing 
more overseas Koreans to work and stay in South Korea. With regard to 
overseas Koreans, the Kim Young-Sum administration initiated the New 
Policy for Overseas Koreans in 1993, which led to the establishment of 
the Globalization Project Committee in 1995 and the Overseas Koreans 
Foundation in 1997 in an attempt to strengthen ties between overseas 
Koreans and promote their rights and interests, as well as participation in 
the country’s development.5 The succeeding Kim Dae-Jung administra-
tion introduced the Overseas Koreans Act in 1999, which granted partial 
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citizenship to overseas Koreans.6 Policies that also cover non-Korean 
immigrants include: the Foreign Industrial Trainee Program, which 
started in 1991; successive Employment Permit Systems (EPS)7 from 2004 
onward; the Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea of 2007; aboli-
tion of the Family Registry Law with the patrilineal family system, which 
was replaced by the Law on the Registration of Family Relationship in 
2008;8 and the Multicultural Family Support Act of 2008.9 Among these 
policies, the EPS and the Overseas Korean Act were important steps in 
extending, albeit partially, the scope of citizenship before the introduc-
tion of the New Nationality Law of 2010. What these policy changes 
show is an orientational shift in South Korea’s policy since the 1990s to 
actively utilize migrant labor rather than control them to ensure social 
cohesiveness.
The New Nationality Law of 2010 is characterized by: (1) the relaxa-
tion of requirements for the naturalization of competent immigrants; 
(2) the relaxation of the obligation to give up a foreign nationality upon 
naturalization (limited acceptance of dual citizenship); (3) the accept-
ance of dual citizenship based on a pledge not to exercise their foreign 
nationality inside the country; and (4) the prohibition of expatriation 
without completing military service. The New Nationality Law allows 
holding dual citizenship for immigrants upon naturalization to South 
Korea. The recognition of dual citizenship seems to be the government’s 
attempt to attract more talented immigrants to the country and to 
integrate immigrant brides and their children into society. It also aims 
to keep ties with overseas Korean communities, as well as those who 
emigrate for career and education, so that they can contribute to the 
development of the national economy and that the assets and pensions 
of aged overseas Koreans can be brought into the country.
The question of dual citizenship has been debated in South Korea since 
the early 1990s, but it was seen negatively at first because of concerns that 
it could be used to avoid military service or that it might cause a problem 
with the family registration system. However, as a consequence of the 
continuing outflow of the population (especially young and talented 
individuals), as well as the need for further foreign investment to recover 
from the economic crisis of 1997, granting partial citizenship for overseas 
citizens and the recognition of dual citizenship have become important 
on the agenda for the development of the state. In addition, the pres-
sure from Korean communities in the US, as well as the organization of 
Korean adoptees abroad,10 has increased since the turn of the century.
Consequently, South Korea’s dual citizenship policy sets several limi-
tations on who is eligible to take such citizenship. The policy excludes: 
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those who hold two nationalities as a result of “overseas birth”;11 
male citizens who have not completed their military service; foreign 
spouses of Korean nationals who could not maintain their marriage 
due to unforeseeable reasons (such as death or disappearance of the 
Korean spouse); foreigners living in the country for more than 20 years 
(namely, the Chinese minority); overseas Koreans under the age of 65 
(regardless of their citizenship); and low-skilled migrant workers.12 For 
overseas Koreans, the age restriction and the military obligation are the 
main obstacles. In fact, the overseas Korean community in the US has 
been calling for the Korean government to lower the age restriction. 
The current president, Park Geun-Hye, has been speaking about lower-
ing the age requirement for overseas Koreans from 65 to 55 since her 
presidential election campaign—due probably to securing the voting by 
overseas Korean citizens beginning with the presidential last election 
(December 2012). With regard to immigrants with no Korean origin, 
there are already several requirements to fulfill before obtaining a per-
manent or long-term residency visa or before applying for naturaliza-
tion. This makes it difficult for semi- or low-skilled migrant workers 
to have dual citizenship in South Korea.13 Thus, South Korea’s New 
Nationality Law can also be seen as an attempt to attract skilled migrant 
workers as well as Koreans educated abroad to return, while marginal-
izing low-skilled and poorly educated migrant workers, maintaining the 
national security system, and encouraging the economic activities and 
investments of overseas Korean citizens under the auspices of the state.
These concerns are not unique to South Korea, as the question of dual 
citizenship has been under debate in many other countries. However, 
the reaction to these questions and the changes made to policies differ, 
even among countries of similar social and economic conditions. Among 
Asian countries, for instance, Singapore and Japan have a similar, or 
even higher, economic status compared with South Korea. These three 
countries also share common social problems today, including an aging 
population, labor shortages, and a declining birth rate. However, nei-
ther Singapore nor Japan officially acknowledges dual citizenship. With 
its strictly polarized immigration policy, Singapore provides liberal and 
preferential conditions for highly skilled and talented professionals 
to work, while putting such constraints on low-skilled workers as not 
allowing family reunions and marriage with Singaporean citizens (Cho, 
2011; Low, 2011). These “global talents” tend to be highly mobile, 
though, while permanent residents are often reluctant to become natu-
ralized citizens because of the military service obligation, and many 
young Singaporeans are willing to leave the country for their career 
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or education, if given the chance (Yeoh & Lin, 2012). This has made 
Singapore increasingly dependent on non-resident migrant workers. 
As a consequence, today the Singaporean government is under strong 
pressure from both non-resident citizens and non-citizen residents to 
start recognizing dual citizenship. The Japanese government too has 
been reluctant to open its door to low- or semi-skilled migrants. Official 
acceptance of immigrant labor is limited to “through the side door,” 
such as granting Long-term Resident visa to Japanese descendants, 
allowing trainees on the Technical Intern Training Program not to be 
treated as immigrant labor, and accepting candidate nurses and candi-
date care workers from Southeast Asia under the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (Carlos, 2012). A social environment unfavorable to outsid-
ers may also prevent immigrants from becoming a member of Japanese 
society, which is reflected in the fact that the rates of permanent 
residency and naturalization show no significant difference from those 
in Singapore and South Korea, despite the fact that Japan has no man-
datory military service for male citizens.
There are, of course, problems regarding the treatment of, or range 
of discrimination against, low-skilled migrant workers in South Korea. 
Nevertheless, South Korea did introduce a dual citizenship policy, 
albeit limited. While there may be several complex factors that led the 
government to implement the policy, a major one may be the rapid and 
massive transformation in the composition of the population due to 
growing immigration since the 1990s. The development of such social 
problems as an aging population and declining birth rate also had an 
undeniable influence on migration and citizenship policies. Another 
factor may be the historical experience of having large emigrant popu-
lations as a consequence of colonization, decolonization, war, and eco-
nomic difficulties, which have developed into an abundant “resource” 
for networking, especially after the economic crisis in the late 1990s. 
Migration to Western countries, especially to the US, has long been 
a strong preference for many South Koreans in search of better work 
and educational opportunities, and it has now developed into lively 
networks and communities of overseas Koreans generating the “culture 
of migration” in South Korean society. South Korea’s policy of limited 
acceptance of dual citizenship may be driven by economic interest 
rather than universal human rights norms or diaspora welfare. Yet its 
limited nature and exclusion of low-skilled migrant workers show the 
government’s concern with the issue of competing loyalties and obliga-
tions, as well as immigrant integration and political cohesion. While 
South Korea seems to be shifting toward a multicultural society with the 
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New Nationality Law, it has brought about a new set of problems for 
society to overcome. That said, the rest of this chapter will discuss what 
implications the dual citizenship policy has for the changes happening, 
or that will happen, in South Korean society.
10.4 Dual citizenship, transnationalism, 
and transnational nationalism
While scholars of globalization have argued that there are increas-
ingly more transnational or postnational spaces for individuals, civil 
organizations, and NGOs to develop a transnational civil society, 
outside the modern state structure and the system of international 
society (e.g. Appadurai, 1996; Ong, 1999; Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1994), 
such a contrast between national and transnational is misleading. Both 
practices are often mutually dependent, and transnational activities 
can be embedded within the very structure of the state and interstate 
system, helping to reconstitute the state itself (Bauböck, 2003, p. 701; 
Varadarajan, 2010, p. 25). In a similar vein, dual citizenship has been 
a disturbing factor for the modern nation-state with regard to the 
principle of single allegiance, and it is often seen as a sign of growing 
transnationalism that enables individuals to transcend exclusionary 
nationalism. Dual citizenship, however, does not necessarily have to 
conflict with nationalism, but nationalism can play an important role 
in both the implementation and practice of policies targeting over-
seas Koreans. In fact, migrants today maintain connections with their 
families, friends, co-villagers, religious colleagues, and business partners 
with the help of communication, transportation, and financial mecha-
nisms. Such cross-border social networks enable them to engage in the 
economic, social, and political life of their country of origin, while 
simultaneously encouraging the sending countries to develop such con-
nections for their own advantage.
The growing volume and frequency of transnational activities of 
migrants—migrant transnationalism—can, in a cumulative way, have 
enough impact to change the state sovereignty and social life of people 
in both the sending and receiving countries (Portes, 2003; Vertovec, 
2004). On the one hand, therefore, “dual citizenship is an enabling 
device for transnational practices” (Bauböck, 2003, p. 715), as it gives 
individuals such rights as unconditional right of entry, right to bring 
in family members, right to own property, right to access welfare, and 
right to security and protection. On the other hand, though, it is part of 
a national project to re-establish and reinstitute the role and sovereignty 
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of states in a changing global environment and to engage with diaspora 
for national development. As Varadarajan writes:
the diasporic reimagining of the nation that characterizes the 
production of the domestic abroad is not a process that is driven 
by diasporas themselves. It is […] a peculiar form of transnational 
nationalism that has been embraced by states at the same time as 
they embark on programs of neoliberal restructuring. (2010, p. 49)14
In terms of South Korea, overseas Koreans have long entered into 
transnational activities across state boundaries in business, educa-
tion, artistic activities, social movements, and political participation 
(Lee & Park, 2008). They not only establish and maintain ties with 
Korean society through such cross-border activities, but also extract 
various benefits.15 The media—newspapers, satellite television, and the 
Internet—may play an important role in this process, since they enable 
people to communicate and share information within and beyond 
diaspora communities that network across borders, as well as to inter-
link the social lives of diaspora communities and South Korea through 
common cultural resources such as TV programs and music. The devel-
opment of such connections has made the South Korean government 
aware of the usefulness of diaspora networks to attract investment 
and human resources from overseas Koreans, and possibly strengthen 
economic, political, and cultural ties between their host countries and 
South Korea. However, it is also true that there is a significant difference 
between Korean diaspora communities in the degree of their transna-
tional activities and engagement with South Korea.
South Korea has introduced a series of policies for its diaspora popu-
lation since the 1990s that has extended the boundary of political 
belonging, albeit partially, beyond its territorial boundary. This was due 
to the changes in the political and economic environment following 
the end of the Cold War as well as political democratization at home, 
the economic crisis of 1997, and the growing numbers of overseas 
Koreans. The New Nationality Law of 2010 extended the boundary 
further by partially recognizing dual citizenship. The dual citizen-
ship policy can be understood as an attempt to reimagine the nation 
through the expansion of the scope of citizenship. In other words, it 
is a project of state-initiated transnational nationalism, with the aim 
of improving the political and economic standing of South Korea in 
international society by attracting talented migrants and developing 
diasporic engagement.
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It is, however, difficult to evaluate how successful the dual citizenship 
policy is in attracting and providing an opportunity for immigrants and 
overseas Koreans to enjoy full citizenship in South Korea. Although it 
has only been two years since the enactment of the New Nationality Law 
in January 2011, statistics shows that the number of those who acquired 
South Korean nationality has not increased drastically compared with 
previous years, but it rather decreased: about 13,000 people got South 
Korean nationality in 2012, while it was about 19,000 in 2011 and 18,000 
in 2010 (Table 10.1). The number of citizenship renunciations has also 
decreased, though still exceeding the number of naturalizations. While 
there is no concrete data on the rate of dual citizenship holders/applicants 
among the number of naturalizations and renunciations, it may be assu-
med that, overall, the interest in dual citizenship among immigrants and 
overseas Koreans without Korean citizenship is not so high. On the 
other hand, however, the rate of citizenship renunciations among those 
who hold dual citizenship is decreasing since the enactment of the New 
Nationality Law. Therefore, the expectation of the government from the 
dual citizenship policy is “to stop the net outflow of population and to 
contribute to the increased economic competitiveness of the country.”16
There are still several obstacles to be removed before the dual citizen-
ship policy brings about further social changes. For instance, manda-
tory military service still pushes Korean males with dual citizenship to 
choose foreign citizenship over Korean citizenship, and it also makes 
immigrants unwilling to naturalize, in order to avoid the duty for their 
Table 10.1 Acquisition and loss of nationality in South Korea from 2007 to 2012
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Naturalization 8,480 11,512 25,035 16,303 16,085 10,540
Recovery 1,781 3,740 1,708 1,010 2,264 1,987
Acquisition 119 125 205 267 316 240
Reacquisition 158 122 129 543 899 616
Loss 22,802 20,163 21,136 22,131 21,472 17,641
Renunciation 726 276 886 733 1,324 823
Other 696 154 708 1,448 1,722 1,365
TOTAL 34,762 36,092 49,807 42,435 44,082 33,212
Note: ‘Other’ includes numbers for decision of nationality, choice of nationality, and keep-
ing of nationality.
Source: Ministry of Justice, South Korea, Churipgug-oegugin-jeongchaek-tonggye-yeonbo 2012 
[Korea Immigration Service Statistics 2012], pp.614–615.
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children. In addition, for non-Korean immigrants, except those who are 
married to a Korean citizen,17 requirements for naturalization, such as 
length of residency and residential status, occupational and economic 
status, and knowledge of the Korean language, history, and culture, 
often become hindrances, as these may cost more than the benefit of 
holding dual citizenship. Moreover, the existence of a narrow ethno-
racial concept of national identity becomes not only a barrier to social 
participation for immigrants, including overseas Koreans, but also leads 
to severe discrimination and exclusion that impede the development 
of multiculturalism in South Korea (Lim, 2009). Dual citizenship, then, 
may be no more than an instrumental choice for professional migrant 
workers and spouses of Korean citizens, which is where the debate about 
political belonging and national belonging rises to the surface.
Dual citizenship is a practice of transnational nationalism with which 
states attempt to expand the boundary of the nation and the citizen. At 
the same time, transnationalism of diasporas—for instance, associations 
of Korean American and Korean adoptees lobbying for dual citizenship—
is also inextricably linked with nationalism (Ang, 2001). Such forms 
of nationalism directed to/from outside territorial borders, however, 
have the potential to change the narrow view of nationalists who put 
sole importance on the home country, and to enable immigrants and 
diasporas to express their multiple and multilayered identities. If this 
is the case, South Korean society can overcome its narrow concept of 
national identity and belonging based on the dichotomy of inside/
outside (against immigrants) and purity/impurity (against overseas 
Koreans), and start to embrace not only co-ethnic “brethren” but also 
every stakeholder in society as part of the nation.
10.5 Is dual citizenship a step toward 
a multicultural society?
When thinking about the cultural diversity of South Korean society, 
there are broadly two issues of concern. One is the relationship of 
South Korean society with immigrants, including immigrant workers 
and immigrant brides who are not of Korean origin; and the other is its 
relationship with overseas Koreans, regardless of their citizenship status.
With regard to the latter group, the overseas Korean population 
mainly comprises people of Korean origin in China, North America, 
Japan, former USSR countries, and Koreans adopted overseas, some of 
whom carry Korean citizenship and some not. There are also Korean 
communities in South America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, 
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which are a source of return migration. Just considering the variety of 
locations, it is possible to say that there is already a multicultural diver-
sity within a population group categorized as “Korean.” These Koreans, 
with varying social, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds, are connected 
to South Korea with the help of the development of communication 
and transportation. Some of them “return” to their “home country” in 
order to find jobs or educational opportunities, or to satisfy their desire 
to identify with their ancestral land. However, it is not easy for second 
or third (or later) generations of overseas Koreans to be a part of South 
Korean society. A closer look reveals that their cultural differences are 
not regarded equally in the society, and they quite often face discrimi-
nation and marginalization because of differences in language, cultural 
behavior, and social experience, such as education and military service 
(Kibria, 2002). Since the enactment of the New Nationality Law in 2011, 
many Koreans who were adopted overseas are returning to South Korea 
in order to recover their Korean citizenship and to work and study.18 
However, they too come to feel that they are “foreigners” in society for 
having a different language and social experiences.
Such experiences are the consequence of the narrow ethno-racial con-
cept of national identity, in which not only non-Korean immigrants, but 
also “mixed-blood” and overseas Koreans, are marginalized and discrim-
inated against as not being “true” Korean. Especially among overseas 
Koreans, the Korean Chinese have been facing serious discrimination 
in South Korea for decades (Chung, 2008; S. Lee, 2005). Most Korean 
Chinese come as low-skilled labor migrants or as brides, and they have 
often been treated unjustly at work and at home: their common ethnic 
origin and language places them only slightly above other low-skilled 
migrant workers. Such treatment of Korean Chinese was evident in the 
Overseas Koreans Act of 1999, which at first excluded Korean Chinese, 
ethnic Koreans in the former USSR countries, and some Koreans in Japan. 
Although the Act was amended later due to opposition from civil society 
and the Chinese government, each Korean group from different loca-
tions was still treated unequally and hierarchically within the amended 
Act: the highest privilege was given to Korean Americans, while scant 
attention was given to Korean Chinese (Chung, 2008; Park, 1996). It 
is also reported that Korean businessmen’s imposition of their business 
models and cultural practices on their ethnic Korean business partners 
in the former USSR countries is creating an extremely negative reaction 
among these ethnic Koreans (Hü binette, 2009, p. 58). This demonstrates 
that there is a hierarchical view against diasporas on the side of native 
Koreans; placing diaspora communities in a lower status than Koreans 
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in South Korea. Taken as a treatise or an ideology, the idea of diaspora 
essentially contains the essence of differentiation. It bestows the “home 
country” with the authenticity and centrality for the national collective, 
without questioning the sociohistorical origin of the nation itself. It 
then establishes an unequal power relationship between those who are 
members of the “home country” and the diasporas outside.
In terms of immigrants of non-Korean origin, the government has 
introduced some policy measures during the last decade. Responding to 
the rapid increase in international marriages since the turn of the cen-
tury19 and providing support for these multicultural families, especially 
for foreign brides and their children, have become important items on 
the agenda. The South Korean government enacted the Act of Treatment 
of Foreigners in 2007, in which the protection of the human rights of 
foreigners and support for their social integration were addressed as being 
the duty of the state and local governments. One measure implemented 
by the Act was the social integration program for spouses of Korean 
citizens. The program provided its participants with certain incentives 
to obtain permanent resident status or naturalization. While it usually 
requires five years of residency with long-term residential status, written 
exams, and interviews in order to naturalize to South Korea, those who 
take the program receive an exemption from the written exams, and the 
time needed for the process is reduced.
Following the relaxation of requirements for resident status acquisition 
and the simplified naturalization process for spouses of Korean citizens, 
the government introduced the Multicultural Family Support Act in 2008 
and established more than 200 Multicultural Family Support Centers 
around the country.20 Local governments mainly operate these centers, 
providing such services as counseling for women and children, lan-
guage education programs, working support programs, and organizing 
volunteer teams for these families. Together with the social integration 
of marriage immigrants, there was a question of the increasing number 
of children with dual citizenship as a consequence of the new Family 
Relationship Registration Act of 2008, which removed patrilineal civil 
registration. More recently, the Korean Immigration Service prepared 
the Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, in which immigrant integration 
and achieving multiculturalism are the recurring themes.21 Although it 
is still a policy without a concrete and specific perspective, it shows the 
remarkable shift in South Korea’s policy orientation, which could not 
have been imagined a few decades ago. One goal of the dual citizenship 
policy introduced in this context was to normalize the status of mar-
riage immigrants and their children. It was, therefore, the growing social 
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diversity in South Korean society that brought about the introduction of 
the New Nationality Law.
Further study and careful analysis are necessary before understand-
ing whether South Korean society is moving toward accepting cultural 
diversity or trying to push immigrants with various cultural back-
grounds to follow and fit in with the standards of society.22 However, 
at least in policy, the South Korean government has made a move 
toward multiculturalism: the introduction of the New Nationality Law 
and immigrant integration policies are the latest steps forward, but 
definitely not the last. More comprehensive and systematic cooperation 
from national and local governments, as well as civil-society organiza-
tions and individuals, should be developed further in order for dual 
citizenship to bring full-fledged social benefits for every actors involved.
10.6 Conclusion
Dual citizenship policy represents both transnationalization of citizen-
ship and a nationalist project for securing state authority. Bloemraad 
notes:
dual citizenship inhabits a curious place. On the one hand, it under-
mines traditional citizenship by allowing, and even promoting, mutual 
belonging, claims-making, rights and responsibilities. […] On the other 
hand, dual nationality reinforces the centrality of nation-states because 
they continue to be the bodies that grant citizenship. (2004, p. 393) 
Behind the increasing number of countries recognizing dual citizen-
ship in recent years, there is a growing interest in the diasporas on the 
side of the state authority. It has resulted in various policy changes, 
including dual citizenship policy attempting to encourage not only 
remittances and investments from emigrants, but also the return of the 
educated and skilled ones. It has also changed the image associated with 
emigrants from “betrayers” and “escapees” to “heroes” and “develop-
ment partners,” especially in developing countries (Guevarra, 2009; 
Whitaker, 2011). Each country has different reasons for recognizing or 
denying dual citizenship; in addition, the rules and practices of dual 
citizenship vary between those countries recognizing it. Although it is 
undeniable that economic and political interests are the strong driving 
forces behind the recognition of dual citizenship, attitudes toward dual 
citizenship vary between states depending on their political, economic, 
historical, social, and cultural background.
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In the case of South Korea, the historical experience of having a large 
emigrant population as a consequence of colonization, decolonization, 
war, and economic difficulties, has prepared an abundant “resource”—
namely overseas Koreans—for networking. It became especially attrac-
tive for the government following the economic crisis of the late 1990s. 
The growing numbers of immigrants, as well as such social problems as 
an aging population and declining birth rate, have also fueled the shift 
in migration and citizenship policies.
The New Nationality Law, with partial recognition of dual citizen-
ship, represents the changing attitude of the South Korean state toward 
immigrants and the diasporas. It may become a springboard not only for 
resolving social problems and labor shortages, but also for recognizing 
the value of social diversity and realizing multiculturalism. However, in 
reality, South Korea’s immigration policies, including dual citizenship, 
still have many limitations and inadequacies in achieving the ideal.
Who benefits, then, from dual citizenship in South Korea? For the 
government, it is an attempt to attract skilled and talented individu-
als from abroad, as well as to generate economic gains from overseas 
Koreans through their investments and other transnational activities. 
However, these expectations seem quite difficult to fulfill, given the 
social and legal obstacles, such as persistent ethno-racial nationalism 
and suspicion against cultural diversity, or exclusion from the dual citi-
zenship policy of foreign-born Koreans under the age of 65 and male 
citizens who have not completed their military service. Such obstacles 
make dual citizenship an impractical and questionable option in the 
eyes of diaspora Koreans. The scope of South Korean transnational 
nationalism encompasses South and North Koreans, Koreans adopted 
abroad, and overseas Koreans around the world trying to reconstitute 
globally the nation (Park, 1996). The New Nationality Law may provide 
further institutional infrastructures for this reimagining of the nation 
beyond territorial boundaries, and then dual citizenship will become an 
arena where competing interests and identity-claims come into play. In 
fact, diaspora communities are not homogeneous, but consist of indi-
viduals and groups from different backgrounds with varying needs and 
interests. It is therefore an extremely difficult task for the government 
to balance and manage their interests with those of native citizens and 
other immigrant groups, because policies favorable for the diasporas 
or immigrants may cause opposition from native citizens. Without 
tackling this issue, however, a series of policies for the diasporas will 
not bring about any successful outcomes; and that is applicable to non-
Korean immigrants as well.
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Highly skilled migrants may stay without being naturalized in order to 
maintain their ability to move easily to other countries for better oppor-
tunities, or to avoid the military service obligation for their children, for 
instance. On the other hand, though, dual citizenship has the advantage 
of securing rights and status for low- or semi-skilled migrants. However, 
other than as migrant brides, obtaining Korean citizenship is not easy for 
low-skilled migrants, since they often encounter difficulties in satisfying 
the residential and work requirements for naturalization. Moreover, the 
still narrow concept of “national belonging” in South Korea on many 
occasions prevents them from being regarded as equal members of society 
even after obtaining Korean citizenship, which may make dual citizenship 
unappealing to immigrants. It is, therefore, possible to say that the dual 
citizenship policy of South Korea has not yet realized its potential benefits 
for any of the actors involved, due to its partiality and limits.
However, this is not to devalue the dual citizenship policy. Together with 
the multicultural policies introduced in South Korea, it has at least contrib-
uted to raising the question of diversity within the category of “Korean,” as 
well as exposing the existence of various immigrant groups already living 
as members of the state, local communities, and families. As Lim points 
out, tolerance of cultural diversity and the transition to a multicultural 
society cannot be automatically achieved with mere policy introduction 
(Lim, 2009). In order for the dual citizenship policy to be beneficial for 
all stakeholders, from the state to individual migrants, there is a need 
for developing awareness of and respect for cultural and ethnic diver-
sity. Various tasks are left for the society including further advocacy and 
awareness-raising, multicultural education at schools, legal regulations on 
corporate discrimination and hate speech, removal of educational obstacles 
for minorities, broader communication and dissemination of information 
at national and local government offices through multilingual media, and 
so on. Such efforts are especially important in countries like South Korea 
and Japan, where ethno-racial nationalism is persistent. The recognition 
of dual citizenship can contribute to foster a multicultural society. But 
such a potential will not simply be realized through policy implementa-
tion from the above. It is also and even more important to question about 
exclusive relationship between an individual and a political community 
and to recognize flexible and diverse forms of affiliations in order to go 
beyond the narrowly defined national and ethnic politics of belonging.
Notes
 1. Citizenship and nationality are quite often used interchangeably. Nationality 
is the legal bond between a person and a state. It denotes formal membership 
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and gives rise to rights and duties for the individual and the state concerned. 
While this legal bond is also commonly referred to as citizenship, the latter 
is, however, a set of rights and duties that can, in some cases, be partially 
granted to an individual regardless of their nationality, and it does not 
necessarily overlap with the scope of nationality. However, to enter into a 
comprehensive discussion of the widely accepted definitions for these two 
terms—citizenship and nationality—is beyond the scope of this paper, given 
the broad debate surrounding these two terms. Although this paper uses 
“dual citizenship” rather than “dual nationality,” it is still important not to 
conflate these two since understanding these as two distinct legal statuses 
may enable us to have a better understanding of an individual’s legal status, 
political belonging, and social identity/identification.
 2. This does not mean that dual citizenship had not become an issue before 
the Convention. In the 19th century, acquisition of nationality was already a 
matter of interstate cooperation for the US and European countries to resolve 
the competing claims of military conscription (Koslowski, 2001, p. 206).
 3. While the modern meaning of the term “diaspora” is originally based on the 
Jewish experience of dispersion and a promise of future return, the term has 
come to be used in a broader sense in recent years without the catastrophic 
connotations (Cohen, 1997), referring to emigrants and their descendants 
living outside their countries of origin or ancestry while still maintaining a 
connection with those countries. However, what the term implies is more 
than just denoting emigrants and their descendants. The usage of the term 
here is to denote not just emigrants and their communities who maintain 
links with their “homeland,” but also those subjects with whom state 
authorities actively engage in order to build a network for development. In 
other words, emigrants are treated as “diaspora” when they are recognized 
by the state authorities as the subject of interpellation and are incorporated 
into a sort of “center–outer” relationship against their homeland.
 4. For details about South Korea’s immigration policies, see S. Lee (2005).
 5. The policy recognized, for instance, the real estate ownership of first-genera-
tion emigrants, and increased the limit of the amount of property that could 
be taken out of the country, which overseas Koreans had been calling for.
 6. The Overseas Koreans Act granted partial citizenship to overseas Koreans, 
including legal residency, possession of land, and freedom to work in the 
country. It was the Korean emigrants and their descendants in the US who 
raised the initial idea of the Act, asking for equal treatment of former citizens 
living abroad in property succession and acquisition of real estate. Although 
the Act excluded Korean Chinese from the definition of overseas Korean at 
first, it was judged as unconstitutional in 2001 and was amended in 2004 to 
include Korean Chinese and Koreans in the former USSR countries.
 7. The EPS enabled employers, especially small and medium businesses, to 
legally hire the migrant workers needed for their business, while securing 
basic rights for the workers under labor relations laws, and even putting 
obligations on employers to pay for “insurance,” which covered the cost 
of returning and, if necessary, unpaid wages at the time of departure. The 
system was modified in 2008 to allow non-skilled workers to change their 
visa status to a permanent type by fulfilling certain criteria, such as five years 
of employment in the country and a good skill level. It was the first com-
prehensive program for the employment of foreign workers with conditions 
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equal to those of Korean workers, and it also contributed to reducing the 
number of undocumented migrant workers (Kong et al., 2010).
 8. The law transformed the previous registration system, under which the 
household was the basis of registering an individual’s address, represented 
by the head of the household. Under the new system, an individual could 
choose their own address for registration. The new system also allowed a 
married couple to give their child the mother’s family name, which was 
previously restricted to the father’s family name, and for the child to change 
their family name in the case of divorce or remarriage of a parent.
 9. For details of the Multicultural Family Support Act, see Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family website, http://english.mogef.go.kr/eng_laws/laws_12.
html, accessed July 8, 2013.
10. See for instance work of Global Overseas Adoptees’ Link (G.O.A.’L), http://
goal.or.kr/, accessed August 10, 2013. G.O.A.’L launched its Dual citizenship 
Campaign in 2007 to raise awareness about adoptees and dual citizenship 
in South Korean society, and published a report in 2010 (Global Overseas 
Adoptees’ Link, 2010).
11. “Overseas birth” means an act of traveling to another country with the aim 
of giving birth to a child there merely to obtain foreign citizenship.
12. Hi Korea: e-government for foreigners, http://www.hiKorea.go.kr/pt/main_kr.pt, 
accessed February 15, 2012.
13. Residential visa (F-2), Permanent Resident visa (F-5), and Overseas Koreans 
(F-4). A Residential visa (F-2) is granted to spouses of Korean nationals or 
permanent residents, and it allows a stay of three years only. It is also 
granted to foreign workers and investors upon satisfying certain require-
ments. Foreign residents are able to apply for a Permanent Resident visa 
(F-5) after residing in South Korea for three years with F-2 status. Those who 
came with an employment visa may apply for F-2 status by fulfilling certain 
requirements, and those who married a Korean national can obtain F-2 status 
upon marriage, and will be able to change to F-5 status after a stay of three 
years, whereby they will have the same rights as Korean citizens. However, 
the Korean government explicitly announced that it would provide “a high-
investment foreigner and a foreigner of superior ability in specified fields” 
with a stable residency qualification, job security, and preferential treatment 
for F-5 status if they were going to obtain F-2 status and satisfy certain educa-
tional and financial criteria. F-5 status is to be offered immediately to foreign 
investors who have resided in Korea for at least three years, invested more 
than USD 500,000, and hired at least five Korean nationals. It is also granted 
to professional and skilled foreigners who are specialists in the fields of 
science, education, culture/art, physical culture, and business administration.
14. Introducing the concept of “the domestic abroad,” Varadarajan (2010) 
analyzes the recent policies of the Indian state for its diaspora population. 
According to Varadarajan, there were two simultaneous, ongoing pro-
cesses behind the Indian state embracing the concept of people of Indian 
origin abroad as “the domestic abroad,” through such policy changes as 
the recognition of dual citizenship. It was necessary for the Indian state to 
bring in more foreign investment in the aftermath of the currency crisis of 
1991. However, the succeeding neoliberal economic reforms were, in the 
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eyes of the bourgeoisie and political representatives, “imposed by external 
forces, a fact that was symptomatic to the loss of the sovereignty and the 
legitimacy of the Indian state” (Varadarajan, 2010, p. 20). In order to resolve 
this dilemma, engaging with Indian diaspora became essential for not just 
economic development but also the representation of the Indian state in 
international society.
15. While there are many studies on the cross-border activities of diaspora 
Koreans, the publications (in Korean) of the Research Center for Overseas 
Korean Business and Culture (Chonnam University, South Korea) are useful 
resources for understanding the economic and cultural activities of overseas 
Koreans.
16. South Korea Ministry of Justice, Trends in Nationality Statistics, http://www.
index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/potal/ stts/PO_STTS_IdxMain.jsp?idx_cd=1760, 
accessed February 15, 2012.
17. During the period from January 2011 to March 2013, 12,011 foreigners who 
were naturalized through marriage, became dual citizens after making an oath 
of not exercising their foreign citizenship within South Korea Ministry of 
Justice, Trends in Nationality Statistics, http://www.index.go.kr/egams/stts/jsp/
potal/ stts/PO_STTS_IdxMain.jsp?idx_cd=1760, accessed February 15, 2012.
18. “13 Korean adoptees obtain dual citizenship,” The Korea Herald, April 
19, 2011. http://www. Koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20110419000739, 
accessed August 30, 2013.
19. The rate of international marriages has increased since 2000, reaching 
about 13% in 2005. The major countries of origin for these brides are China 
(Korean Chinese), Vietnam, the Philippines, and Cambodia, and many of 
them are married to Korean men working in agriculture and fisheries.
20. For further information on the service of the Multicultural Family Support 
Center, see a Portal Supporting Multicultural Households, http://www.livein
Korea.kr/global/contents/contents_view.asp?idx=28, accessed July 8, 2013.
21. The First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, 2008–2012, http://immigration.
go.kr/HP/IMM/icc/basicplan.pdf, accessed January 21, 2012, and the 2nd 
Basic Plan for Immigration Policy, 2013–2017, http://www. immigration.
go.kr/HP/COM/bbs_03/ShowData.do, accessed September 1, 2013. See also 
Building a Multicultural Society Together, http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/TIMM/
imm_07/image/bro_eng.pdf, accessed September 1, 2013. All published by 
the Korean Immigration Service.
22. For examples of recent studies on migrant integration in South Korea, see 
Y. L. Kim (2010), B. Lee (2010), and Y. O. Kim (2012).
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Japanese society has, at various times throughout its history, been led 
in different directions by state policy makers’ catch phrases. The final 
societal destination of these slogans has changed to suit the needs of the 
times, but their reoccurrence and importance can neither be denied nor 
overlooked. Phrases and slogans such as sonnō-jōi (Revere the Emperor, 
Expel the Barbarians), fukoku kyōhei (Enrich the Country, Strengthen 
the Military), tōyō no dōtoku, seiyō no gakugei (Eastern Ethics, Western 
Science), wakon yōsai (Western Learning, Japanese Spirit), bunmei kaika 
(Civilization, Enlightenment) and dastua nyūō (Leave Asia, Join the 
West) are all examples of “battle cries” behind which society was rallied 
in order to rid itself of some seemingly corrupting influence or to 
adopt systems in order to make a radical change in direction. More 
recently, while arguably less provocative in nature, catch phrases have 
continued to be employed to focus national attention on goals deemed 
important by the nation’s state-makers today. Here, words like kindaika 
(modernization), ōbeika (Westernization), kokusaika (internationaliza-
tion), and gurōbaruka (globalization) have adorned official documents 
and the media reflecting the needs or goals of each respective period 
(Chapple, 2002).
While by no means solely limited to the education sector, as edu-
cation is often considered the “cornerstone of all social systems” 
(Ministry of Education, Science and Culture 1999, 2), it is here that 
these national slogans and phrases have been utilized most successfully 
and have influenced the greatest number of policies and people. Since 
its inception in 1873, Japan’s highly centralized modern education 
OPEN
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system has been used to disseminate official state philosophy well 
beyond the confines of the classroom, designed to change society in 
often dramatic and drastic ways. The fact that it remains compara-
tively top-down and uniform has contributed to the successful spread 
and social-consciousness permeation of slogans and their goals. It is 
through the education system that the government’s ideals are prom-
ulgated and therefore a vehicle that reflects policy directives which are 
not always as simplistic or innocuous as their succinct slogans make 
them appear.
In the same vein as terms from eras gone by, one of the keywords 
in higher education in Japan today relates to the development of 
so-called “global jinzai” (global personnel or human resources). This 
chapter, through an examination of the background and goals of 
this latest term, aims to assess whether it represents a prerequisite for 
something worthwhile in Japanese society, is merely a guise serving 
some alternative purpose, or is in fact an (unsophisticated) attempt 
to achieve something beyond its reach.  Through an examination of 
the situation, goals and actions taken in the name of fostering global 
jinzai, much can be learned of the (real?) motives behind the phrase. 
Ostensibly arising from a need to interact with larger numbers of 
non-Japanese in various situations and localities, global jinzai can be 
interpreted as Japan’s equivalent attempt at what is often referred to 
as “global competence” in other countries, in order to deal with an 
increasingly interconnected world outside and a growing multicultural 
society at home.
The chapter argues that while outwardly the motives and goals of 
creating globally competent human resources and fostering internation-
alization appears seemingly straightforward (Knight & Altbach, 2007), 
different groups have somewhat differing—at times even contradictory—
agendas. Thus, rather than functioning as a potential pathway towards 
multiculturalism, the global jinzai slogan is merely a vehicle for long 
sought after reform (particularly with regard to the English language 
and universities in general) reflecting a reality of Japanese society. In 
short, what is really being discussed are the fundamental changes in 
educational philosophy and structure required to enable development 
in a “globally competent” direction. Finally, it concludes by questioning 
whether this ongoing push really will, or can, lead to the expectations 
that many have, given the entire debate’s immaturity and deficiencies 
in terms of being capable of fostering global citizens able to adapt to a 
more multicultural society.
Global Jinzai, Education and Multiculturalism 215
11.2 What are global jinzai?
To understand what is generally referred to by the term global jinzai 
requires an appreciation of the situation facing Japanese society today. As 
in times past, which resulted to slogan-led plans, global jinzai is born out of 
a need to react to the external environment. In this case it is the twin forces 
of a desire to increase Japan’s political presence on the global stage and 
strengthen its economic position internationally in the face of growing, 
diversified, and rapidly changing competition. Like all developed nations, 
the ability to be able to sell products in today’s dramatically evolving world 
requires skills and abilities different from those of even just a few years ago. 
Consequently, education aimed at fostering globally competent human 
resources is something that most countries are today actively seeking.
This fact is evidenced through a quick Internet search, which reveals 
over 10 million hits related to the term “global jinzai” in Japan. It is 
used and discussed in the media as if its goals are clear and its focus 
defined. Yet, in spite of its seemingly constant recent media use, “global 
jinzai” continues to remain somewhat of a vague term, something akin 
to the term “leadership” in English, “a term which everybody knows, 
but for which there are countless definitions” (Pollock, 2012, p. 1). 
However, unlike slogans of the past, global jinzai encompasses a number 
of measurable qualities making it unique, a point addressed later.
One seemingly all-encompassing definition of global jinzai is the fol-
lowing, from the Joint Business-Academia Committee for the Promotion 
of Global Jinzai Development, which claims that global jinzai are:
people who, in today’s competitive and cooperative world, can—while 
maintaining their sense of Japanese identity—possess a broad worldview 
based on both general and specialized education, have communica-
tive and cooperative abilities to build relationships which go beyond 
values, cultures and different languages, and that have the ability to 
create new values and the desire to contribute to society now and in 
future generations. (Author’s translation and emphasis added)1
Another even more quantifiable definition can be found in the 
mid-term report (released in June 2011) of the Japanese Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)’s Council on the Promotion of 
Global Human Resources, which claims that global jinzai comprise three 
categories (METI, 2011). The first is language proficiency and communi-
cation skills, and is the most detailed. The second category encompasses 
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features such as an independent (shutaisei) active (sekkyokusei) attitude, 
a spirit of challenge, a harmonious (chōwasei) and flexible ( jyūnansei) 
spirit, and a sense of commitment (sekininkan) and responsibility 
(shimeikan). The third category is the requirement for cross-cultural 
understanding and, once again, cultural identity as a Japanese.
While at first glance these both appear to be well-prepared definitions, 
they do pose a number of concerns. Explained this way, global jinzai is 
an outward-looking concept (similar to Japan’s version of the concept of 
internationalization, kokusaika) and fails (perhaps purposely) to examine 
the requisite systemic changes required domestically. In other words, 
by focusing attention on the capabilities required for work abroad, the 
debate about the changes required to accept greater diversity within 
Japan are in effect quietly overshadowed and even nullified. Hence, 
acceptance of, and policies towards, multiculturalism are not seen as 
things that need to be considered. Global jinzai requires an international 
curriculum and it is here too that the link with internationalization is 
again apparent. Yet the difference seems to be an overwhelming feeling 
that by sending students abroad such talent can be fostered; it is not 
something that can be easily nurtured domestically. This most likely 
stems from the fact that multiculturalism is seen as something that 
exists in other settings (rarely in Japan) and therefore the required spe-
cial skills can only be fostered overseas.
A second point of concern is that language skills can at least be 
“measured” using standardized achievement tests, while the other two 
categories are subjective and consequently extremely difficult to both 
foster and gauge. This probably explains why they are usually over-
looked for the more easily identifiable “language ability” and there 
is such scant information regarding how exactly to foster them. This 
point will also be returned to later.
A third point of concern is the final category of cross-cultural under-
standing and cultural identity “as a Japanese” which reads almost as 
an oxymoron. While naturally understanding one’s cultural identity 
is an important prerequisite and base for cross-cultural understand-
ing, it is dubious to assume that this is something that can be taught 
at higher educational levels. Surely these are things that should take 
place at the lower levels of the educational ladder (if at all), and the 
need to reiterate it speaks volumes of the desire to protect the status 
quo. Similarly, the assumption that one’s identity as a Japanese is a 
fixed concept that is required to be stressed first almost contradicts the 
very philosophy behind the entire global jinzai process itself. Yet, at a 
symposium organized by the Sankei Shimbun newspaper in 2012, three 
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of the four expert panelists mentioned the need to understand and 
promote Japanese identity (Sankei Shimbun, 2012). Hence the term is 
at risk of being hijacked by those with agendas which may be opposed 
to the concept of internationalism. In short, global jinzai may merely 
represent another way of strengthening Japanese identity in reaction 
to a perceived outward threat. If not, one would expect there to be 
clear action and results suggesting the contrary. Evaluated this way, the 
slogan fits the mold of similar slogans of the past and falls into a kind 
of “sanctioned, but confined reform” category (i.e. educational reform 
sanctioned by the government but which falls within clearly stipulated 
confines—in this case firmly stressing and retaining “Japaneseness” as a 
prerequisite). However, ensuring that the promotion of a global mindset 
is predicated on the maintenance and reassurance of a Japanese iden-
tity is a very un-nuanced reality of what an individual is, and not only 
points to an ongoing heavy dose of social control, but is also a reflection 
of insecurity in allowing a total opening to the world. In other words, 
the development of global citizens (detailed later), which I argue is a 
more useful, important, and necessary goal of internationalization, is 
virtually untenable in Japan under present restrictions.
In other fields in Japan we can find different definitions: for exam-
ple, those from both the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) and the 
Council on Competitiveness Nippon (COCN), which do not include 
references to Japanese identity. However, this is likely because they 
are solely concerned with skills like negotiating with customers and 
business management and are merely reflections of what most other 
countries refer to by the concept of global jinzai and are beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Thus, the concept being pushed by MEXT appears 
to mask a few ulterior motives.
It is also interesting to note that, as mentioned, the development of 
skills deemed necessary for productivity in this global age are by no 
means the sole domain of Japanese educators. Rather, it is truly itself a 
global trend. However, when compared with definitions of what skills a 
globally competent person should have, the inadequacy of the predom-
inant definitions in Japan is striking. In addition to mastering a foreign 
language and a different culture and geography, fluency in things like 
e-commerce, the Internet, knowledge of political and economic sys-
tems of other countries, and familiarity with global issues are also often 
stated as important (Ouyang & McAlpine, 2013). What is more, rarely 
do non-Japanese definitions of global competency skill requirements 
make much reference to an individual’s sense of cultural and national 
identity as a prerequisite for functioning in a multicultural setting.
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11.3 Background—why now?
Why has there been such an interest in the concept of global jinzai of 
late? After all, other than the slogan itself, nothing in the content of the 
concept is particularly ground-shaking or revolutionary. For decades now, 
Japan’s leaders have been singing a similar tune and preaching the need 
for greater collective international skills. In 1997, for example, a special 
committee on education formed within the Japan Business Federation 
submitted a report entitled “Fostering Human Resources Capable of 
Contributing to the Global Society.”2 Claiming that dealing with a glo-
balizing society is now a “matter of urgency,” the report outlined four 
requirements of such human resources, namely: independence, respect 
for and understanding of difference, foreign language abilities to commu-
nicate with non-Japanese people, and specialist skills. Almost two decades 
later virtually the same skills are still considered a matter of urgency. So 
what exactly is different this time?
Until recently, an impressive image of Japanese businessmen traveling 
the world as a part of their jobs has permeated the media. Today, how-
ever, with a decline in the number of young Japanese studying abroad, 
and the world becoming more interdependent than ever before, there 
is seemingly a lack of Japanese willing (and perhaps able) to venture 
abroad in order to forward the nation’s economic hopes. It is these twin 
factors—an increasingly “inward-looking mentality” of young Japanese 
coupled with the greater and diversifying international desires and 
needs of Japanese manufacturers and leaders—that has rekindled this 
entire debate recently.
11.3.1 An inward-looking trend
Since peaking at 82,945 students studying overseas in 2004, with the 
exception of the number of Japanese leaving to study in China and 
India (which has shown an increase), the overall number has been on 
the decline. The latest available statistics show that the number dropped 
3.1% from the previous year (the sixth continuous year-on-year drop) 
to 58,060 in 2010 (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2013b). There are a number of 
reasons that have contributed to this decline. Firstly, the financial costs of 
study abroad (particularly in OECD nations) have risen dramatically over 
the past two decades. A second factor is language ability. While many stu-
dents study abroad to improve their foreign language skills, usually that 
is all they are able to accomplish in the time away. In other words, taking 
regular classes at an overseas university, joining an internship program, 
or other such activities are usually out of the question. Thirdly, and 
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related to the second point, due to increasing language requirements, 
the required educational level and corresponding academic motiva-
tion of Japanese students are also contributing factors. Fourthly, many 
Japanese universities are not well prepared to deal with students who do 
study abroad in terms of providing academic recognition of their study. 
Finally, a growing number of students ironically actually see study 
abroad as a disadvantage in finding employment in Japan, given the 
narrow and limited recruitment timeframe and differences in academic 
calendars. In short, the attitude towards study abroad—and indeed 
career planning itself today in Japan—is in flux, resulting in a growing 
gap between societal (particularly parental) expectations and those of 
the business world.
In a survey conducted in March 2013 by the Institute for a Global 
Society, 50% of high school students and 55% of university students 
surveyed responded that they felt it was too late for them to become 
globally active citizens, even if they started receiving education now 
to learn how to deal with a globalizing world (The Japan Times, 2013).
11.3.2 Future demand for global jinzai
As new technologies make rapid economic growth and development 
possible in more remote places and on an unprecedented scale, more 
than ever before developed nations need to keep pace in order to avoid 
being left behind. Based on present trends, Japan may be unable to take 
advantage of emerging growth in the newly expanding BRICs (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China) or VISTA (Vietnam, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, 
Argentina) regions without greater numbers of globally competent 
employees. Furthermore, Japan can no longer rely on a model in which 
only a handful of top, elite executives are responsible for global business 
success. Given the nature of the evolving global economy it is no longer 
only the large multinationals that require more globally competent 
staff, even “domestically-focused companies and small businesses are 
feeling the need to become more global” (Pollock, 2012, p. 1). And, for 
Japan to be able to play a greater, more proactive role—commensurate 
with its economic size—on the world stage, helping towards the solution 
of global problems, a much larger cross-section of society needs to be 
aware, interested, and involved in global issues on a regular basis.
Yet, at present, according to a survey of Japanese companies pub-
lished in 2012, sponsored by Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology, only around 1.68 million Japanese can 
be classified as globally competent jinzai (MEXT, 2012). It is estimated 
that demand for global jinzai by Japanese companies will grow by a 
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massive 240% over the next five years (from 2012 and 2017), equating 
to around 8.7% of the entire employed population (ibid.). The good 
news is that, according to the aforementioned survey, 30% of university 
students and 40% of high school students said they want to become an 
active participant in the global society, but they just do not know how 
to do it (The Japan Times, 2013). Hence the urgency this time is greater 
than at any time in previous decades.
11.4 Extenuating reasons: An imposter in the policy?
However, there are other reasons behind the push for global jinzai than the 
above-mentioned predominantly business-oriented ones. A brief examina-
tion of these, and their respective agendas, reveals a familiar feature of 
educational policy in Japan that could be termed “Trojan horse change.”
In addition to the concerns voiced in the business world, the global 
jinzai debate reflects a common sense of urgency within Japan that 
higher education is no longer serving the needs and goals of society, 
and consequently that Japan is being rapidly left behind. With Japan’s 
eighteen-year-old-population rapidly declining, the need to seek alter-
native sources to contribute to the overall student pool has also become 
an important task. Foreign students have been targeted as one such 
possible source. To this end, in 2008 the government set a target of 
300,000 international exchange students in Japan (a figure equivalent 
to approximately 10% of the entire Japanese student population) by 
2020, a proposal more daring than its predecessor of 100,000 by 2000 
(which was not in fact achieved until 2003 and then only as the result 
of an easing of regulations related to application and visa procedures).
Still, more pessimistic voices point out that 45.8% of private four-
year universities were unable to fulfill their student quotas and had to 
rely on students from Asia to make up the shortfall or risk bankruptcy 
(Sawa, 2013). What is more, Japanese companies today are not only 
recruiting or relying solely on Japanese students. “There was a shared 
understanding between the Japanese business sector and the govern-
ment that Japan needed to recruit talented students to succeed in 
international competition” (NIER, 2011, p. 3). Further, today, those 
students are being actively sort globally. Thus, global jinzai represents 
a “Trojan horse” attempt at university reform in order to increase inter-
national student numbers, internationalize the curriculum and faculty 
as well as to hopefully boost international rankings in the long-term 
(MEXT has set a goal of having ten Japanese universities ranked in the 
top 100 worldwide by 2020).
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Yet Japan is competing in an increasingly competitive and expanding 
market, not only for global talent but also for international students. 
According to the OECD (2012), over the past three decades the number of 
international students has increased fivefold from 0.8 million worldwide 
in 1975 to 4.1 million in 2010. Not only is Japan’s popularity as a destina-
tion a questionable factor (not being an English-speaking country, where 
by far the majority of students are heading), the figures also reveal that 
other countries’ students are more active than Japanese students, mean-
ing that they are becoming globally competent employees in greater 
numbers and contributing to their respective countries’ growth and 
development. In short, Japan is facing intense competition on various 
fronts (NIER, 2011). Reform is recognized as a matter of urgency, but is 
not something that can easily be achieved.
11.5 Nothing more than English?
Returning to the fact that, of the three identified core components of 
global jinzai, only language skills are measurable, it is only here that 
anything resembling policies or plans actually exists at present. This 
likely stems from the reality that nationwide English language abilities 
are still not where the Japanese government would like them to be. 
In international TOEFL rankings in Asia, Japan is 27th out of 30 nations, 
and scores for other tests are not much different. Consequently, the 
global jinzai discussion comes at a crucial time for Japan, with other 
debates pertaining to English (i.e. foreign language) education in ele-
mentary schools, teacher licensing, and so forth also coming to the 
fore. In other words, global jinzai provides a useful smokescreen behind 
which discussions and even changes, particularly related to English lan-
guage, can be ushered in under a sense of imperative.
In a recent concrete proposal, MEXT has announced that it plans to 
develop 100 “Super Global High Schools” from spring 2014, which will 
represent a new type of high school tasked with fostering global lead-
ers who can deal with the world (Oka, 2013). These schools will place 
greater emphasis on English and other foreign languages while at the 
same time stressing problem analysis and problem-solving abilities as 
well as educating about culture and history. Perhaps the most strik-
ing feature of the proposal is that they will be classed as “exceptional 
schools” in terms of the national curriculum guidelines, and thus when 
necessary will not be bound by traditionally rigid rules.
Yet what such a policy proposal reveals in reality is, firstly, MEXT’s 
lack of imagination (Super English Language High Schools [SELHis] 
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were created in 2003 in an effort to improve the English language ability 
of Japanese high schools students, but have not led to striking results), 
and, secondly, once again it is really only English that is important. The 
fact that these schools will be an exception and not the norm points to 
the fact that it is after all only the elite who are being fostered. Finally, 
indicating that they may even be exempt from national curriculum 
restrictions, meaning they are stepping outside the norm in terms of 
what they offer, reflects the extent of the restriction that the present 
curriculum poses. Surely, if the goal was to foster Japanese with global 
competencies, then such options should be the norm offered to all the 
population. Furthermore, there is no public discussion about the role of 
languages other than English in the national curriculum, even though 
Japanese society today is far from the monolingual one it portrays itself 
as (Lie, 2004; Maher & Yashiro, 1995).
11.5.1 Aiming for the top: Global jinzai and university reform?
If we examine the action plans towards creating such global talent, as 
laid out by MEXT in its recently published proposals for reforming uni-
versities in order to make them “an engine for social change” (MEXT, 
2012, p. 11), there are in fact scant references to the issue of global jinzai. 
Five goals and two plans are listed, the majority of which are aimed at 
institutional change, and this, again, probably ultimately reflects MEXT’s 
real motive behind the debate on global jinzai.3 Radically trying to 
change Japan’s universities by first raising public and business awareness 
of the gap between present and desired higher education is an effective 
tool, followed by incentives to change.
The results to date, however, have been far from stunning. The much 
heralded “Global 30”4 presently number only 13, and other than these, 
most universities are either struggling or see little incentive to radically 
internationalize their campuses other than the usual cosmetic changes. 
In reality, even a full implementation of the proposals that MEXT is 
suggesting is hardly likely to lead to any significant advance in overall 
standings of Japan’s higher educational institutions on any global index. 
Further, it is unrealistic to expect universities to shoulder the burden of 
creating such future labor alone. It requires a concerted change in the 
compulsory education curriculum in general, greater emphasis on career 
education and more system-wide flexibility.
In order for global jinzai to become a driving force for educational reform 
at the top, changes are required, particularly in terms of educational qua-
lity, content, and the system itself. Firstly, faculty must themselves become 
more “globally competent,” experienced, or at the very least, inclined. 
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This is not necessarily the case. University teachers in Japan are often 
criticized for being insular and inward-looking. Some are even opposed 
to having students study abroad (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2012). Unlike 
in many other developed countries, where competition and deregulation 
have led to enormous—at times incredulous—changes, today in Japan 
the notion of promotion based on seniority and lifetime employment, 
hinder greater openness and innovation (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2013a). 
Further, a lack of commitment by university leaders means that this trend 
will likely continue for the immediate future. Actively advertising inter-
nationally is one option, yet it requires a system in place to accommodate 
such talent as well as the ability for them to offer classes in, once again, 
English. Yet the creation of such a system is predicated on acquiring con-
sensus and recognition among the Japanese populace that their country 
is now a multicultural society. This in turn requires an education system 
that actively acknowledges such a concept and educates accordingly. As a 
recent editorial in The Japan Times (2013) stated:
Unfortunately, even when the curriculum is globalized and when 
broadening experiences like study abroad are undertaken, the teach-
ing methods at most universities, as well as secondary schools, 
remain mired in one-way, teacher-centered approaches that do 
not help students acquire confidence, communication skills or a 
broader understanding that they need for engaging in international 
situations.
In an effort to bring greater clarity to the needs of global jinzai, a num-
ber of reports have already been released. A mid-term report released 
by the LDP’s Financial Reform Group recommends doubling the pre-
sent number of native English speaking teachers in Japan to 10,000 
within three years, and to be able to send one to every elementary, 
junior, and senior high school in the country within ten years (Nihon 
Keizai Shimbun, 2013c). Similarly, as mentioned above, MEXT recom-
mends increasing the number of foreign faculty in Japan’s universities 
(although no concrete plans or details have been made yet) in plans 
which resemble the oyatoi gaikokujin (hired foreigners) project of the 
Meiji era, and consequently the hope of it leading to lasting changes is 
remote. Once again, the focus is on English and the concern is about 
reforming universities and on general language skills in particular.
In terms of systematic changes, a number of issues are pertinent. The 
development of global jinzai requires an international curriculum, and 
it is here too that the link with internationalization is again apparent. 
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Yet the difference seems to be an overwhelming feeling that by sending 
students abroad can be fostered such talent; it is not something that 
can be easily nurtured domestically. This most likely stems from the fact 
that multiculturalism is seen as something that exists in other settings 
but rarely in Japan, and special skills are required for people to be able 
to adequately deal with it. Such skills can only be fostered overseas. 
A commitment to making classes of an international standard and 
offering flexibility in academic calendars (the likes of the touted “Gap 
Year Project,” Ashizawa, 2012) are two possible options. Here “inter-
national standard” does not mean to imply that present levels are 
necessarily low, rather that the systems supporting the curricula are not 
international. For example, the numbering of classes (to facilitate cross 
crediting) is undertaken by only around 7% of the nation’s universities 
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2012). Because global jinzai requires intercultural 
communication abilities and a greater understanding and acceptance 
of diversity (a fundamental of multiculturalism), there is also an urgent 
need to internationalize campuses in Japan to provide for such learning 
opportunities for those students unable (or unwilling) to study abroad, or 
for those who return to further hone their skills. More use of dual degrees, 
offering greater diversity in international programs (volunteer abroad, 
international internships, and so on) could be faculty- or university-wide 
possibilities. Meanwhile, at the class level, providing greater evidence of 
student learning which is internationally compatible (learning outcome 
assessment, portfolios, etc.) is another option.
Without doubt, the fostering of global jinzai has become a foundation 
stone of numerous policy initiatives and even the driving force behind 
the creation of some new faculties. Yet global jinzai refers to multi- and 
interdisciplinary skills usually acquired from disparate departments. 
Rather than new faculties, it would be more appropriate to give greater 
consideration to the offering of courses or qualifications that span 
disciplines and/or departments. Further, to lead to the fostering of 
global citizens, a much more transparent, focused, and open curriculum 
is required than exists at present. This leads on to a final question: is 
the ongoing push for global jinzai—however its goals are defined—an 
outdated and inadequate policy nowadays anyway?
11.6 Conclusion
The global jinzai slogan appears to be one aimed at pressing society to 
become more outward-looking and, in particular, English language-
focused. Put simply, state goals like economic development and domestic 
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growth require Japan to interact on a greater scale internationally. 
People are required to change, which inherently requires a reexamina-
tion of the role of the individual in society. Global jinzai must be players 
for “Corporate Japan” on a global stage, yet be able to think and act as 
individuals in one-on-one exchanges. Thus, global jinzai should ulti-
mately lead to changing business structures in Japan that will in turn 
affect the education system and consequently all aspects of society. In 
short, in order to create global jinzai, the fundamentals of education, 
particularly its ultimate goals and the aims of state-making, will need 
to be reevaluated. The long-standing traditional group model is unlikely 
to support, or lead to, the creation of such human capital, because the 
world today is more complex than textbooks lead us to believe.
As a policy driver, global jinzai represents a massive push for Japan. 
Perhaps it may eventually even become a kind of “black ships” event for 
education in Japan, reminiscent of the fleet accompanying Commodore 
Perry that heralded in the modern age for Japan and its increasing 
interaction with other nations. That possibility remains, but, as I have 
attempted to outline, at present it is difficult to see it emerging. Whether 
global jinzai actually becomes a touchstone for change or merely joins 
the scrapheap of used slogans remains to be seen. And it may even be a 
moot point in the long term.
The ideal encapsulated in the term “global jinzai,” despite the cos-
mopolitan and universal image it portrays, is fast becoming more and 
more irrelevant. Ouyang and McAlpine point out that the ultimate 
goal of educational internationalization is global citizenship—“the 
most important political and philosophical concept since the idea of 
the free, equal individual with rights” (Ouyang & McAlpine, 2013, 
p. 10)—and that global competency alone is not necessarily likely to 
achieve this. Thus, in spite of the best efforts by Japan’s educational 
policy leaders and experts, the entire debate relating to global jinzai 
is highly unlikely to lead to any fundamental change. In this sense 
as well, it is therefore an imposter that misleads by association with 
trendy phrases and ideas.
In contrast to global competency defined as a set of skills and 
knowledge useful in a globalised economy and labour market, global 
citizenship refers to individuals empowered by a broader knowledge 
of the wider world that contributes to their intellectual abilities of 
problem-solving and critical thinking, and most importantly a strong 
sense of social responsibility from an unbiased global perspective. (Ouyang & 
McAlpine, 2013, p. 10. Italics added)
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Thus, as Ş. İlgu Özler (2013, p. 13) claims, “we need a new cosmopolitan 
vision, with a common human identity and a sense of global citizenship 
displacing our understanding of relations between citizens of ‘foreign’ 
countries.” To achieve such a condition requires states to embrace the 
situation in which they are willing to relinquish their hold on national-
istic educational ideals so as to allow their citizens to see the bigger and, 
I would argue, more important, picture. If Japanese society is to embrace 
multiculturalism, the trend towards global jinzai offers potential and 
possibilities towards creating a required social and mental framework. 
However, multiculturalism or global citizenship are not the ultimate 
goal of many who promote the global jinzai debate. Once the ultimate 
goal of global jinzai is explained thus, it becomes easier to understand 
why, in spite of discussions, symposiums, policies, plans, and ongoing 
debates, in this undeveloped immature state it will likely never realize 
its full potential under present circumstances in Japan.
Notes
1. Author’s translation. For the full report, see: http://www.jsps.go.jp/
j-tenkairyoku/data/meibo_siryou/h23/ sankou06.pdf.
2. Author’s translation. For the report see: Nikkeiren Kyōiku Tokubetsu Iinkai 
1997.
3. The five goals are: improving foreign language ability through the use of 
entrance exams and classes, increasing overseas study and exchange oppor-
tunities, strengthening teachers’ global educational ability, offering flexibility 
in entrance and graduation times, and increasing the number of foreign 
teachers.
4. The Global 30 (G30) project aims to contribute to the globalization of 
Japanese higher education by selecting 30 universities to act as centres of 
globalization by predominantly offering courses in English for international 
students.
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Daigaku kaikaku jikkō puran. [The plan to change universities]. Retrieved 
from http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/24/06/__icsFiles/afieldfile/
2012/06/25/1312798_01.pdf.
Ministry of Education, Science and Culture (1999). Japanese government policies in 
education, science, sports and culture 1999: Educational reform in progress. Tokyo: 
Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture Japan.
NIER [National Institute for Educational Policy Research] (2011). International 
student policy in Japan. In Education in Japan. Retrieved from http://www.nier.
go.jp/ English/EducationInJapan/Education_in_Japan/Education_in_Japan_
files/201203IntlSt.pdf
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2012, December 21). Jinzai kyōsō kokkyō naku uchimuki 
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Introduction
The chapters in this edited collection comprise a significant representation 
of research that was carried out at the Afrasian Research Centre of Ryukoku 
University in the past three years. While most of the authors are based in Japan 
and the majority of the material focuses on Japanese transnational and inter-
nationalization processes and movements, the connection of people, language, 
and politics in and to the wider region entailed that we look beyond the borders 
of Japan to the Asia-Pacific in framing many of the discussions both in individual 
chapters and in the collection as a whole. Some of these movements operate 
at a basic level such as the emigration of Japanese to the United States (Honda, 
Chapter 3), the immigration of foreigners to Japan and other countries (Carlos, 
Chapter 9), or the integration of foreign (often Asian) children into diversifying 
school systems (Gunderson, Chapter 4) or foreign domestic (often Asian) workers 
into Europe and elsewhere (Karatani, Chapter 8). In other cases, the processes are 
less obviously movements within national systems, as with language policies in 
Japanese education (Nagamine, Chapter 6 and Takakuwa, Chapter 7) or across 
international systems as with the language of International Relations (Shimizu, 
Chapter 5). In all cases, however, the phenomena under study cannot simply 
be reduced to one-way processes or even two-way phenomena of transfer and 
reception or resistance. The multiple levels of multicultural circulation require 
increasingly sophisticated theoretical models of understanding human activity 
that transcend national borders in the 21st century.
Partly for these reasons, we proposed the use of an interactive multiculturality 
in our introduction as a move beyond a more static multiculturalism which has 
come under increased scrutiny and critique in recent years. We have not made 
a greater effort to define this term partly from the perspective that no single 
term is going to solve the problems that have been identified with the current 
limitations of multiculturalism in theory and practice. New volumes on multi-
culturalism have been published with increasing urgency, it would seem, just as 
the term has come under greater fire in the social imaginary in many parts of 
the world and from politicians eager to make their national credentials secure. 
We acknowledge that others have used multiculturality and other such terms 
and will continue to use new terminology in an attempt to correct perceived 
shortcomings of a multiculturalism that is too dependent on culturalism. In 
the afterword we would like to reiterate two themes that have threaded these 
chapters even where they were not explicitly addressed throughout. First, what 
can the emphasis on the Asia-Pacific add to our understanding of a global multi-
culturalism and second whether it is time for multiculturalism to be replaced by 
other types of theoretical understandings.
Afterword
William S. Bradley and Kosuke Shimizu
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Emphasis on the Asia-Pacific
Related to our discussion of the problem of methodological nationalism in the 
introduction is the question of what kind of regional understanding is supposed 
by the terminology Asia-Pacific. While, as noted above, many of the chapters have 
contributed to discussions of border crossing, questions can be raised, notably in 
the Japanese context, as to the degree that there is a firmly shared understanding 
of Japan’s historical and political contributions to a region as amorphous as the 
Asia-Pacific. Indeed as several of the chapters have made clear, a broader under-
standing of multiculturalism in Japan as similar to other East Asian countries 
(Bradley, Chapter 2) or an understanding of what is entailed by further interna-
tionalization of Japanese young people as global resources (Chapple, Chapter 11) 
is not broadly conceived and shared across Japanese society. These connections of 
Japan and the Asia-Pacific through multiculturalism will likely continue to grow 
in the future, however, in ways that can be tracked at levels that are not civiliza-
tional in scale but consist instead of the less highlighted movements of people, 
developments in language policies, and other types of political and economic 
exchanges some of which have been detailed in this volume.
In a recent contribution to the multiculturalism literature, Crowder (2013) 
reviewed arguments concerning global cultures other than Western Europe and 
North America. He contends that this can be argued to be the genesis of liberal mul-
ticulturalism based on immigration in the post-World War II period. Noting Islam 
and Confucianism as two of the largest regional cultural groupings, which might 
challenge a universalism of human rights (as a key component of most versions of 
multiculturalism), he further examines what he terms the “Asian values debate.” 
Citing multiple authors, Crowder (2013, pp. 183–189) notes some tendencies to see 
Confucian influences in East Asian contexts leading to favoring strong state autho-
rities, family (as opposed to individual) values, and deference to socioeconomic 
rights over civil and political human rights. Without providing a point-by-point 
critique of such arguments (in fairness to Crowder, he is also citing others as much 
as positing such differences himself ), we find such generalized understandings of 
East Asia lacking viable specificity. Let us give one example from our collective 
chapters. There are pressures and demands driving the changes in South Korean 
nationality laws to allow for dual citizenship (Park, Chapter 10), which exist in 
Japan equally, but have played out differently according to factors that could not be 
reduced to civilization analysis such as Confucian understandings in our opinion. 
It is for this reason that the diversity that we have assembled in these chapters is 
not meant to provide distinctive Asian examples of some form of multiculturalism 
that counters the Western European and North American multiculturalism ( just as 
there is variety in such groupings as well). It is rather to illustrate the overlaps and 
divergences in problems of multicultural society in global contexts. We expect that 
the chapters here will contribute to understandings of migration, language, and 
politics in the wider global context not only East Asia or the Asia-Pacific.
Multiculturalism and new terminology
Finally we return to the problem of multiculturalism and multiculturality. We 
respect arguments that would like to move beyond the fixed ways of thinking 
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about multiculturalism, multiculturalism beyond culture, if it can be imagined in 
our contemporary world. We called attention to this problem in the introduction 
and we conclude here with a similar set of ideas. The essential problem with mul-
ticulturalism as is has been theorized in past decades (and parodied by its critics) 
is not emphasis on diversity and tolerance but emphasis on problems based on 
essentialist readings of culture and identity. This argument is made repeatedly 
by many of the recent treatments of multiculturalism. Whether multiculturality 
as a term will come to stand for a process approach of understanding diversity 
across and within societies and even within individuals themselves is debatable. 
However, we remain convinced that there are the twin needs of humans for 
belonging to localized ethnic groupings but at the same time to become increas-
ingly open to a globalized identity of humans facing similar challenges of ame-
liorating environmental risk, creating new modes of conflict reconciliation, and 
challenging the divisions and injustice of inequality in societies and a harshly 
unequal world. This evidently means that new models and understandings of 
a reinvigorated set of multicultural policies, negotiations, and processes will be 
a central theme of global politics for years to come. We hope with humility to 
have contributed to such understanding with this volume while aware that more 
nuanced theorizing and research will be required to meet the challenges noted 
above.
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